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Abstract
Centralized identity management solutions were created to deal with user and data security
where the user and the systems they accessed were within the same network or domain
of control. Nevertheless, the decentralization brought about by the integration of the
Internet into every aspect of life is leading to an increasing separation of the user from
the systems requiring access. Identity management has been continually evolving in order
to adapt to the changing systems, and thus posing new challenges. In this sense, the
challenges associated with cross-domain issues have given rise to a new approach of identity
management, called Federated Identity Management (FIM), because it removes the largest
barriers for achieving a common understanding.
Due to the importance of the federation paradigm for online identity management, a lot of
work has been done so far resulting in a set of standards and specications. According to
them, under the FIM paradigm a person's electronic identity stored across multiple distinct
domains can be linked, shared and reused. This concept allows interesting use-cases, such
as Single Sign-on (SSO), which allows users to authenticate at a single service and gain
access to multiple ones without providing additional information. But also provides means
for cross-domain user account provisioning, cross-domain entitlement management and
cross-domain user attribute exchange.
However, for the federated exchange of user information to be possible in a secure way,
a trust relationship must exist between the separated domains. The establishment of
these trust relationships, if addressed in the federation specications, is based on complex
agreements and congurations that are usually manually set up by an administrator.
For this reason, the \internet-like" scale of identity federations is still limited. Hence,
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there is a need to move from static congurations towards more exible and dynamic
federations in which members can join and leave more frequently and trust decisions can
be dynamically computed on the y. In this thesis, we address this issue. The main goal is
contributing to improve the trust layer in FIM in order to achieve dynamic federation. And
for this purpose, we propose an architecture that extends current federation systems. The
architecture is based on two main pillars, namely a reputation-based trust computation
module, and a risk assessment module.
In regard to trust, we formalize a model to compute and represent trust as a number,
which provides a basis for easy implementation and automation. It captures the features
of current FIM systems and introduces new dimensions to add exibility and richness.
The model includes the denition of a trustworthiness metric, detailing the evidences
used, and how they are combined to obtain a quantitative value. Basically, authentication
information is merged with behavior data, i.e., reputation or history of interactions. In
order to include reputation data in the model we contributed with the denition of a generic
protocol to exchange reputation information between FIM entities, and its integration with
the most widely deployed specication, i.e., Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML).
In regard to risk, we dene an assessment model that allow entities to calculate how
much risk is involved in transacting with another entity according to its conguration,
policies, operation rules, cryptographic algorithms, etc. The methodology employed to
dene the risk model consists of three steps. Firstly, we design a taxonomy to capture the
dierent aspects of a relationship in FIM that may contribute to risk. Secondly, based
on the taxonomy and aiming at developing a computational model, we propose a set of
metrics as a basis to quantify risk. Finally, we describe how to combine the metrics into a
meaningful risk gure by using the Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) methodology,
which has been applied and adapted to dene the risk aggregation model.
Furthermore, an also under the MAUT theory, we propose a fuzzy aggregation system to
combine trust and risk into a nal value that is the basis for dynamic federation decisions.
Formal validation of the above mentioned ideas has been carried out. The risk assess-
ment and decision making are analytically validated ensuring their correct behavior, the
reputation protocol included in the trust management proposal is tested through simula-
tions, and the architecture is veried through the development of prototypes. In addition,
dissemination activities were performed in projects, journals and conferences.
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Summarizing, the contributions here constitute a step towards the realization of dynamic
federation, based on the exibilization of the underlying trust frameworks.
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Resumen
Historicamente el dise~no de soluciones de gestion de identidad centralizada ha estado
orientado a proteger la seguridad de usuarios y datos en entornos en los que tanto los
usuarios como los sistemas se encuentran en la misma red o dominio. Sin embargo, la
creciente descentralizacion acaecida al integrar Internet en muchos aspectos de la vida
cotidiana esta dando lugar a una separacion cada vez mayor entre los usuarios y los
sistemas a los que acceden. La gestion de identidad ha ido evolucionando para adaptarse
a estos cambios, dando lugar a nuevos e interesantes retos.
En este sentido, los retos relacionados con el acceso a diferentes dominios han dado lugar a
una nueva aproximacion en la gestion de identidad conocida como Federecion de Identidad
o Identidad Federada. Debido a la importancia de este paradigma, se ha llevado a cabo
un gran trabajo que se reeja en la denicion de varios estandares y especicaciones.
De acuerdo con estos documentos, bajo el paradigma de identidad federada, la identidad
digital de un usuario almacenada en multiples dominios diferentes puede ser enlazada,
compartida y reutilizada. Este concepto hace posibles interesantes casos de uso, tales como
el Single Sign-on (SSO), que permite a un usuario autenticarse una sola vez en un servicio
y obtener acceso a multiples servicios sin necesidad de proporcionar informacion adicional
o repetir el proceso. Pero ademas, tambien se proporcionan mecanismos para muchos otros
casos, como el intercambio de atributos entre dominios o la creacion automatica de cuentas
a partir de la informacion proporcionada por otro dominio.
No obstante, para que el intercambio de informacion personal del usuario entre dominios
federados se pueda realizar de forma segura, debe existir una relacion de conanza entre
dichos dominios. Pero el establecimiento de estas relaciones de conanza, a veces ni siquiera
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recogido en las especicaciones, suele estar basado en acuerdos rgidos que requieren gran
trabajo de conguracion por parte de un administrador. Por esta razon, la escalabilidad
de las federaciones de identidad es todava limitada.
Como puede deducirse, existe una necesidad clara de cambiar los acuerdos estaticos que
rigen las federaciones actuales por un modelo mas exible que permita federaciones di-
namicas en las que los miembros puedan unirse y marcharse mas frecuentemente y las
decisiones de conanza sean tomadas dinamicamente on-the-y. Este es el problema que
tratamos en la presente tesis. Nuestro objetivo principal es contribuir a mejorar la capa
de conanza en federacion de identidad de manera que el establecimiento de relaciones
pueda llevarse a cabo de forma dinamica. Para alcanzar este objetivo, proponemos una
arquitectura basada en dos pilares fundamentales: un modulo de computo de conanza
basado en reputacion, y un modulo de evaluacion de riesgo.
Por un lado, formalizamos un modelo para calcular y representar la conanza como un
numero, lo cual supone una base para una facil implementacion y automatizacion. El
modelo captura las caractersticas de los sistemas de gestion de identidad federada actuales
e introduce nuevas dimensiones para dotarlos de una mayor exibilidad y riqueza expresiva.
Se lleva a cabo pues una denicion de la metrica de conanza, detallando las evidencias
utilizadas y el metodo para combinarlas en un valor cuantitativo. Basicamente, se fusiona
la informacion de autenticacion disponible con datos de comportamiento, es decir, con
reputacion o historia de transacciones.
Para la inclusion de datos de reputacion en el modelo, contribuimos con la denicion de un
protocolo generico que permite el intercambio de esta informacion entre las entidades de
un sistema de gestion de identidad federada, que ha sido ademas integrado en el estandar
mas conocido y ampliamente desplegado (Security Assertion Markup Language, SAML).
Por otro lado, en lo que se reere al riesgo, proponemos un modelo que permite a las
entidades calcular en cuanto riesgo se incurre al realizar una transaccion con otra entidad,
teniendo en cuenta su conguracion, polticas, reglas de operacion, algoritmos criptogra-
cos en uso, etc. La metodologa utilizada para denir el modelo de riesgo abarca tres
pasos. En primer lugar, dise~namos una taxonoma que captura los distintos aspectos de
una relacion en el contexto de federacion de identidad que puedan afectar al riesgo. En se-
gundo lugar, basandonos en la taxonoma, proponemos un conjunto de metricas que seran
la base para cuanticar el riesgo. En tercer y ultimo lugar, describimos como combinar
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las metricas en una cifra nal representativa utilizando el metodo Multiattribute Utility
Theory (MAUT), que ha sido adaptado para denir el proceso de agregacion de riesgo.
Ademas, y tambien bajo la metodologa MAUT, proponemos un sistema de agregacion
difuso que combina los valores de riesgo y conanza en un valor nal que sera el utilizado
en la toma de decisiones dinamicas sobre si establecer o no una relacion de federacion.
La validacion de todas las ideas mencionadas ha sido llevada a cabo a traves del analisis
formal, simulaciones, desarrollo e implementacion de prototipos y actividades de disemi-
nacion.
En resumen, las contribuciones en esta tesis constituyen un paso hacia el establecimien-
to dinamico de federaciones de identidad, basado en la exibilizacion de los modelos de
conanza subyacentes.
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Introduction
\Management of trust, and by extension
identity, must be a rst order capability."
David D. Clark, 2012
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1.1. Motivation and Objectives
The management of digital identity is said to be located at the core of the Internet econ-
omy [OECD Report, 2011], since its evolution can leverage a new wave of innovation
explosion. On the Internet nowadays, as well as in other network scenarios, it is likely
that each user ends up with multiple credentials and multiple access permissions across
dierent applications provided by dierent service providers. Our identity data is scattered
and these fragmented logins present a challenge in forms of synchronization of shared iden-
tities, security, etc. There is a strong need for an intrinsic identity system that is trusted
across the web and within enterprises and for unambiguously identifying users.
1
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Recently, Identity Federation12 has emerged as a key concept in the identity manage-
ment eld, as a mean of linking a person's electronic identity stored across multiple distinct
domains. Thus, the federation model enables users of one domain to securely access re-
sources of another domain seamlessly, without the need for redundant user login processes.
Particularly, the most popular use-case in Federated Identity Management (FIM) is Sin-
gle Sign-On (SSO), which allows users to authenticate at a single site and gain access to
multiple ones without providing additional information. Due to the importance of the fed-
eration paradigm for online identity management [Chadwick, 2009], a lot of work has been
done so far. As a result, the industry and research community have produced a number
of standards and specications [Cantor et al., 2005b] [Goodner and (eds.), 2009] [OpenID,
2007] [Bertocci et al., 2007] [Hammer-Lahav, 2010] representing the fundamental build-
ing blocks to accomplish identity federation. However, none of the specications dene a
suitable trust model to allow the establishment of dynamic federations.
Trust is a fundamental issue to address scalability. Moreover, the exibility of every
federation framework is tied to the underlying trust model, often poorly dened or even
out of the specications scope. For this reason, new enhanced techniques are required to
achieve ad-hoc dynamic federation. Furthermore, the signicance of research on this topic
has been recently highlighted to the point of stating that\If dynamic federation negotiation
and trust management in IdM systems could be achieved, it would revolutionize the internet
marketplace" [ETSI, 2011]. The work in [Dabrowski and Pacyna, 2008] denes a modular
reference architecture that abstracts the dierent identity layers on the Internet, pointing
out the state of implementation. This architecture is depicted in the left side of Figure 1.1.
In turn, the right side of the picture shows how existing identity specications implement
particular functionalities. It can be seen that the Trust Layer, which is mandatory for
dynamic and ad-hoc inter-federation interactions, is still uncovered.
Motivated by this problem and aiming at contributing to improve the identity landscape,
and more specically the logic trust layer shown in 1.1, we propose \a dynamic infras-
tructure for federated identity management in open environments".
1We will use the terms \identity federation" and \federated identity management" indistinctly through-
out this dissertation.
2Sometimes in the literature, a distinction is made between federated identity and user-centric iden-
tity [Hardt, 2005] consider this latter as an evolution of the former. However concepts are not exclusive
since federated identity can be implemented empowering user control, thus having federated user-centric
systems [Suriadi et al., 2009]. Our proposal applies in any case, because, whether user-centric or not, trust
relationships must be always established between the parties sharing identity information.
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Figure 1.1: Reference framework architecture for Identity Management systems and cur-
rent state of its implementation (©[Dabrowski and Pacyna, 2008])
On the one hand, with \dynamic infrastructure", we refer to the design of the necessary
structures and elements that support the creation of federations in a more agile way,
minimizing pre-conguration. What if every time we wanted to send an email, we had
to get your IT administrator to coordinate a secure connection between our email server
and the email server of the receiving company? Probably if this level of pre-conguration
was required, email would not be ubiquitous now. This problem still needs to be solved
in FIM to achieve wide scale adoption.
On the other hand, with the term\open environments"we refer to the fact that participa-
tion in FIM should be open, market driven, and transparent. Providers may join and leave
federations at any moment, they may belong to dierent domains and may be unknown
to each other.
Summarizing, the problem of establishing federations in dynamic and open environments
is that current technologies require trust and contractual frameworks to be pre-congured
before any interaction between parties takes place. Thus, the initial setup complexity is a
high barrier and may not worth adopting these procedures for a short-term collaboration
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because time and cost will probably not outbalance the rewards of cooperation. Therefore,
the main goals of our research are oriented to overcome the limitations of the current static
features of FIM systems, and can be summarized in:
Minimize dependence on pre-conguration, improving automation.
We aim to make entities involved in FIM transactions more autonomous and capable
of making decisions to collaborate in a dynamic fashion. The intended contribution
towards this goal encompasses the analysis of the gaps and limitations that make
current FIM technologies static, and the design of an architecture to cover these
limitations. We envision risk and trust evaluation as core aspects of the architecture,
which must be considered in decision making. Consequently, the other main goals of
this thesis are the development of appropriate risk and trust models for FIM. Having
formal models to compute and represent trust and risk as numbers provides a basis
for easy implementation and automation.
Introduce a risk management model.
The introduction of risk analysis enhances security and provides a solid base for
deciding whether to cooperate or not with unknown potential partners. It will allow
entities to know how much risk is involved in transacting with an entity according to
its conguration, policies, operation rules, cryptographic algorithms, etc. Evaluation
shall be made on the y, on a per transaction basis. The contribution shall include
the design of metrics to quantify all the risk aspects involved in FIM scenarios, as
well as an aggregation model that leads to a meaningful numerical value upon which
decisions can be made. This is the most challenging goal, since there are no proposals
on risk calculation in FIM.
Enrich trust mechanisms.
Current FIM frameworks are based on binary decisions (certicate-based trust). We
aim to enrich the trust establishment procedures by taking advantage of common
knowledge (reputation) and monitoring the evolution of the relationship through
time (history of interactions). The contribution shall model the features of current
FIM systems and introduce the new mentioned dimensions to add exibility and
richness. The model shall detail the evidences used, and dene how to combine
them to obtain a nal quantitative value.
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Furthermore, as it is also an important part in the development of a doctoral thesis, we
also aim to achieve the following goals:
Evaluation and validation of the contributions.
Dissemination of the results through publication, collaboration in research projects
and participation in conferences.
Identication of new lines of research that can be derived from this work.
Completion of the writing and public defense of the thesis dissertation.
1.2. Development Plan
With the aim to achieve the goals presented in the previous section, we will follow these
steps:
Gather the bibliography related to FIM in order to study and analyze the existing
gaps in regard to trust establishment.
Design an architecture with the necessary elements to permit dynamic federations
based on trust and risk.
Develop the quantitative trust and risk models, which constitute the main pillars of
the architecture.
Design a decision system that combines the trust and risk values.
Perform evaluation and validation tests of the proposed architecture and designed
modules in order to demonstrate the benets of the proposal and its feasibility.
Obtain the main conclusions from the performed research work and identify new
research lines to be followed.
Write and publish papers with the partial results that are obtained during the dif-
ferent phases of the research.
Write the dissertation document.
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1.3. Interest of the Research
With respect to publication and dissemination, the content of this thesis was developed as
a research line in two national R&D projects: \Espa~na Virtual"3 and CONSEQUENCE4.
Both projects included an specic working package for \Security and Identity Manage-
ment", where our ideas on dynamic federation were contributed. In addition, during a
research stay at NEC Laboratories Europe, the work on the integration of reputation in
FIM was included in the deliverables of an internal business project centered in IdM.
Furthermore, dissemination was also achieved through publication of scientic papers. The
main papers that support the interest of the research presented in this thesis are detailed
below. For each contribution, we briey explain the kind and date of publication (i.e.,
whether conference or journal) and its contents, showing which part of the dissertation
they support. It is to note that all the journal papers correspond to journals indexed in
the JCR. We also reference other complementary works we have published that, though
they do not deal with core aspects of this thesis, are derived from the ideas presented here
(e.g., use-cases, application scenarios, etc.). The criterion for ordering the results is their
relevance to the dissertation, so more relevant papers are listed rst.
Main Contributions to Journals:
1. Title: A metric-based approach to assess risk for \On Cloud" Federated Identity
Management.
Authors: P. Arias-Cabarcos, F. Almenares, A. Marn, D. Daz-Sanchez, R. Sanchez.
Journal: Springer's Journal of Network and Systems Management, Special Issue on
Cloud Computing, Networking, and Service (CCNS) Management. September 2012.
(Impact Factor 2011 0.452) [Arias et al., 2012b].
In this paper we analyze the FIM process and propose a comprehensive taxonomy
(starting form the structure outlined in [Arias, 2011]) that helps in the classication
of the involved risks in order to mitigate vulnerabilities and threats when decisions
about dynamic collaboration are made. Moreover, a set of new metrics is dened
to allow a novel form of risk quantication in these environments. Other contribu-
3http://www.espanavirtual.org/
4http://consequence.it.uc3m.es
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tions of the paper include the denition of a generic hierarchical risk aggregation
system, and a descriptive use-case where the risk computation framework is applied
to enhance cloud-based service provisioning.
2. Title: Enhancing Privacy and Dynamic Federation in IdM for Consumer Cloud
Computing.
Authors: R. Sanchez, F. Almenares, P. Arias-Cabarcos, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics ISSN: 0098-3063. Printed ver-
sion in Vol. 58, Iss. 1, 95 - 103, February 2012.(Impact Factor 2011: 0.941) [Sanchez
et al., 2012].
In this paper an architecture for dynamic federation with privacy improvements is
presented. The document, extended from our conference paper in [Sanchez Guerrero
et al., 2012], describes the rst denition of the reputation assertion used in our trust
model for conveying reputation data between providers.
3. Title: FedTV: personal networks federation for IdM in mobile DTV.
Authors: F. Almenares, P. Arias-Cabarcos, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn, R. Sanchez.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. ISSN: 0098-3063. Printed
version in Vol. 57, Iss. 2, 499 - 506, May 2011. (Impact Factor 2011: 0.941) [Al-
menarez et al., 2011].
This work, extended from our conference paper in [Almenares et al., 2011], proposes
an enhanced mobile client to support the establishment of federations to allow co-
operation in mobile DTV scenarios (content sharing, service delegation, etc.). We
extend the Enhanced Client Prole dened in SAML v2 [Cantor et al., 2005b],
incorporating a trust management layer inside user's consumer electronic devices'
software. Thus, the components of our architecture for dynamic federation are in-
corporated in a real world scenario that shows its benets and applicability.
Furthermore, The following publications complement the core ideas in the above mentioned
papers by the denition of application scenarios:
4. Title: FamTV: An architecture for Presence-Aware Personalized Television.
Authors: P. Arias-Cabarcos, R. Sanchez, F. Almenares, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. ISSN: 0098-3063. Printed
version in Vol.57, no.1, pp.6-13, February 2011. (Impact Factor 2011: 0.941) [Arias
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et al., 2011a].
This work, extended from our conference paper in [Arias et al., 2011b], presents a
way to combine content adaptation paradigms together with presence detection in
order to allow a seamless and personalized entertainment experience when watching
TV. It includes a security layer where the trust-based federation will be used to
dynamically cope with the huge ecosystem of services and applications that can be
accesed from the TV. This work received the Chester W. Sall Award for the 2nd
place best paper in the IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 2011.
5. Title: SuSSo: Seamless and Ubiquitous Single Sign-on for Cloud Service Continuity
across devices.
Authors: P. Arias-Cabarcos, F. Almenares, R. Sanchez, A. Marn, D. Daz-Sanchez.
Journal: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics. ISSN: 0098-3063. Printed
version in Vol. 58, Iss. 4, 1425 - 1433, November 2012. (Impact Factor 2011:
0.941) [Arias et al., 2012c].
This work, extended from our conference paper in [Arias et al., 2012a], presents
an architecture for moving SAML sessions across devices guaranteeing cloud service
continuity. It complements the proposal in [Almenarez et al., 2011] by tackling
mobile scenarios. This work builds partly on the dynamic federation architecture
modules presented in this thesis.
Main Contributions to International Conferences:
1. Title: Towards dynamic trust establishment for identity federation.
Authors: F. Almenares, P. Arias-Cabarcos, A. Marn, D. Daz-Sanchez.
Conference: Euro American Conference on Telematics and Information Systems
(EATIS 2009). Prague, Czech Republic, June 03 - 05, 2009 [Almenarez et al., 2009].
This rst paper analyzes the state-of-the-art and compares identity federation proto-
cols. Based on the analysis, it identies the need for new trust models that improve
exibility in federation scenarios, and outlines an initial conceptual description of
the basic architectural requirements.
2. Title: Enabling SAML for Dynamic Identity Federation Management.
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Authors: P. Arias-Cabarcos, F. Almenares, A. Marn, D. Daz-Sanchez.
Conference: Wireless and Mobile Networking Conference. Gdansk, Poland,
2009 [Arias et al., 2009].
This paper completes the former by performing a deeper review of the existing iden-
tity federation frameworks, analyzing the underlying trust mechanisms and its suit-
ability to be applied in open environments. Furthermore, we propose an extension
for the SAML standard in order to facilitate the creation of federation relationships
in a secure dynamic way between prior unknown parties based on the introduction
of reputation. The realization of the approach, including a discussion of software
components and a proof-of-concept implementation, is also described.
3. Title: Risk Assessment for Better Identity Management in Pervasive Environments.
Authors: P. Arias-Cabarcos.
Conference: IEEE PerCom Phd Forum 2011. Seattle, Washington, USA March 23,
2011 [Arias, 2011].
The paper builds on the premise that risk evaluation must be considered as a key
enabler to foster collaboration between parties in a dynamic but yet secure manner.
The main idea outlined in the document is to enrich the decision making process in
federated environments by introducing risk assessment and integrate it with trust
evaluation, a solution not yet proposed in the published literature to that date. We
rst introduce the modeling of identity federation protocols as two-phased proce-
dures (i.e., Pre-Federation and Post-Federation) and sketch a preliminary taxonomy
to be used in determining risk metrics. This short paper was presented in a poster
session during the PhD forum organized in the context of the 9th IEEE Interna-
tional conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications. The forum was
structured as a combined one-day workshop prior to the conference and a poster
session during the main conference sessions to encourage interaction between PhD
students and researchers from academia, industry, and government. As a result of
this participation, our contribution to the forum was awarded with the\Best PhD
Forum Contribution Award".
4. Title: Family Personalization Service.
Authors: D. Daz-Sanchez, R. Sanchez, P. Arias-Cabarcos, I. Bernave, F. Almenares.
Conference: IEEE International Conference on Consumer Electronics - Berlin
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(ICCE-Berlin 2011).
This work, builds on the ideas in [Arias et al., 2011b], and presents a personalization
system that allows to automatically congure devices surrounding users. The system
addresses privacy-based ltering and group preference modeling.
5. Title: Introducing Infocards in NGN to enable user-centric identity management.
Authors: D. Proserpio, F. Sanvido, P. Arias, R. Sanchez, D. Daz-Sanchez, A. Marn,
F. Almenares.
Conference: IEEE Global Communications Conference - Miami, Florida, USA
(GLOBECOM 2010).
This paper proposes a solution that leverages the benets of the infoCard identity
technology and introduces this user centric paradigm into the emerging NGN archi-
tectures.
1.4. Organization of the Thesis
In order to accomplish the goals outlined in the above sections, the organization of this
dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the state-of-the-art on technologies and latest research related to the
thesis. It objectively reviews the dierent existing frameworks for identity management;
provides an overview of trust/reputation and risk models; and summarizes related work
being carried out by individual researchers, international research projects and organiza-
tions involved in standardization.
After this background, Chapter 3 goes into a deeper analysis of the research challenges in
identity management and presents a detailed description of the research problem we aim
to solve. The problem statement is clearly articulated based on this analysis and also the
objectives pursued in this thesis are rened. The chapter ends with a value proposition,
i.e., highlighting the potential impact of our research.
Chapter 4 proposes a generic infrastructure to solve the limitations of current identity
federations. Based on this high-level infrastructure description, Chapters 5 and 6 go
deeper into the main building blocks of the architecture, namely the the risk module and
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the trust and reputation module.
More specically, in Chapter 5, we design a taxonomy to capture the dierent aspects of
a relationship in identity federation that may contribute to risk. Based on the taxonomy
and aiming at developing a computational model, we propose a set of metrics as a basis to
quantify risk. We also describe how to aggregate the metrics into a meaningful risk gure,
coming to the nal formal denition of the model.
Next, Chapter 6 formalizes a trust model that captures the features of current FIM sys-
tems and introduces new trust dimensions to add exibility and richness. We propose
mechanisms to convey and use reputation data in the model.
After that, Chapter 7 explains how the trust and risk model proposals are integrated and
used to make dynamic federation decisions; and Chapter 8 is dedicated to the validation
of the ideas presented in this thesis.
Finally Chapter 9 summarizes the results and discussions presented in this thesis. Further-
more, since the need for further work and exploration is necessary in any useful research,
we also describe the future lines that can be followed from the ideas presented here.
Apart from the the aforementioned chapters, we have included two appendices. Ap-
pendix A contains a glossary with all the acronyms used in the document; and Appendix B
is a catalogue that summarizes the set of metrics for risk quantication proposed in the
thesis.
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Chapter2
State of the art
\All men by nature desire knowledge."
Aristotle, On Man in the Universe
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2.1. Federated Identity Management
Federated Identity Management, FIM, or Identity Federation 1 refer to the technologies,
standards and use-cases which serve to enable the portability of identity information across
otherwise autonomous security domains [Maler and Reed, 2008]. The ultimate goal of iden-
tity federation is to enable users of one domain to securely access data or systems of another
domain seamlessly, and without the need for completely redundant user administration.
The main actors in a FIM scenario are: 1) the Identity Provider (IdP), which vouches
for the identity of a user and issues authentication, authorization and/or attribute tokens
about her; 2) the Service Provider (SP)2, which provides services to the end user and relies
on the identity tokens generated by the IdP; and 3) the User, that interacts (usually via a
user agent, e.g., web browser) with both SPs and IdPs. In this section we provide a general
picture of the current identity landscape, explaining the existing federation protocols and
specications.
2.1.1. Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is an standard developed by the Security
Services Technical Committee (SSTC) of the standards organization OASIS (the Orga-
nization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards).The latest version,
SAMLv2.0 [Cantor et al., 2005b], became an OASIS Standard in March 2005 and it is built
upon a number of existing standards, such as eXtensible Markup Language (XML) [Bray
et al., 2008], XML Signature [Eastlake et al., 2012], XML Encryption [Eastlake et al.,
2002b], Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [Fielding et al., 1999], Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) [Box et al., 2000], etc. SAML denes a framework to allow the exchange
of security information between online business partners. More specically, it allows the
exchange of authentication, attribute and/or authorization related data about a principal
(usually an end user) between an Identity Provider and a Service Provider. Accordingly,
Figure 2.1 shows the main concepts and components dened in the specications.
Basically, as represented in the image in Figure 2.1, SAML species four dierent elements,
which are detailed below:
1We will use these terms indistinctly throughout this thesis
2The term Relying Parties is also frequently used to refer to SPs
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Figure 2.1: The Security Assertion Markup Language framework (©[Maler and Reed,
2008]
).
Assertions [Cantor et al., 2005b], which are statements related to authentication,
attribute, or authorization about a subject, issued by an Identitiy Provider (IdP).
The valid structure and contents of an assertion are dened by the SAML assertion
XML schema. Regarding the kind of statements in the assertions:
 Authentication statements are created by the party that successfully authen-
ticated a user. At a minimum, they describe the particular means used to
authenticate the user and the specic time at which the authentication took
place.
 Attribute statements contain specic identifying attributes about the subject
(e.g., that user \John Doe" has \Gold" card status).
 Authorization decision statements dene something that the subject is entitled
to do (e.g., whether \John Doe" is permitted to buy a specied item).
In order to better illustrate the format of a SAML Assertion, Figure 2.2 shows an
• 
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XML fragment containing an example assertion with a single authentication state-
ment.
Figure 2.2: Example fragment of a SAML assertion (©[Hughes and Maler, 2005]). SAML
Assertions consist of XML packets containing information such as a target user's identier,
authentication status and attributes
The assertion in Figure 2.2 begins with the declaration of the SAML assertion names-
pace in line 1. Next, lines 2 through 6 provide information about the nature of the
assertion: which version of SAML is being used, when the assertion was created,
and who issued it. Lines 7 through 12 provide information about the subject of
the assertion, to which all of the contained statements apply. The subject has a
name identier (line 10) whose value is \j.doe@example.com", provided in the for-
mat described on line 9 (email address). It can also be noted that the assertion as a
whole has a validity period indicated by lines 14 and 15. Finally, the authentication
statement appearing on lines 17 through 24 shows that this subject was originally
authenticated using a password-protected transport mechanism (e.g. entering a user-
name and password submitted over browser session protected with Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) [Freier et al., 2011] ) at the time and date shown.
Protocols [Cantor et al., 2005b], which dene how and which assertions are re-
quested. The set of SAML protocols and their descriptions are summarized in Ta-
ble 2.1.
Bindings [Cantor et al., 2005a], which dene the lower-level communication or
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Protocol Description
Authentication Request Protocol Denes a means by which a principal (or an agent acting on behalf of
the principal) can request assertions containing authentication statements
and, optionally, attribute statements
Single Logout Protocol Denes a mechanism to allow near-simultaneous logout of active sessions
associated with a principal. The logout can be directly initiated by the
user, or initiated by an IdP or SP because of a session timeout, adminis-
trator command, etc.
Assertion Query and Request Protocol Denes a set of queries by which SAML assertions may be obtained
Artifact Resolution Protocol Provides a mechanism by which SAML protocol messages may be passed
by reference using a small, xed-length value called an artifact. The
artifact receiver uses the Artifact Resolution Protocol to ask the message
creator to dereference the artifact and return the actual protocol message
Name Identier Management Protocol Provides mechanisms to change the value or format of the name identier
used to refer to a principal. It also allows to terminate an association of
a name identier between an IdP and a SP
Name Identier Mapping Protocol Provides a mechanism to programmatically map one SAML name identi-
er into another, subject to appropriate policy controls
Table 2.1: SAML Protocols
messaging protocols (such as HTTP or SOAP) that the SAML protocols can be
transported over. The set of SAML bindings and their descriptions are summarized
in Table 2.2.
Binding Description
HTTP Redirect Binding Denes how SAML protocol messages can be transported using HTTP
redirect messages (302 status code responses)
HTTP Post Binding Denes how SAML protocol messages can be transported within the
base64-encoded content of an HTML form control
HTTP Artifact Binding Denes how an artifact is transported from a message sender to a mes-
sage receiver using HTTP
SAML SOAP Binding Denes how SAML protocol messages are transported within SOAP 1.1
messages, with details about using SOAP over HTTP
Reverse SOAP (PAOS) Binding Denes a multi-stage SOAP/HTTP message exchange that permits an
HTTP client to be a SOAP responder. Used in the Enhanced Client
and Proxy Prole to enable clients and proxies capable of assisting in
IdP discovery
SAML URI Binding Denes a means for retrieving an existing SAML assertion by resolving
a URI (Uniform Resource Identier)
Table 2.2: SAML Bindings
Proles [Hughes et al., 2005], which are combinations of SAML protocols and bind-
ings, together with the structure of assertions to cover specic use-cases. Proles
typically dene constraints on the contents of SAML assertions, protocols, and bind-
ings in order to solve the business use case in an interoperable fashion. The set of
SAML bindings and their descriptions are summarized in Table 2.3.
Furthermore, there are two other SAML concepts dened in the specications that are
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Proles Description
Web Browser SSO Prole Denes how SAML entities use the Authentication Request Protocol
and SAML Response messages and assertions to achieve single sign-
on with standard web browsers. It denes how the messages are used
in combination with the HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, and HTTP
Artifact bindings
Enhanced Client and Proxy (ECP) Prole Denes a specialized SSO prole where specialized clients or gateway
proxies can use the Reverse-SOAP (PAOS) and SOAP bindings
Identity Provider Discovery Prole Denes one possible mechanism for service providers to learn about
the Identity Providers that a user has previously visited
Single Logout Prole Denes how the SAML Single Logout Protocol can be used with
SOAP, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, and HTTP Artifact bindings
Assertion Query/Request Prole Denes how SAML entities can use the SAML Query and Request
Protocol to obtain SAML assertions over a synchronous binding, such
as SOAP
Artifact Resolution Prole Denes how SAML entities can use the Artifact Resolution Protocol
over a synchronous binding, such as SOAP, to obtain the protocol
message referred to by an artifact
Name Identier Management Prole Denes how the Name Identier Management Protocol may be used
with SOAP, HTTP Redirect, HTTP POST, and HTTP Artifact bind-
ings
Name Identier Mapping Prole Denes how the Name Identier Mapping Protocol uses a synchronous
binding such as SOAP
Table 2.3: SAML Proles
useful for building and deploying a SAML environment:
The Metadata [Cantor et al., 2005c], which dene a way to express and share con-
guration information between SAML parties. For instance, these data can include
an entity's support for given SAML bindings, identier information, and Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) [Adams, C. and Farrell, S., 1999] information. SAML Metadata
is dened by its own XML schema.
The Authentication Context [Kemp et al., 2005], which can be used in SAML
assertions to provide detailed information regarding the type and strength of authen-
tication that a user employed when he authenticated at an identity provider. An SP
can also include an authentication context in a request to an IdP to request that the
user is authenticated using a specic set of authentication requirements, such as a
multi-factor authentication. There is a general XML schema that denes the mech-
anisms for creating authentication context declarations and a set of SAML-dened
\Authentication Context Classes", each with their own XML schema, that describe
commonly used methods of authentication.
The combination of the aforementioned building-block components allow a number of
use-cases to be supported. Arguably, the most important use case for which SAML is
applied is multi-domain web Single Sign-on (SSO), shown in Figure 2.3 which allows a
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Figure 2.3: The Single Sign-On use case (©[Hughes and Maler, 2005]).
user to authenticate at a single site and gain access to other sites without the need for
re-authentication, i.e., reusing the same identier, act of authentication, and login session
across multiple sites.
Apart from the aforementioned web SSO use case, SAML covers a huge range of use-cases,
namely: Federation via Out-of-Band Account Linking, Federation via Identity Attributes,
Federation via Transient Pseudonym or Persistent Identiers and Federation Termination.
2.1.2. Liberty Alliance
Liberty Alliance (LA) [Project, 2012] was formed in September 2001 by a group of orga-
nizations with the aim to establish open standards to easily conduct online transactions
while protecting the privacy and security of identity information. Based on this philosophy,
the Liberty project designed an architecture and a set of protocols that provide support
for federated identity management. The development of the core Liberty specications
was organized in three phases, as shown in Figure 2.4:
Phase 1- Liberty Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF): In July 2002,
the Liberty Alliance released its rst set of public specications, Liberty Identity
Federation (ID-FF) 1.0. At this time, several member companies also announced
upcoming availability of Liberty-enabled products, marking very rapid release and
deployment of open specications. The Liberty Alliance released two more versions of
the Identity Federation specication, and then in June 2003 contributed its federation
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Figure 2.4: Liberty Alliance core frameworks (©[Liberty Alliance, 2013])
specication, to OASIS, forming the foundation for SAML 2.0 3.
The ID-FF framework [Cantor and (eds.), 2003] denes a set of protocols, bindings,
and proles that provides a solution for identity federation, cross-domain authen-
tication, and session management. This framework can be used to create a new
identity management system or to develop one in conjunction with legacy systems.
ID-FF is designed to work with heterogeneous platforms, various networking devices
(including personal computers, mobile phones, and personal digital assistants), and
emerging technologies. ID-FF is built upon the concept of Circle of Trust (CoT),
which is dened by Liberty as a federation of SPs and IdPs that have business rela-
tionships based on Liberty architecture and operational agreements and with whom
users can transact business in a secure and apparently seamless environment.
Summarizing, the Liberty ID-FF Protocols and Schema Specications dene trans-
mission formats for the functions explained in Table 2.4.
Phase 2- Liberty Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF): Liberty Al-
3 Though some dierences between SAML V2.0 and ID-FF V1.2 exist (http://saml.xml.org/dierences-
between-saml-v2-0-and-liberty-id--1-2), we will use the terms SAML and Liberty throughout this thesis
to generally refer to SAML-based FIM frameworks
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ID-FF Protocol Function Description
Single Sign-On and Federation Protocol Denes the rules for request and response messages with which a principal is
able to authenticate to one or more service providers and federate (or link)
congured identities.
Name Registration Protocol Denes the request and response messages a service provider would use to
create its own opaque handle to identify a principal when communicating with
the identity provider. This registration would occur after federation has been
accomplished. After the service provider registers this new handle, subsequent
communications with the identity provider would use this identier rather
than the identier originally dened by the identity provider.
Federation Termination Notication Protocol Denes a one-way message that one provider would use to notify another
provider when a principal has terminated identity federation.
Single Logout Protocol Denes the request and response messages that providers would exchange
when notifying each other of logout events. This exchange would terminate
all sessions when a logout occurs at either the service provider or the identity
provider.
Name Identier Mapping Protocol Denes the request and response messages that one service provider can use
to communicate with a second service provider to obtain the name identier
assigned to a principal federated in the name space of the second service
provider.
Table 2.4: Functions covered by ID-FF protocols
liance also focused on identity web services standards, publicly releasing the Liberty
Identity Web Services Framework in April 2004. Liberty ID-WSF [Beatty et al.,
2004] provides the framework for building interoperable identity services, permission
based attribute sharing, identity service description and discovery, and the associated
security proles.
The aim is at providing specications for identity-based web services to work in
tandem with the previous Liberty ID-FF. Thus, the Liberty ID-WSF can be used to
develop web services that retrieve, update, or perform an action on identity data in a
federated network environment using a SOAP-based invocation. ID-WSF introduces
three new subjects apart from the dened in the ID-FF specications, namely:
 A Web Service Consumer (WSC), which invokes the functions provided by a
web service by making a request to the web service's provider.
 A Web Service Provider (WSP), which implements a web service based on a
request from a WSC.
 A Discovery Service (DS), which permits: a) registration of services associated
with an identity (i.e., each WSP registers the identity service that hosts to a
DS); and b) discovery of services associated with an identity (i.e., the WSC
queries DS in order to retrieve WSP data)
Phase 3- Liberty Identity Services Interface Specications (ID-SIS): Since
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2003 Liberty also worked on this set of specications that enable interoperable iden-
tity services. Thus, the Liberty Identity Service Interface Specications [Kellomaki
and Wason, 2003] comprise a set of identity services built on top of the ID-WSF
framework. These services, which are supposed to have strong demand by the in-
dustry, are:
 Personal Prole, which describes a web identity service that provides a princi-
pal's basic prole information, such as their contact details, or name.
 Employee Prole, which describes a web identity service that provides a em-
ployee's basic prole information, such as their contact details, or name.
 Contact book, which describes a web identity service that allows a principal
to manage contacts for private and business relations, and for the principal
himself.
 Geolocation, which species a web identity service oering geolocation infor-
mation associated with a principal.
 Presence, which species a web identity service oering presence information
associated with a principal.
 Directory Access Protocol, which describes a web service oering directory in-
formation as an instance of a data-oriented identity web service, based on the
Liberty ID-WSF data services template.
 Content SMS and MMS, which describes a web service that layers the ID-WSF
1.1 framework on the Multimedia Messaging Service interface type MM7 to add
identity-based invocation and addressing.
Apart from the core frameworks dened above, during the last years of the project Liberty
Alliance also released two more frameworks dealing with governance and identity assurance
issues, namely:
Identity Governance Framework (IGF): In February 2007, the Liberty Alliance
started to work on the Identity Governance Framework [Madsen, 2009], releasing the
rst version publicly in July 2007. The Identity Governance Framework denes a
set of standards to help enterprises easily determine and control how identity related
information is used, stored, and propagated in appropriate and secure ways.
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Identity Assurance Framework (IAF): The Liberty Alliance started to work on
the Identity Assurance Framework [Cutler, 2007] in 2008. This framework details
four identity assurance levels designed to ease and speed the process of linking trusted
identity-enabled enterprise, social networking and Web 2.0 applications together
based on standardized business rules and security risks associated with each level of
identity assurance. The assurance levels are based on the four levels of assurance
outlined by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
Publication 800-63 version 1.0.1 [Nadalin et al., 2006], and range in condence level
from \low" to \very high". The level of assurance provided is measured by the
strength and rigor of the identity proong process, the credential's strength, and the
management processes the service provider applies to it. These four assurance levels
have been adopted by the U.K. government, the Government of Canada and the
U.S. Federal Government for categorizing electronic identity trust levels for providing
electronic government services.
Since 2009, the work of the Liberty Alliance is transitioning to the Kantara Initiative 4 ,
which means that all the Liberty Alliance material has been contributed to this new orga-
nization. Kantara is a non-prot professional association dedicated to advancing technical
and legal innovation related to digital identity management. It is not a standards body
but it submits recommendations to standards bodies such as OASIS, Internet Engineer-
ing Task Force (IETF), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union Standardization Section (ITU-T) and other standard-
developing organizations. As dened in the Kantara web site, the mission of the initia-
tive is to foster identity community harmonization, interoperability, innovation, and broad
adoption through the development of open identity specications, operational frameworks,
education programs, deployment and usage best practices for privacy-respecting, secure
access to online services
2.1.3. WS-Federation
The Web Service Federation Language or WS-Federation [Goodner and (eds.), 2009] is an
OASIS standard that forms part of the larger Web Services Security framework (WS-*).
More specically, WS-Federation describes how to use WS-Trust [Nadalin et al., 2009],
4http://kantarainitiative.org
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WS-Security [Nadalin et al., 2004] and WS-Policy [World Wide Web Consortium (W3C),
2007] all together in order to provide federation between security domains. This en-
ables high value scenarios where authorized access to resources managed in one realm can
be provided to security principals whose identities and attributes are managed in other
realms. WS-Federation includes mechanisms for brokering of identity, attribute discovery
and retrieval, authentication and authorization claims between federation partners, and
protecting the privacy of these claims across organizational boundaries.
WS-Federation relies on the Security Token Service (STS) model dened by WS-Trust, and
a protocol (involving Request Security Token (RST) and Response messages) for handling
such tokens, which contain information described by WS-SecurityPolicy. The STS is used
to broker an establishment of a trust relationship between resource providers / relying
parties and other service providers. Dierent federation services can be developed as
variations of the base STS. Furthermore, processing in WS-Federation is kept independent
of the security token format and the type of token being transmitted. WS-Federation
denes also a metadata model and a document format describing how services can be
discovered and combined, as well as their access policies. The types of services in WS-
Federation are:
Authorization services: can be viewed as decision brokering services. Interop-
erability of services requires a common model for interacting with authorization
services.
Authentication type services: a set of URIs is dened for specifying the param-
eter that sets the type of authentication in Request Security Token and Response
messages.
Attribute services: WS-Federation denes a model for accessing attribute services
which may be needed to establish a federation context, e.g., information for advanced
functionality or personalized user experience.
Pseudonym services: allow principals to have dierent aliases in dierent realms
or for dierent resources. They provide dierent kinds of identity mappings, e.g.,
with pseudonyms established per login or per service. In combination with the
attribute services, they allow information to be provided about a requestor identied
by a pseudonym, if the requestor has authorized this.
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Privacy services: extensions to WS-Trust syntax are dened to express both pri-
vacy requirements of a requester and mechanisms used by a STS for issuing a token.
This may include, e.g., identication of sensitive claims in a token that must be
protected by encryption.
2.1.4. OpenID
OpenID is dened as an open, decentralized, and free framework for user-centric digital
identity management. It is based on well-known existing Internet technologies (HTTP,
SSL, Die-Hellman [Rescorla, 1999]), and it is clearly oriented to be used in web sce-
narios. The eorts to develop OpenID started in 2005 and the framework is currently
dened in a set of open specications [OpenID, 2007] [Hardt et al., 2007] [Recordon et al.,
2008] [Recordon and Fitzpatrick, 2006] [Hoyt et al., 2006].
The protocol operation for user authentication is easy: basically an identity is represented
by means of an URI and the authentication process involves verifying that the user owns
this URI. According to it, when a user wants to log into an OpenID enabled web site (or
Relying Party), the browser (or User Agent) is redirected to the OpenID Identity Provider
(OP), who attempts to authenticate the user and informs the web site of its success or
failure. A major feature of OpenID is user-centricity, which means that users can decide
which Identity Provider they trust the most to authenticate them. In fact, users can also
become their own IdP without the need of registration or authorization from a third party.
Thus, the OpenID protocol does not rely on a central authority to authenticate a user's
identity.
The OpenID Authentication protocol ow is depicted in Figure 2.5. It consists of the
following steps:
In steps 1, 2 and 3 the end user tries to access a web site and, after being presented
with the OpenID prompt page, he initiates authentication by presenting a user-
supplied identier to the Relying Party via their User-Agent.
In step 4, after normalizing the user-supplied identier, the Relying Party performs
discovery on it and establishes the OP endpoint URL that the end user uses for
authentication.
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Figure 2.5: OpenID Authentication protocol ow
Optionally in step 5 the Relying Party and the OP establish an association { a shared
secret established using Die-Hellman Key Exchange. The OP uses an association
to sign subsequent messages and the Relying Party to verify those messages; this
removes the need for subsequent direct requests to verify the signature after each
authentication request/response.
In step 6 the Relying Party redirects the end user's User-Agent to the OP with an
OpenID Authentication request.
In steps 7 and 8 the OP establishes whether the end user is authorized to perform
OpenID Authentication and wishes to do so.
In step 9 the OP redirects the end user's User-Agent back to the Relying Party with
either an assertion that authentication is approved or a message that authentication
failed.
In step 10 the Relying Party veries the information received from the OP and
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decides whether to allow access to the service or not.
The OpenID Authentication protocol messages are mappings of plain-text keys to plain-
text values exchanged using the HTTP protocol. In order to generally illustrate the
message format, Figure 2.6 shows an example of OpenID authentication request message
(step 6).
Figure 2.6: Example of OpenID Authentication Request message
As it can be seen in Figure 2.6, an OpenID message contains a series of keys (the openid
message parameters) preceded with the "openid." prex. For each key a value is provided
and the whole message is codied to be sent over an HTTP GET request.
Summarizing, OpenID is mainly an authentication protocol and federation is achieved
with extensions, such as [Hardt et al., 2007] that allows attribute exchange.
2.1.5. Information Cards
The Information Card (aka infoCard) technology allows to represent personal digital iden-
tities that people can use online. Conceptually, Information Cards are the digital version
of the physical cards we carry in our purse or wallet today. In line with this metaphor,
Information Cards are handled by users with a new kind of\digital wallet"called a selector.
The Information Card technology is advanced by a non-prot organization - the Informa-
tion Card Foundation (IFC)5 - composed by companies and individuals working together
to evolve the internet identity ecosystem. The foundation is currently organized in a series
of active Working Groups that deal with issues such as standardization, implementation
guidelines and best practices, interoperability with deployed identity technologies, etc.
Furthermore, they published several white papers and specications on Information Card
technology and practice, being [Nanda and Jones, 2008] and [Jones and (eds.), 2009] the
core documents that dene the identity formats and protocol ows.
5http://informationcard.net
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As dened in the aforementioned specications, the identity information is represented as
a signed XML document, also called security token.
Figure 2.7: Information Card format
Figure 2.7 shows the XML schema for Information Cards. As it can be noted, it contains
information such as expiration time, issuer data, type of supported claims, etc. The key
data in this document are the claims or user attributes. Depending on who is vouching
for the claims, two types of Information Cards are specied: 1) Personal or Self-Issued
cards, which represent a small, xed attribute set whose values are determined solely by
the user (e.g., phone number, e-mail address, web address); and 2) Managed Information
Cards, which contain claims issued by Identity Providers. The latter can be auditing,
non-auditing, or auditing-optional to accommodate the needs of dierent business models.
Based on the low level XML data, each Information Card has a visual representation in the
form of a card-shaped picture and a card name associated with it. This graphic metaphor
enables users to organize their digital identities and to easily select one they want to use
for any given interaction. The participants in digital identity interactions are IdPs, SPs
and users, with the particularity that users interact through an Identity Selector.
The Identity Selector is an active client that allows users to store, manage, and
use their digital identities. Examples of identity selectors are Microsoft's Windows
CardSpace [Bertocci et al., 2007], and several kinds of Identity Selectors from the Eclipse
Higgins Project [Higgins Project, 2009]. Among the key functionalities of a selector, the
most remarkable ones are: providing a consistent user experience for authentication based
on a graphic interface, allowing the creation and managing of personal Information Cards,
and facilitating the import and export of Information Cards in standard le formats.
The diagram in Figure 2.8 depicts the basic protocol ow when using an Information
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Figure 2.8: Basic protocol ow when using an Information Card at a web site (©[Jones
and (eds.), 2009])
Card at a web site. Steps 1, 2, and 5 are essentially the same as a typical forms-based
login today: (1) The user navigates to a protected page that requires authentication.
(2) The site redirects the browser to a login page, which presents a Web form. (5) The
browser posts the Web form that includes the login credentials supplied by the user back
to the login page. The site then validates the contents of the form including the user
credentials, typically writes a client-side browser cookie to the client for the protected
page domain, and redirects the browser back to the protected page. The key dierence
between this scenario and today's site login scenarios is that the login page returned to
the browser in step (2) contains an HTML tag that allows the user to choose to use an
Information Card to authenticate to the site. When the user selects this tag, the browser
invokes an Identity Selector, which implements the Information Card user experience and
protocols, and triggers steps (3) through (5). In Step (3), the browser Information Card
support code invokes the Identity Selector, passing it parameter values supplied by the
Information Card HTML tag supplied by the site in Step (2). The user then uses the
Identity Selector to choose an Information Card, which represents a digital identity that
can be used to authenticate at that site. Step (4) retrieves a Security Token that represents
the digital identity selected by the user from the Security Token Service at the Identity
Provider for that identity. In Step (5), the browser posts the token obtained back to the
Web site using a HTTPS/POST. The web site validates the token, completing the user's
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Information Card-based authentication to the Web site. Following authentication, the web
site typically then writes a client-side browser cookie and redirects the browser back to
the protected page.
Summarizing, the key feature of Information Card based identity systems is the focus on a
user centric experience. In addition, Information Cards support several data formats and
authentication methods such as SAML, and OpenID. On the other hand, beyond being
used to log into web sites, Information Cards can also facilitate other kinds of interactions
based on attribute exchange. One possible use of claims is online age verication, with
Identity Providers providing proof-of-age cards, and Relying Parties accepting them for
purposes such as online wine sales; other attributes could be veried as well. Another is
online payment, where merchants could accept online payment cards from payment issuers,
containing only the minimal information needed to facilitate payment. Furthermore, role
statements carried by claims can be used for access control decisions by Relying Parties.
2.1.6. O-Auth
OAuth is an open-source specication for authorization, which requires implicit federa-
tion. It denes a framework for allowing a third-party application (the \Consumer" or
\Client") to access protected resources from another application (the \Service Provider",
or \Resource Owner") at the request of a \User" of the Client application. OAuth allows
the user to enter his user credentials (e.g., username and password) only to the provider,
which then grants the Client permission to view the protected resources on behalf of the
user.
Though it is mainly a delegation protocol, the federation model is supported. The OAuth
specication simply assumes that there is some form of authentication mechanism in place
that is acceptable to the SP. It could be local authentication (e.g., as seen on Facebook,
etc), or federation from SAML, OpenID, etc.
The OAuth 1.0 Protocol was published as RFC 5849 [Hammer-Lahav, 2010], an informa-
tional Request for Comments, in April 2010. Currently, OAuth 2.0 is a work in progress at
the IETF. This evolution of the initial version focuses on client developer simplicity while
providing specic authorization ows for web applications, desktop applications, mobile
phones, and living room devices.
2.1 Federated Identity Management 31
The OAuth Authorization scheme uses the standard HTTP Authorization and WWW-
Authenticate headers to pass OAuth Protocol Parameters. According to the specications,
Table 2.5 shows the main OAuth concepts and denitions.
OAuth concept Denition
Service Provider A web application that allows access via OAuth
User An individual who has an account with the Service Provider
Consumer A website or application that uses OAuth to access the Service Provider on
behalf of the user
Protected Resource(s) Data controlled by the Service Provider, which the Consumer can access
through authentication
Consumer Key A value used by the Consumer to identify itself to the Service Provider
Request Token A value used by the Consumer to obtain authorization from the user, and
exchanged for an Access Token
Access Token A value used by the Consumer to gain access to the Protected Resources on
behalf of the user, instead of using the user's Service Provider credentials
Token Secret A secret used by the Consumer to establish ownership of a given Token.
Table 2.5: Relevant OAuth concepts
An example OAuth use case is allowing printing service printer.example.com (the
Consumer), to access private photos stored on photos.example.net (the Service
Provider) without requiring users to provide their photos.example.net credentials to
printer.example.com . The underlying OAuth protocol ow that would take place in a
scenario like the mentioned example is depicted in Figure 2.9.
The steps in the protocol are explained below:
In step A the Consumer asks for a Request Token by sending an HTTP request to
the Service Provider's Request Token URL. The request must be signed and contain,
among other parameters, the Consumer Key that identies the Consumer.
In step B The Service Provider veries the signature and Consumer Key. If suc-
cessful, it generates a Request Token and Token Secret and returns them to the
Consumer in the HTTP response body.
In step C, the Consumer must obtain approval from the user by directing the user
to the Service Provider.
In step D the Service Provider veries the user's identity and asks for consent. After
the user authenticates with the Service Provider and grants permission for Consumer
access, the Consumer must be notied that the Request Token has been authorized
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Figure 2.9: OAuth v1.0 Authentication ow (©[Atwood et al., 2007])
and ready to be exchanged for an Access Token. Thus, the Service Providers directs
the user back to the Consumer.
In step E, the Consumer makes an HTTP request to the Service Provider's Ac-
cess Token URL in order to obtain an Access Token. The request must be signed
and contains, among other parameters, the Consumer Key and the Request Token
previously obtained.
In step F, the Service Provider veryes the request and, if successful, generates an
Access Token and a Token Secret that are returned in the HTTP response body.
In step G, the Consumer is able to access the protected resources on behalf of the
user by generating signed requests that contain the Access Token and Token Secret
granted in the previous step.
In summary, OAuth aims to unify the experience and implementation of delegated web
service authentication into a single, community-driven protocol. The specication builds
on existing protocols and best practices that have been independently implemented by
various websites. An open standard, supported by large and small providers alike, pro-
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motes a consistent and trusted experience for both application developers and the users
of those applications.
2.2. Trust and Reputation Models
2.2.1. Basic Concepts and Denitions
Trust and reputation are present in our daily lives and constitute an important basis
for security since they are indispensable to allow cooperation between strangers. These
concepts have been widely investigated in a range of disciplines and academic domains,
such as psychology, economy or sociology. Similarly, since the advent of the digital era,
trust and reputation emerged as vital concepts also in the eld of computer science. The
signicance of incorporating trust and reputation systems to this eld lies on the fact
that they are enabling technologies which aid in decision making, support secure online
transactions, and whose inclusion is expected to guarantee the long-term growth and
success of the Internet [The Internet Society, 2008].
For these reasons, there is a rapidly growing literature around trust and reputation sys-
tems, being [McKnight and Chervany, 1996], [Jsang et al., 2007], [Sabater and Sierra,
2005] and [Gomez Marmol and Martnez Perez, 2010] representative samples of research
on the topics. More specically, [McKnight and Chervany, 1996] is a classical paper that
elaborates on the meanings of trust; [Jsang et al., 2007] and [Sabater and Sierra, 2005] are
surveys of trust and reputation models; and [Gomez Marmol and Martnez Perez, 2010] is
a more recent work that extracts the common points in trust and reputation models and
provide a series of guidelines towards standardization.
Thus, based on the literature, it can be stated that computational trust tries to apply the
human notion of trust into the digital world with the aim to increase the reliability and
performance of electronic communities. However, due to the subjective nature and the
applicability of the terms in dierent contexts and from dierent perspectives, there is a
lack of consensus in the denition of trust. It can be observed that trust is an abstract
and complex notion related to concepts such as e.g., condence, reliance, dependence, or
faith. For these reasons, trust is quite challenging to formalize and many denitions have
been given. To name a few relevant ones:
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Gambetta states that \trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the
subjective probability with which an agent will perform a particular action, both before
[we] can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity of ever to be able to
monitor it) and in a context in which it aects [our] own action" [Gambetta, 2000].
Jsang sees trust as \a belief that one entity has about another entity. Firstly, there
must be a reason behind the belief, and secondly, the belief expresses an expectation
of how an entity will behave or perform" [Jsang, 1996].
As dened by Marsh trust is \a useful judgment in the light of experience of the
behavior of others" [Marsh, 1994].
According to the ITU-T, \generally an entity can be said to trust a second entity
when the rst entity makes the assumption that the second entity will behave exactly
as the rst entity expects" [ITU, 2000].
Despite the lack of a unique consistent denition, a number of commonly identied prop-
erties of trust can be derived from the above statements and the vast number of denitions
found in the literature. In this sense, trust is usually specied in terms of a relationship
between a trustor, the subject that trusts a target entity, which is known as the trustee i.e.,
the entity that is trusted. Trust forms the basis for allowing a trustee to use or manipulate
resources owned by a trustor or may inuence a trustor's decision to use a service provided
by a trustee. Thus, trust can form an important factor in decision-making. Furthermore,
a number works distinguish between situational versus general trust, being the rst asso-
ciated to particular situations or contexts and the latter a general measure of the global
trustworthiness of an entity independently of the context. Trust ultimately is a personal
and subjective phenomenon that is based on various factors or evidences, and that some
of those carry more weight than others. For example, personal experience typically carries
more weight than second hand trust referrals, but in the absence of personal experience,
trust often has to be based on referrals from others.
On the other hand, reputation has also been widely studied in the literature. In this case,
the existing denitions show that the main property inherent to the concept of reputation
is the sense of \collective thinking". Therefore, as described in [Jsang et al., 2007],
reputation can be considered as a \collective measure of trustworthiness (in the sense of
reliability) based on the referrals or ratings from members in a community".
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In reputation systems, usually four distinct types of agents or roles are involved [Casare
and Sichman, 2005]. Despite the terminology may vary, the semantics of these roles are:
Evaluators: these are agents who can develop an evaluation or evaluative belief about
other agents, including individuals, groups, organizations, etc. The information used
by evaluators can be direct experiences with the targets or through third parties.
Targets: these are agents that play the role of the evaluation object.
Beneciaries: these are individuals, groups, organizations, etc., who benet from the
evaluation.
Propagators: these are third parties that can propagate the reputation information
to other agents who need the information, usually beneciaries.
Furthermore, according to Resnik et al. [Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002] reputation systems
need to have the following three properties to operate:
Longevity of agents: agents are long lived, which means that it should be impossible
for an agent to change his/her identity or pseudonym to erase the records about
his/her past behaviors. Without longevity, agents can erase their bad reputation
scores easily, so new reputation scores may not reect their real reputation status.
Protocol of ratings: reputation systems need to have a certain protocol by which
ratings about current interactions are captured and distributed.
Usability of reputation system: ratings about past interactions must be useful to
guide certain decisions or actions. There is no reason for reputation systems to exist
without any usability.
However, because the notions of trust and reputation themselves are vague, what con-
stitutes a trust or a reputation system is dicult to describe concisely. Nevertheless, it
is clear that there are important dierences between the two concepts. Basically, trust
systems produce a score that reects the relying party's subjective view of an entity's
trustworthiness, whereas reputation systems produce an entity's public reputation score
as seen by the whole community. This means that an entity can trust others based on
their good reputation, while it can also trust some other entity with a bad reputation be-
cause it has a certain knowledge based on past direct experience or referral relationships.
But trust and reputation models also have certain key processes in common (as identi-
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ed in [Gomez Marmol and Martnez Perez, 2010]) such as scoring, ranking, rewarding,
punishing or gathering behavioral information.
There can of course be trust systems that incorporate elements of reputation systems and
vice versa, so that it is not always clear how a given systems should be classied. In fact,
trust and reputation are used interchangeably in some of the existing literature, since the
use of reputation information may foster trust.
Here, we provide a brief summary of these models based on the network architecture, as
done in [Jsang et al., 2007]: centralized or distributed systems. For each class, a general
description of the model operation is provided together with the main limitations and
advantages, and some examples of existing models in the category and their application
scenarios.
2.2.2. Centralized Models
In a centralized reputation system, all the information about the performance of a given
participant is collected as ratings from other members in the community who have had
direct experience with that participant. In these systems, a central authority is in charge
of collecting the ratings, computing a reputation score for every participant and making
these scores publicly available. Hence, participants can access each other's scores and use
them when deciding whether or not to transact with a particular entity. Fig. 2.10 shows
a typical centralized reputation system, where A and B denote transaction partners with
a history of transactions in the past, and who consider transacting with each other in the
present.
The global reputations are updated after every transaction, since transacting entities pro-
vide ratings about each other's performance in the transaction.
Centralized reputation systems have important advantages. Firstly, the protocol for gath-
ering/conveying reputation data is easier. Every entity just has to communicate with
the central authority to submit votes or retrieve reputation about others in a client-server
manner. Secondly, the computation of aggregated values is performed by the central server
so there is no computation overhead in the clients.
On the other hand, there are also some drawbacks. Since the architecture is centralized,
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Figure 2.10: Centralised reputation system (©[Jsang et al., 2007])
the reputation server becomes a single point of failure, as well as a bottleneck which can
restrict the ow of transactions. In addition, the scalability of this systems is limited. On
the one hand it may be unfeasible to have a single authority that all entities trust. And
on the other hand, as the number of entities grow, providing performance and robustness
requires a large invest of money for the central authority.
Due to their simplicity, most of the successfully deployed reputation systems have a central-
ized architecture. Among popular well-known systems, we can cite EBay 6, the Epinions
system 7 for products and shop reviews, or Google's Web Page Ranking System (PageR-
ank) [Page et al., 1999].
2.2.3. Distributed Models
In a distributed reputation system there is no central authority for submitting ratings
or obtaining reputation scores of others. Instead, dierent distributed approaches can
be followed. There can be distributed stores where ratings can be submitted, or each
entity simply records the opinion about experiences with other parties, and provides this
information on request. Thus, whenever an entity wants to transact with another unknown
party, it has to rst nd the distributed stores, or try to obtain opinions from entities that
6http://www.ebay.com
7http://www.epinions.com
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have had direct experience with that target party. Fig. 2.11 shows the operation model of
a distributed reputation system.
Figure 2.11: Distributed reputation system (©[Jsang et al., 2007])
After obtaining the scores from the distributed stores or peers, it is the asking entity the
one that has to compute the aggregated reputation value based on the received ratings.
Obviously, if the entity has had direct experience with the target party, it can be also
taken into account for the calculation, possibly carrying a higher weight than the received
opinions. Since there is no central authority this kind of system do not have a single point
of failure. However, the process of data dissemination and reputation calculation gets
more complex. In a distributed environment, each participant is responsible for collecting
and combining ratings from other participants. In this conditions it is often impossible
or too costly to obtain ratings resulting from all interactions with a given party. Instead
the reputation score is based on a subset of ratings.Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks, where
every node plays the role of both client and server, represent an environment well suited
for distributed reputation management.
The application of trust and reputation systems to P2P networks is specially useful to
identify unreliable or malicious participants in order to isolate and avoid transactions with
them. Thus, many authors have proposed trust and reputation models for P2P networks,
such as the Eigentrust algorithm [Kamvar et al., 2003], approaches [Cornelli et al., 2002]
and [Damiani et al., 2002] to identify reputable servents and reliable resources in P2P
applications for le exchange, or the PTM [Almenarez et al., 2004] model designed to
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manage trust relationships between peers in open and dynamic environments.
Summarizing, centralized reputation systems rely on a central entity to gather, compute
and disseminate reputation information. Distributed reputation systems on the other hand
rely on decentralized solutions where every peer stores information about the other peers
with which they interacted, and dissemination is performed on demand between peers.
To conclude, centralized reputation systems work well and are easier to deploy. However,
there are environments where a distributed reputation system, i.e., without any centralized
functions, is better suited than a centralized one.
2.3. Risk Assessment
2.3.1. Basic Concepts and Denitions
Risk is a very general concept and it has been interpreted in dierent ways depending
on the specic application. Consequently, there are many denitions in the literature,
sometimes inconsistent and ambiguous.
Here we name a few denitions that help in contextualizing this thesis:
Risk is dened as ``the possibility of something bad happening" in the Cambridge
dictionary8.
As dened in the wikipedia9, \risk concerns the expected value of one or more results
of one or more future events. Technically, the value of those results may be positive
or negative."
According to the ISO Guide 73:2002 [Guide, ISO, 2002], risk is \the eect of uncer-
tainty on objectives."
In the norm OHSAS (Occupational Health and Safety Assessment Series)
18001:2007 [Palomino and Rivero, 2008] risk is dened as \a combination of the
likelihood of an occurrence of a hazardous event or exposure (s) and the severity of
injury or ill health that can be caused by the event or exposure (s)."
8dictionary.cambridge.org
9en.wikipedia.org
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According to NIST SP 800-30 [Stoneburner et al., 2002], risk is \a function of the
likelihood of a given threat-source's exercising a particular potential vulnerability, and
the resulting impact of that adverse event on the organization. "
The common theme in these denitions and in those found in the literature is a concern
with potential future harm or loss. Thus, most denitions view risk as a combination of
the probability of an undesired event and the magnitude of the impact if it occurs. Risk is
strictly tied to uncertainty. Uncertainties include events (which may or not happen) and
uncertainties caused by ambiguity or a lack of information.
More formally (and quantitatively), risk is proportional to both the results expected from
an event and to the probability of this event. Mathematically, risk is generally dened as:
Risk = Probability of Event  Impact of Event (2.1)
Since risk is crucial for secure decision making, it is useful to create models for risk assess-
ment that allow to calculate risk based on the generic formula in (2.1). Risk assessment
can be dened as the determination of a risk value for a specic context, which is a step
of risk management. Risk management is the identication, assessment, and prioritiza-
tion of risks followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to minimize,
monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of unfortunate events or to maximize
the realization of opportunities [Purdy, 2010].
The risk assessment step can be done following dierent approaches: quantitative analysis,
semi-quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. [ENISA, 2006]. In quantitative analysis
numerical values are assigned to both impact and likelihood. These values are derived
from a variety of sources. Impact can be determined by evaluating and processing the
various results of an event or by extrapolation from experimental studies or past data.
The quality of the entire analysis depends on the accuracy of the assigned values and the
validity of the statistical models used. The advantage of this analysis is that it provides
a precise numerical risk value which is useful for cost benet analysis of recommended
controls. However, depending on the numerical ranges used to express the measurement,
the meaning of the numerical risk value may lead to ambiguities; a high risk value can be
due to the high value of the asset or the high probability of loss or both factors. Thus,
high risks due to high probability and low impact may be considered equal to high risks
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due to low probability and high impact, and the meaning is dierent in each case.
On the other hand, the qualitative analysis uses descriptive variables to represent the
magnitude and likelihood of potential consequences. The scales used can be formed or
adjusted to suit the circumstances, and dierent descriptions may be used for dierent
risks. This kind of analysis is useful for example when non-tangible aspects of risk are
to be considered (e.g., reputation, culture, image, etc.) or when there is a lack of ade-
quate information and numerical data or resources necessary for a statistically acceptable
quantitative approach. This kind of analysis provides a mean to identify and assess risks
in a relatively shorter time. However, the cost benet analysis of recommended controls
becomes dicult in the absence of a precise numerical risk value.
Finally, in semi-quantitative analysis approaches the objective is to assign numeric values
to the scales used in the qualitative assessment. The mapping of these values to the risk
can be obtained using a mapping table based on the advises of the security experts. These
values are usually indicative and not real, which is the prerequisite of the quantitative
approach. Therefore, as the value allocated to each scale is not an accurate representation
of the actual magnitude of impact or likelihood, the numbers used must only be combined
using a formula that recognizes the limitations or assumptions made in the description of
the scales used.
As risk carries so many dierent meanings there are also a number of formal methods used
to assess or to \measure" risk. Here we summarize four well-known methodologies in order
to provide a brief background that contextualizes the thesis.
NIST 800-30 Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems
and CVSS
The NIST 800-30 Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems [Stoneb-
urner et al., 2002] is a risk management methodology developed by the National Institute
for Standards and Technology. The steps of risk analysis using NIST 800-30, summarized
in Figure 2.12, are described below.
1. System Characterization. This step involves the collection of system-related infor-
mation of dierent kinds (hardware, software, system interfaces, etc.) The goal is to
establish the scope of the risk management eorts.
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Figure 2.12: NIST 800-30 risk management methodology (©[Stoneburner et al., 2002])
2. Threat Identication. The goal of this step is to identify the potential threat sources
and compile a threat statement listing potential threat sources that are applicable
to the system being evaluated.
3. Vulnerability Identication. The goal of this step is to develop a list of system
vulnerabilities (aws or weaknesses) that could be exploited by the potential threat
sources.
4. Control Analysis. The goal of this step is to analyze the controls that have been
implemented, or are planned for implementation, by the organization to minimize
or eliminate the likelihood (or probability) of a threat's exercising a system vulner-
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ability.
5. Likelihood Determination. This step involves the mapping of vulnerabilities to their
associated likelihood. The likelihood that a potential vulnerability could be exercised
by a given threat-source can be described as High, Medium, or Low. This likelihood
levels are dened in a descriptive qualitative manner in the scale Low, Medium and
High.
6. Impact Analysis. The goal of this step is to determine the adverse impact resulting
from a successful threat exercise of a vulnerability. The adverse impact of a security
event can be described in terms of loss or degradation of any, or a combination of
any, of the following three security goals: integrity, availability, and condentiality.
Some tangible impacts can be measured quantitatively in lost revenue, the cost of
repairing the system, or the level of eort required to correct problems caused by
a successful threat action. Other impacts (e.g., loss of public condence, loss of
credibility, damage to an organizationSs interest) cannot be measured in specic
units but can be qualied or described in terms of High, Medium, and Low impacts.
Because of the generic nature of this discussion, the NIST 800-30 guide designates
and describes only the qualitative categories High, Medium, and Low impact.
7. Risk Determination. The purpose of this step is to assess the level of risk. The
determination of risk for a particular threat/vulnerability pair can be expressed as
a function of: (1) the likelihood of a given threat-source's attempting to exercise a
given vulnerability, (2) the magnitude of the impact should a threat-source success-
fully exercise the vulnerability, and (3) the adequacy of planned or existing security
controls for reducing or eliminating risk. To measure risk, a risk-level matrix such as
the sample matrix depicted in Figure 2.13 must be developed. Thus, the nal deter-
mination of risk is derived by multiplying the ratings assigned for threat likelihood
and threat impact. The sample matrix in Figure 2.13 shows how the overall risk
levels of High, Medium, and Low are derived. The determination of these risk levels
or ratings may be subjective. The rationale for this justication can be explained in
terms of the probability assigned for each threat likelihood level and a value assigned
for each impact level. In this example:
The probability assigned for each threat likelihood level is 1.0 for High, 0.5 for
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Medium, 0.1 for Low.
The value assigned for each impact level is 100 for High, 50 for Medium, and
10 for Low.
And the nal risk scale assigns High Risk for values >50 to 100; Medium Risk for
values >10 to 50; and Low Risk for values from 1 to 10.
Figure 2.13: Risk Level Matrix sample according to NIST 800-30 methodology
(©[Stoneburner et al., 2002])
8. Control Recommendations. During this step of the process, controls that could miti-
gate or eliminate the identied risks, as appropriate to the organizationSs operations,
are provided. The goal of the recommended controls is to reduce the level of risk to
the IT system and its data to an acceptable level.
9. Results Documentation. Once the risk assessment has been completed (threat-
sources and vulnerabilities identied, risks assessed, and recommended controls pro-
vided), the results should be documented in an ocial report.
Magerit
Magerit was prepared and promoted by CSAE (Consejo Superior de Administracion Elec-
tronica), Spain in response to the perception that the government (and, in general, the
whole society) increasingly depends on information technologies for achieving its service ob-
jectives [Ministerio de Administraciones Publicas de Espa~na, 1999]. The Magerit method-
ology fo risk analysis is comprised of the following ve steps:
1. Determination of assets. This step involves identifying those assets that are relevant
for the organization, their interrelationships and their value. The essential asset is
the information handled by the system, i.e., the data, but other relevant assets can
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be identied around these data, for example the services that can be provided to
these data or the computer applications that allow these data to be handled.
2. Determination of threats. The goal of this step is to determine the threats that may
aect each asset. Threats are \things that happen." Of all the things that could
happen, those that are of interest are those that could happen to our assets and
cause damage. There are threats from natural disasters (earthquakes, oods, etc)
and industrial accidents (pollution, electrical failures, etc). There are threats caused
by persons, either through errors or intentional attacks.
3. Determination of safeguards. The goal of this step is to determine what safeguards
are available and how eective they are against the risk. Safeguards or counter-
measures are procedures or technological mechanisms that reduce the risk.
4. Determination of the impact. This step involves the estimation of the impact, dened
as the measurement of the damage to an asset arising from the occurrence of a threat.
5. Determination of the risk. This step involves the estimation of the risk, dened as
the measurement of the probable damage to the system. Risk is the weighted impact
on the rate of occurrence (or the expectation of appearance) of the threat. Knowing
the impact of the threats to the assets, the risk can be derived by taking into account
the frequency of occurrence.
OWASP Risk Rating Methodology
The risk rating methodology proposed by OWASP (The Open Web Application Security
Project) [OWASP, 2012] is based on the conception of risk as equal to Likelihood x Impact.
They rst decompose the likelihood and impact in factors and then show how to combine
these factors to determine the overall severity for the risk.
The methodology is comprised of six steps:
1. Risk identication. This step consists of identifying a security risk that needs to be
rated. It means gathering information about the threat agents involved, the attack
they are using, the vulnerability involved, and the impact of a successful exploit.
2. Break down of factors for estimating likelihood. At the highest level, this is a rough
measure of how likely a particular vulnerability is to be exploited by an attacker. The
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factors that inuence the estimate of the likelihood are divided into two categories:
threat agent factors and vulnerability factors. Each category has a set of options and
each of the options has a likelihood rating from 0 to 9 (see Table 2.6), which will be
used to estimate the overall likelihood.
Factor Category Option Rating
Threat Agent Factors
Skill level How technically skilled is this group of threat agents? No
technical skills (1), some technical skills (3), advanced com-
puter user (4), network and programming skills (6), security
penetration skills (9)
Motive How motivated is this group of threat agents to nd and ex-
ploit this vulnerability? Low or no reward (1), possible reward
(4), high reward (9)
Opportunity What resources and opportunity are required for this group of
threat agents to nd and exploit this vulnerability? full access
or expensive resources required (0), special access or resources
required (4), some access or resources required (7), no access
or resources required (9)
Size How large is this group of threat agents? Developers (2),
system administrators (2), intranet users (4), partners (5),
authenticated users (6), anonymous Internet users (9)
Vulnerability Factors
Ease of discovery How easy is it for this group of threat agents to discover this
vulnerability? Practically impossible (1), dicult (3), easy
(7), automated tools available (9)
Ease of exploit How easy is it for this group of threat agents to actually ex-
ploit this vulnerability? Theoretical (1), dicult (3), easy (5),
automated tools available (9)
Awareness How well known is this vulnerability to this group of threat
agents? Unknown (1), hidden (4), obvious (6), public knowl-
edge (9)
Intrusion Detection How likely is an exploit to be detected? Active detection in
application (1), logged and reviewed (3), logged without re-
view (8), not logged (9)
Table 2.6: Contributing factors for likelihood estimation according to OWASP Risk Rating
Methodology [OWASP, 2012]
3. Break down of factors for estimating impact. There are two kinds of impact factors.
The rst is the technical impact on the application, the data it uses, and the functions
it provides. The other is the business impact on the business and company operating
the application. As in the case of likelihood estimation, each factor has a set of
options, and each option has an impact rating from 0 to 9 (see Table 2.7) associated
with it. This ratings will be used to estimate the overall impact.
4. Determining severity of the Risk. In this step the overall risk is calculated. For
this purpose both likelihood and impact are computed as the average of the scores
of each option. After calculating these two numerical values, thay are classied as
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Factor Category Option Rating
Technical Factors
Loss of condentiality How much data could be disclosed and how sensitive is it?
Minimal non-sensitive data disclosed (2), minimal critical data
disclosed (6), extensive non-sensitive data disclosed (6), exten-
sive critical data disclosed (7), all data disclosed (9)
Loss of integrity How much data could be corrupted and how damaged is it?
Minimal slightly corrupt data (1), minimal seriously corrupt
data (3), extensive slightly corrupt data (5), extensive seri-
ously corrupt data (7), all data totally corrupt (9)
Loss of availability How much service could be lost and how vital is it? Minimal
secondary services interrupted (1), minimal primary services
interrupted (5), extensive secondary services interrupted (5),
extensive primary services interrupted (7), all services com-
pletely lost (9)
Loss of accountability Are the threat agents' actions traceable to an individual?
Fully traceable (1), possibly traceable (7), completely anony-
mous (9)
Bussiness Factors
Financial damage How much nancial damage will result from an exploit?
Less than the cost to x the vulnerability (1), minor eect
on annual prot (3), signicant eect on annual prot (7),
bankruptcy (9)
Reputation damage Would an exploit result in reputation damage that would harm
the business? Minimal damage (1), Loss of major accounts
(4), loss of goodwill (5), brand damage (9)
Non-compliance How much exposure does non-compliance introduce? Minor
violation (2), clear violation (5), high prole violation (7)
Privacy violation How much personally identiable information could be dis-
closed? One individual (3), hundreds of people (5), thousands
of people (7), millions of people (9)
Table 2.7: Contributing factors for impact estimation according to OWASP Risk Rating
Methodology [OWASP, 2012]
LOW, MEDIUM or HIGH. Less than 3 is LOW, 3 to less than 6 is MEDIUM, and 6
to 9 is HIGH. Finally, likelihood and impact are combined according to Figure 2.14
in order to get a nal severity rating for the risk.
Figure 2.14: Overall risk calculation according to OWASP Risk Rating Methodology
(©[OWASP, 2012])
5. Deciding what to x. After following the previous steps, the outcome is a prioritized
list of risks to x. OWASP recommends to x the most severe risks rst in order
to improve the overall risk prole. It is also important to take into account the cost
associated to implementing controls to x a risk, since some risks mighth not be
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worth xing.
6. Customizing the risk rating model. Finally, OWASP recognizes that there is not a
risk rating methodology that is universaly applicable. Thus, costumization is allowed
and the following mechanisms are considered as convenient ways to tailor the model:
Adding factors: dierent factors that better t the applicacion can be chosen.
For example, a military application might add impact factors related to loss of
human life or classied information.
Customizing options: the provided options are just a general sample, but new
options can be added. Furthermore, the scores associated with the options can
be also changed.
Weighting factors: the model above assumes that all the factors are equally
important. However, the factors can be weighted to emphasize those that are
more signicant for a spcic context.
Despite the various methodologies in conducting security risk analysis and them being
tailored to particular contexts, there are commonalities in their steps. Basically, all the
methodologies share a common framework similar to the following procedure: (1) assets,
vulnerabilities and threats identication; (2) risk assessment; (3) selection of controls; and
(4) re-evaluation.
We have chosen NIST 800-30, Magerit and OWASP as representative examples of risk
management methods, but more risk methodologies have been developed. The survey
in [ENISA, 2006] provides a more detailed compilation of risk methodologies.
As stated before, risk is tied to uncertainty. But there is also another concept closely
related to risk: trust. A decision to trust is usually associated with an explicit or implicit
assessment of risk. For example, if risk is low, it is easier to trust; but if risk is high, trust
is generally less willingly assumed. Nevertheless, the relationship between trust and risk
is much more complex and therefore hard to formalize. In the next section, a literature
review of works considering risk evaluation within trust models is provided.
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2.3.2. Risk Considerations in Trust Models
The relationship between risk and trust concepts has also been widely studied in the
literature. In \Why Trust is not proportional to Risk" [Solhaug et al., 2007], Solhaug et al.
remark that it is crucial to understand the relationship between trust and risk in order to
allow secure trust-based cooperation and they also provide an analysis in this regard.
They criticize Josang and Presti's idea in [Jsang and Presti, 2004] that \the more trust-
worthy a potential partner, the less risk involved in doing transactions with him." The
authors also disagree with the trust view presented by Grandison and Sloman [Grandison
and Sloman, 2000], which suggests that \the level of trust has an approximate inverse
relationship to the degree of risk". In turn, their vision is that trust is generally neither
proportional nor inverse proportional to risk. Rather, they state that as higher trust-
worthiness means lower probability of an incident, trust is inverse to the probability of a
risk and proportional to the value the trustee is willing to stake, i.e., proportional to the
consequence of a risk. The risk can hence not be determined from the trust value alone.
As mentioned in [Solhaug et al., 2007], there is a number of other inuential contributions
to the area of trust and trust management that are unclear about the precise relation
between trust and risk. Motivated by the lack of consistency in the literature, Gefen et
al. [Gefen et al., 2003] highlight also the need for clarication in the relationship between
trust and risk concepts. They point out that the IT literature on the topic embraces three
primary models for the relationship between trust and risk. These three models, depicted
in Figure 2.3.2, are: (1) the consideration of trust and risk as independent factors; (2) the
consideration of a mediating relationship between both factors; and (3) the consideration
of a moderating relationship.
The rst case encompasses those studies which hypothesize that trust and risk are not
related in a specic cause-eect relation. Instead, the vision about the trust/risk relation-
ship according to this model is that both simultaneously aect behavior in an independent
way. On the other hand, the mediating relationship model suggested in a number of re-
search works states that trust aects perceived risk, which aects behavior. Thus, the
existence of trust reduces the perception of risk, which in turn increases the willingness to
transact. Finally, the last model conceptualizes the relationship between trust and risk as
a moderating relationship, i.e., it is believed that the eect of trust on behavior is dierent
when the level of risk is low versus when the level of risk is high.
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(a) Risk and trust aect behavior independently
(b) Risk mediates the eect of trust on behavior
(c) Risk moderates the eect of trust on behavior
Figure 2.15: Models of trust and risk relationship (©[Gefen et al., 2003])
2.4. Related Work
As will be shown in Chapter 3, none of the above identity management solutions dene a
suitable trust and risk model to allow dynamic and secure federation establishment. Or,
equivalently, no trust/risk model has been yet dened that is appropriate for the specic
federation scenario. This section reviews both the related work carried out by researchers
(individually or in the framework of a research project), as well as the standardization
initiatives that are related or may contribute in any aspect to realize the vision of dynamic
federation.
2.4.1. Individual Research and International Projects
The Internet2 group, Ping Identity and Stockholm University are working in \Distributed
Dynamic SAML" [Internet2, 2008] to deal with challenges regarding deployment, scalabil-
ity and interoperability of SAML-based federation deployments. They aim to achieve: 1)
distribution, in the sense of changing the operations of typical multi-party SAML feder-
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ations to be less dependent on central administration; and 2) dynamism, which implies
various means to support discovery and autoconguration instead of static prearrange-
ment between parties. Thus, the group is developing proposals to be promoted in various
communities, including potential submissions to the OASIS Security Services Technical
Committee for consideration as standards.
The main important aspects of their contribution are that the partner keys used to sign and
validate SAML SSO messages are included in the SAML metadata document, and trust
in these keys is derived from the established trust in the metadata document itself. Also,
the metadata document must be signed and the X.509 certicate chain used to validate
the signature is included in the document. Thus, each partner just needs to congure the
root certicates.
But this idea is not quite dierent than just relying on X.509 certicates. There are
only two ways to establish trust in the metadata signatures: based on metadata signing
certicates together with a traditional PKI or using out-of-band certicates as a form of
pre-shared keys for signature validation. The proposal is focused on reducing the manual
steps but it does not address dynamism in the sense of trust establishment and evolution
and does not consider risk assessment. Although the process is lighter and federations
are established more rapidly, trust continues to lie in pre-established relationships, with
no evolution over time, and entities cannot take autonomous decisions without some pre-
congured information. Furthermore, the proposal is tied to certicate-based trust deci-
sions and it is focused on the web SSO prole, but a more general solution is needed that
can be applied to a broader range of federation use cases and protocols.
Another related work, carried out by Boursas et al. [Boursas and Danciu, 2008] [Boursas
and Hommel, 2006], contributes towards the dynamic management and expansion of Lib-
erty Circles of Trust. The main idea is to maintain a repository where trust relationships
are stored. This repository is accesed by the providers in a federation in order to nd a
path to unknown entities and derive transitive trust relationships. Basically, they dene
algorithms and work-ows to allow the establishment of dynamic transitive relationships.
However, problems such as the exchange of trust information over current federation pro-
tocols, are not addressed. In other paper by Boursas et al. [Boursas and Hommel, 2007],
they complete the initial proposal and also introduce a notion of risk management. Risk
values are used together with trust to dene an enhanced access control to service provider
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resources. In regard to risk quantication, they just assume that resource owners always
specify risk levels associated to their resources. Then, based on this assumption they ex-
emplify it by means of a four level linguistic scale (low, medium, high, and critical risk).
The nal decision of granting access or not is made by requiring higher trust values when
the risk increases. It is to note that this approach does not evaluate risk and trust to
establish a federation, but to grant user access to service provider resources.
Bertino et al. in [Bertino et al., 2007] propose to introduce Automated Trust Negotia-
tion techniques (ATN) [Skogsrud et al., 2004] in identity management frameworks as a
mean to allow dynamic cooperation. Thus, negotiating parties establish trust between
them through bilateral credential disclosure. Their approach, called FAMTN (framework-
federated attribute management and trust negotiation) supports negotiations between an
SPs and the user, and between two SPs in the same federation. Such a negotiation aims
to establish a trust level sucient to release sensitive resources, which can be either data
or services.
In other recent work [Kylau et al., 2009], Kylau et al. identify possible trust patterns
in identity federation topologies and enumerate a number of risks as the basis to discuss
the trust requirements of each pattern. In this regard, Also Jsang et al. [Jsang et al.,
2005] dene trust requirements for several identity management models including the
federated case. These works set an important foundation for modeling trust in federation
scenarios. Furthermore, a conclusion that can be easily extracted is that current federation
specications assume that a trust relationship exists but there is no standardization about
how to create or manage it in an automated and secure manner.
All the above mentioned works preceded our proposal and motivate our ideas, but after-
ward new research also started to grow around the eld. The work by Gomez-Marmol et
al. [Gomez Marmol et al., 2010] presents TRIMS, a \Privacy-Aware Trust and Reputation
Model for Identity Management Systems." Their model is oriented to web scenarios with
three kind of entities: WSPs, WSCs and users. The WSPs are those entities providing
identity attributes (i.e., age, e-mail, location, etc.); while the WSCs are the entities actu-
ally delivering the requested web service (e.g., a lm, a book, etc.) to the users based on
the identity information. Thus, when no Service Level Agreement (SLA) exist to handle
the exchange of identity information between providers in a secure manner, TRIMS can
be applied to calculate trust and make a decision based on the computed trust value. The
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trust value that a WSP assigns to an WSC is an aggregation of users opinions, other WSPs
opinions and history of transactions. The nal trust value refers to general trust since it
does not dene trust and/or reputation contexts. Furthermore, risk is not included and
the protocol exchange to gather trust data is not detailed. In [Zuo et al., 2010], Zuo et
al. present a solution to achieve dynamic identity federation based on the introduction
of ATN techniques. In this sense, there is a similarity with the work done by Bertino et
al. [Bertino et al., 2007]. However, [Bertino et al., 2007] applied ATN to improve access
control to user attributes while Zuo's proposal applies ATN to negotiate on federation
establishment. This dierentiation implies that Zuo's ideas are closer to our work. More
specically, the authors propose an architecture together with a new information exchange
protocol and a prototype implementation of the dynamic federation framework. The pro-
posal is built on SAML and the trust relationship is only based on punctual negotiation,
without monitoring the relationship and the evolution of trust.
Similar research, conducted by Xiang et al. [Xiang et al., 2010] also identies the need to
move from static agreements in federations to a more exible model. Thus, they propose
an underlying network and trust model for dynamic federation, which uses a modied
Dijkstra algorithm for the calculation of a trust bootstraping value for unknown parties.
Each entity rst places an initial trust values for neighbors (i.e., for known entities) based
on the existence of digital certicates that verify their identity. Depending if the certicates
are issued by a common Certication Authority (CA), by a trusted CA or they are self-
signed, the trust level is higher or lower. Then, trust in non-neighbor entities is calculated
by modeling the problem as nding the shortest path between the two involved entities
and multiplying the trust values for all the links that conform the path. For this purpose,
each entity handles a trust table where trust values are stored. The network model consists
of federations that have IdP-hubs acting as external interfaces to interoperate with other
federations. For the IdP-Hubs to be able to know the network topology and operate over
it, they conceptually describe a protocol (DYNFED) similar to link state routing protocols.
The protocol is used to announce the local trust levels stored in the entities' trust tables,
so IdP-Hubs are able to construct the network graph under their domain. As occurred in
all the other approaches, risk is not considered when making decisions. Instead they use
a general trust value calculated in a transitive manner.
On the other hand, there are a number of key research projects - primarily funded by
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the European Commission - that are involved (or have been involved) in identity manage-
ment related topics. We gather here the most relevant ones. More specically, within the
Seventh Research Framework Programme of the European Union from 2007 to 2013, sev-
eral new projects related to identity management started. PICOS (Privacy and Identity
Management for Community Services) [PICOS Project, 2011] investigates and develops
a state-of-the-art platform for providing trust, privacy and identity management in mo-
bile communities. PrimeLife [PrimeLife Project, 2011], that is a continuation of project
PRIME [PRIME Project, 2008], works on privacy-enhancing technologies that can enable
citizens to execute their legal rights to control personal information in on-line transactions.
Thus, the project is advancing the state-of-the-art in the areas of human computer inter-
faces, congurable policy languages, web service federations, infrastructures and privacy-
enhancing cryptography. For this purpose, PrimeLife works with the relevant open source
communities and standardization bodies. The SWIFT [SWIFT Project, 2010] project
(Secure Widespread Identities for Federated Telecommunications) leverages identity tech-
nology as a key to integrate service and transport infrastructures for the benet of users
and the providers. It focuses on extending identity functions and federation to the network
while addressing usability and privacy concerns. The research within SWIFT includes a
gap analysis to identie challenges in existing identity frameworks, a requirements list to
address these gaps and a generic architecture based on the requirements. As PRIME does,
this project has an important activity in standardization organisms. Summarizing, PICOS
and PrimeLife are more concerned with privacy whilst SWIFT focuses on improving fed-
eration functions. In this sense SWIFT ideas are more related to ours, since they point
out the need for easier trust establishment mechanisms and their proposed architecture
envisions a module for \Dynamic Federation and Trust Negotiation". Finally, thought all
the projects embrace trust and risk considerations to some extent, none of them provides
a comprehensive solution to the specic case of deciding whether or not to federate (or
transact with a federated party) based on trust and risk calculation, as we develop in this
thesis. In conclusion, current proposals do not provide a general solution that address
how to extend a federation framework independent of the transport protocol or use case.
Finally, we aim to address more dimensions of trust, such as risk management, that are
not considered in the presented approaches.
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2.4.2. Standards Developing Organizations and Related Bodies
Several standardization developing organizations (SDOs) and related bodies are working
on identity management topics that conform fundamental pieces to achieve the establish-
ment of federations in a dynamic manner. In the following, we name this organizations
and explain their work and how it relates to the vision of dynamic federation.
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OA-
SIS)
OASIS leads several eorts in the standardization of federation standards. As previously
documented in this chapter, SAML, WS-Federation, and Identity Interoperability Mes-
tasystem for Information Cards, are federation frameworks standardized by OASIS. In
addition, apart form these mature identity standards,
OASIS created other Technical Comitees (TCs) that are also related to identity man-
agement. The most relevant groups that are adrressing issues of trust, reputation and
federation establishment are:
OASIS IDentity in the cloud (IDCloud) TC.
This group, created in 2010, develops proles of open standards for identity deploy-
ment, provisioning and management in cloud computing. The TC identies gaps
in existing identity management standards and investigates the need for proles to
achieve interoperability within current standards. It performs risk and threat anal-
ysis on collected use cases and produces guidelines for mitigating vulnerabilities.
The most relevant technical work produced by the committee so far are the \OASIS
Identity In The Cloud Use Cases v1.0" and the \Identity in the Cloud Gap Analysis
Version 1.0" documents. Both remark that cloud computing is a natural evolution
from virtualization and the service provider model, and so it magnies the need for
federating identities between providers and customers. For cloud to succeed, they
state, standards must further evolve to make identity federation economical, scalable,
and practical for the mass market.
OASIS Open Reputation Management System (ORMS) TC.
56 CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART
The ORMS group, formed in 2008, has the goal of advancing the ability to use
common data formats for representing reputation data. In their main document,
\Open Reputation Data (ORD) Draft Version 0.1", they describe a reference model
for exchanging portable reputation information between reputation data providers
and consumers.
OASIS Electronic Identity Credential Trust Elevation Methods (Trust Elevation)
TC.
The OASIS Trust Elevation TC, created in 2011, works to dene a set of standardized
protocols that service providers may use to elevate the trust in an electronic identity
credential presented to them for authentication. The Trust Elevation TC promotes
interoperability among multiple identity providers{and among multiple identity fed-
erations and frameworks{by facilitating clear communication about common and
comparable operations to present, evaluate and apply identity to sets of declared
authorization levels.
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)
In 2011 the ETSI Industry Specication Group on Identity and Access Management for
Networks and Services (ISG INS) published a specication entitled \Identity and access
management for Networks and Services; Dynamic federation negotiation and trust man-
agement in IdM systems" [ETSI, 2011]. The document describes a problem statement to
federation establishment based on dynamic SLA negotiations, (so called \ad-hoc federa-
tions"), and presents related use-cases and requirements.
The ETSI specication recognizes that using bilateral static agreements is not feasible
for a global scale federated internet. Current procedures to establish federations impose
a high barrier to small companies (or even individuals) that act as Service Providers,
since they cannot aord the time and money to fulll those agreements. On this basis,
the specication states that techniques are required which give the possibility of ad-hoc
federation; and that such techniques must consider reputation, quality of credentials and
risk.
The document presents several high level use-cases where dynamic federation is useful and
also contemplate the notion of trust establishment based on reputation to allow dynamic
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Figure 2.16: Conceptual scheme for the composition of a Level of Assurance (LoA) metric
(©[ETSI, 2011])
interactions.
Basically, the recommendation to achieve ad-hoc federation establishment is based on the
image in Figure 2.16. Upon a service request, the Service Provider should calculate a
Level of Assurance (LoA) based on four elements, namely: (1) the authentication method
used when the user registered at the Identity Provider(e.g., PostIdent, E-Mail verication,
etc.); (2) the authentication method of the current session (e.g., username/password, SIM-
Card, etc.); (3) the reputation of the user/service requester; and (4) the reputation of the
Identity Provider. Thus, the service delivery decision will depend on the LoA and internal
risk taking factors.
Finally, it is worth noting that the specication remarks the need for dening metrics to
qualify the LoA and the internal risk factors. The document concludes that \the solutions
or mechanisms which will allow to instantiate an ad-hoc federation are still open and should
be discussed".
ABFAB Internet Engineering Task Force Working Group
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) started a working group focused on \Ap-
plication Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web" (ABFAB) [Howlett et al., 2012].
This group envisions federated identity as a mean for facilitating the controlled sharing
of information about principals, commonly across organizational boundaries. This avoids
redundant registration of principals who operate in multiple domains, reducing adminis-
trative overheads and improving usability while addressing privacy-related concerns and
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regulatory and statutory requirements of some jurisdictions.
They noted that federation mechanisms are in use for the web but not for other contexts.
Based on this problem statement, the working group has a special focus on specifying a fed-
erated identity mechanism for use by other Internet protocols not based on HTML/HTTP,
such as for instance IMAP (Internet Message Access Protocol) or SSH (Secure Shell).
The ABFAB working group is currently working on a series of drafts10, being the most
remarkable ones:
\Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB) Architecture":
denes an architecture that addresses the problem of federated access management
to primarily non-web-based services, in a manner that will scale to large numbers of
identity providers, relying parties, and federations.
\Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) Use Cases": enu-
merates a list of use-cases describing how technologies based on the the ABFAB ar-
chitecture and specications could be used to achieve identity federation in non-web
scenarios, such as cloud computing, grid computing, high performance computing,
etc.
\Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond web (ABFAB) Usability and User
Interface Considerations": This document provides recommendations to design con-
sistent interfaces for managing user's identities.
Regarding trust establishment and the creation of dynamic relationships between providers
to share user identity data, the group points out the need for a \Trust Router Protocol".
A Trust Router Protocol, they state, allows a new partner to be added to an ABFAB
community by peering with any member of the Trust Router network, instead of requiring
conguration changes by every partner who may wish to connect with the new partner.
Thus, its main function is the distribution of information about existing trust relationships
within the partnership, avoiding the operational costs and limitations of using a Public
Key Infrastructure (PKI).
10http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/abfab/
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Kantara Initiative
Kantara Initiative was announced on 2009, by leaders of several foundations and associ-
ations working on various aspects of digital identity. It is intended to be a robust and
well-funded focal point for collaboration between members of the identity community. As
stated earlier in this chapter, Kantara is not a standards body but submits recommenda-
tions to standards bodies.
The organization is structured into working groups that deal with dierent aspects of iden-
tity management. The groups that are more related to the concept of dynamic federation
are:
Trust Framework Meta Model Work Group.
This group works on dening the components of a Trust Framework and providing a
mechanism for comparing Trust Frameworks developed by communities. The Trust
Framework Meta Model would be a reference resource not only within Kantara
Initiative activities but also for any community seeking to understand the Trust
Framework concept and potentially as guidance toward the development of Trust
Framework components.
It is worth noting that their work in progress considers a federation use-case that
builds on the notion of reputation-based trust. Although it is not yet dened, they
state that \reputations-based systems have a process that will compute trust based
on behavior of claimants and rating of members. This is not necessarily limited to
humans, but could be used for IdPs and other roles in federation as well."
Federation Interoperability Work Group.
The purpose of this group is to prole existing specications to dene an interoper-
able trust infrastructures for use by parties participating in Trust Frameworks. This
will allow entities to determine the certication status and conguration parameters
of entities outside of their local federation.
Business Cases for Trusted Federations Discussion Group.
The purpose of this discussion group is to identify and raise awareness of business
cases around the deployment and adoption of federation models and systems }U
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particularly the Trust Framework model.
This group will gather input from International stakeholders specically, actors from
within vertical and jurisdictional communities of trust with the purpose of allowing
participants to share information about successful and challenging experiences with
specic focus on the business drivers and motivations for deploying federations and
the Trust Framework model.
Finally, among the work developed in Kantara, it is worth to mention their certication
programs. Kantara Initiative has answers to both technical and operational assurance
needs through certication programs designed to give the marketplace condence, con-
sistency and control when deploying identity solutions. More specically, the programs
are: (1) Identity Assurance Certication Program, that certies identity credential systems
based on four distinct Levels of Assurance ; and (2) Interoperability Certication Program,
that tests identity management implementations and certies the degree of fulllment of
the standards.
The Open Identity Exchange (OIX)
The Open Identity Exchange (OIX) [OIX, 2013] is a non-prot organization dedicated
to building trust in the exchange of online identity credentials across public and private
sectors. OIX also received initial grants from the OpenID Foundation (OIDF) and Infor-
mation Card Foundation (ICF) to advance assurance for open identity technologies. The
initial members are Google, PayPal, Equifax, VeriSign, Verizon, CA and Booz Hamilton.
The OIX proposes an Open Identity Trust Framework (OITF) as a solution to enable large
scale networks of trust, facilitating cooperation of IdPs and SPs without the requirement of
an agreement. An OITF is dened as a set of technical, operational, and legal requirements
and enforcement mechanisms for parties exchanging identity information. In an OITF
additional actors look after these requirements and mechanisms to support the ow of
information among users, IdPs and SPs. The roles and relationships of these additional
actors are shown in Fig. 2.17.
Policymakers start by deciding the technical, operational, and legal requirements for ex-
changes of identity information that fall under their authority. They then select OITF
Providers to implement these requirements. These OITF Providers translate the require-
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Figure 2.17: Roles and relationships between the participants in an OITF (©[OIX, 2013])
ments into a blueprint for a trust framework. Assessors evaluate identity service providers
and relying parties and certify that they are capable of following the OITF Provider's
blueprint. The OITF Provider vets identity service providers and relying parties and con-
tracts with them to follow its trust framework requirements when conducting exchanges
of identity information. The contracts carry provisions relating to dispute resolvers and
auditors for contract interpretation and enforcement. Requirements ow down through
agreements, as shown in the directional arrows in Fig. 2.17.
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA)
European Network and information Security Agency (ENISA) is as a body of expertise, set
up by the EU to carry out very specic technical, scientic tasks in the eld of Information
Security, working as a \European Community Agency". It is not a standards developing
organization but its work includes reviewing of standards from the security point of view
and providing best practice recommendations that are useful for SDOs.
ENISA regularly publishes documents in regard with identity management, where the
need for trust establishment is always contemplated. In \Managing Multiple Electronic
n 
(ortracts WIth Ihe Trust ffamewort PtovIder rOl' lmpIementing reqt.iremerlts sel by PoIicymakers 
~ Other agll!'l!meI'\ts polent.alty .lfected bv requirements set by PoIj(ymakers 
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Identities", trust is recognized as a central issue in all identity transactions. The document
states that trust must be established between the dierent actors involved in identity
federation. The subject must be condent that their personal information will be handled
appropriately, in order to take part in the transaction. Equally, the relying party must be
condent that the subject's obligations under the transaction (such as payment) will be
honoured. In order for the relying party to have this condence, they will need the means
to assess the trustworthiness of the assertion being provided in that particular context.
However, the document concludes, at present there is no reliable mechanism underlying
this process.
It is also remarkable the work of the agency in the eld of risk. The ENISA working
group on risk management regularly publishes a variety of information pertinent to Risk
Management and Risk Assessment.
More specically, their work includes inventories of methods tools and good practices,
achieved results in the area of emerging eisks information material for Small and Medium
Enterprises (SMEs), comparability and interoperability issues of methods, tools and good
practices Integration issues of Risk Management with other operational processes.
Chapter3
Understanding the Problem of Dynamic
Federation
A problem well stated is a problem half
solved
Inventor Charls Franklin Kettering
(1876-1958)
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3.1. Chapter Overview
Dening a research problem is the fuel that drives the scientic process, and is the foun-
dation of any research contribution. But the process of choosing the research topic and
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carefully stating the problem to be solved dening all its nuances is not a trivial task. In
fact, a lot of unease questions arise: What? (What are the major questions for the topic?),
Where? (Where is the topic important: at the local, national or international level?),
Who? ( Who are the information providers on this topic? Who is aected?), and the
ubiquitous and most important question...Why? .
There are also frequently referred points1 to consider in nding and developing a research
topic: that is compelling and interesting, that is original, that is worthy, that is a solvable
and manageable problem, that leads to more research questions, etc. Between them, there
is also a more personal (but not for this less important) point: to choose a problem that
can be enthusiastically pursued.
Given the importance of having a well-dened problem to understand the proposed solu-
tion, we dedicate this whole chapter to this endeavor before starting with the development
of the thesis. Our aim here is to demarcate the problem area considering the above men-
tioned questions and points, to illustrate what caused the need to do this research and
to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the research problem we address. We
want to show how we found a gap in knowledge, and how we are seeking to ll it.
But above all, our intention here is to transmit why the chosen topic kept us motivated
during years and still ignites enthusiasm to derive exciting new lines of research; to convey
the reasons that drove us in the quest to ll the particular gap in knowledge that will
make Dynamic Identity Federation a reality.
Although the thesis purpose and objectives were already precisely declared in the Intro-
duction (Chapter 1), it is only after the revision of the state-of-the-art and related work
that we can provide a deeper explanation. Thus, the following sections focus on explaining
the problem area; analyzing the existing gaps, including how they are being tackled and
which questions remain open; and providing an overview of the contributions of this thesis
to ll existing gaps. Through all of these sections, the factors that motivate our research
are highlighted.
1e.g., the chemistry professor and author Robert Smith, in his book \Graduate Research: A Guide for
Students in the Sciences" (ISI Press, 1984), lists 11 points to consider in nding and developing a research
topic
3.2 Federation and the Identity Landscape 65
3.2. Federation and the Identity Landscape
\The world is already federated, it's the computer that needs to catch up, specically the security protocols."
-Gunnar Peterson, 20102
Identity is a crucial element in most computer security mechanisms and currently located
at the core of the internet economy. The way identity has been handled online evolved
following the progression of Internet technology closely. The famous cartoon stating 3 \On
the Internet, nobody knows you're a dog" illustrated soon the concerns about privacy and
authentication posed by online identity management. During the formative years of the
web, when computers were not hyper-connected, password-based authentication was the
rst approach to handle identity. This mechanism worked pretty well at that time, due
largely to how little data they actually needed to protect. A user password was limited to
few sites, such as an email account and maybe an e-commerce site or two. However, with
the advent of web services, the explosion of online applications and the increase of online
transactions, identity got far more complex. Today, we are asked to prove our identities
every time we board a plane, check into a hotel, make a purchase via check or credit card, or
log onto a computer or secure web site. Many large scale studies point out the high number
of accounts a typical web user has (around 25 as found in [Florencio and Herley, 2007]
). Users face the burden of managing this increasing number of accounts and passwords,
which frequently leads them to devise password management strategies that degrade the
security of their protected information [Gaw and Felten, 2006]. In the enterprise world,
centralized IdM solutions were created to deal with users and data security where the user
and the systems accessed by the user were within the same network.
Thus, identity management has been historically implemented following a \silo" model.
Each service provider or organization creates and maintains the identity management pro-
cess, incorporating means for identifying, proong, provisioning, authenticating, securing,
managing and otherwise maintaining the base of users. But these identity schemes are
inecient for the current demands of cross-organization cooperation, partnership and col-
laboration. PKI [Adams, C. and Farrell, S., 1999] infrastructures were envisioned once as
a universal solution for the identity problem. Nevertheless, though the mechanisms as-
sociated with X.509 digital certicates worked well for identifying computer systems and
2http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1 raindrop/federation/
3Steiner, P. (1993). On the Internet Nobody Knows You Are a Dog, New Yorker (69)20, 5 July.
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establishing secure communication channels, global PKI never happened as an identity
management system.
Federated Identity Management or FIM is the newest approach to distributed iden-
tity management. It frequently relies on PKI for the distribution of cryptographic mate-
rial, inheriting partly the complexity burden of these infrastructures. However, federation
loosens the requirement for a single root authority by replacing the root with denitions,
policies, and semantics agreed upon out of band, and provides new identity functionalities.
A federated identity is a single user identity that can be used to access a group of web sites
bound by the ties of federation, which reduces the burden of having to manage dierent
credentials for every site. The ultimate goal of identity federation is thus to enable users
of one domain to securely access data or systems of another domain seamlessly, without
requiring redundant user administration. The value of federated identity management is
its simplication and decoupling of functions: authentication is separated from the process
of accessing resources. According to this scheme there are three roles (already detailed
in Chapter 2), namely the IdP, the SP and the user. And everyone can benet from the
federated model. The IdP can focus on improving the process of authentication, perhaps
providing dierent modes of strengths of authentication, perhaps providing other services.
The SP no longer has to handle authentication - a messy, problematic business - and can
focus instead on the provision of services. And the user only has to log in once with a
single set of credentials. Furthermore, federation is not only about authentication reuse,
but it allows also the sharing of identity attributes and authorization information, which
leads to other use-cases such as cross-domain user account provisioning, cross-domain en-
titlement management and cross-domain user attribute exchange The Kantara Initiative,
actively involved in the advance of online identity management, highlights four basic value
propositions for FIM. Namely:
Economics of scale: The reuse of credentials shares the cost of provisioning and
supporting credentials and their use.
Information Security and privacy: The reuse of credentials makes it feasible to have
strong credentials and procedures in place to protect identity-related security objec-
tives. As a result it is possible to make processes available on-line where the risk
would have been too high without strong protection in place. Another benet is to
reduce identity-related fraud.
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Business enabling: Whereas applications with a high value per transaction or per
user usually can aord their isolated IdM, long-tail [Anderson, 2004] applications
cannot. The availability of better price/performance credentials will enable new
applications.
Improving existing processes: Many on-line applications loose prospective customers
or users when they require registration. Conrmation mails lost in SPAM-lters are
a frequent cause. Instant identication of a user would result in a higher ratio of
users continuing through the full process.
Impulsed by all these benets, the FIM model entered the identity landscape around a
decade ago and is becoming more and more a hot topic. But federation is easier said
than done. While some important federation eorts have repeatedly failed, such as the
Microsoft's agship identity solution Cardspace, the FIM experience of the last decade
was not entirely negative. Successful FIM deployments have been conducted in education
and industry [Landau and Moore, 2011] mainly based on SAML, a very alive standard
that announced a newer version in December 2012. Also, in the social web arena, OpenID
and OAuth are working well.
However, the wide scale deployment of federation still did not happen. Between the
barriers that are hindering the adoption of federation at a global internet scale, we think
that the underlying trust models are the root cause. In the next section, we take a closer
look at the existing gaps in the current federation schemes in order to clarify the reasons
that led us to propose a dynamic federation model.
3.3. Gap Analysis
A gap, according to the denitions in [Singh, 2005] is the lack of (or lack of adoption of) a
solution based on open standards or specications to support a specic industry need or
requirement, the lack of a specic feature, or an incomplete capability.
A gap, they say, can arise from the lack of a technical mechanism or protocol, a best
practice or guidelines specication, or a performance specication. It can also arise from
the lack of a specication describing the application of a dened technology to address
specic network architectures (e.g., NGN and IMS), business models, and assumptions
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(e.g., scalability). Or it can arise from the lack of a sucient administrative mechanism
or national mandate.
Considering the above denitions and based on the literature review in Chapter 2 plus the
available studies about barriers for federation adoption [ITU-T Focus Group on Identity
Management (FG IdM), 2007] [Landau and Moore, 2011] [Jensen, 2012] [Jsang et al.,
2005] [Sun et al., 2010], the main gaps (non-exhaustive) found in the FIM eld are enu-
merated below. Jensen in [Jensen, 2012] does a good work in compiling the challenges,
so we fundamentally base on his text:
1. Trust. Trust is the fundamental concept underlying federations and is not surprising
that challenges related to this concept are the most frequently raised in the literature.
The separation of functions in the federated model implies that each involved party
has to rely on the other: e.g., the SP has to trust the IdP to correctly authenticate
the users that will access its services; and the IdP has to trust the SP to properly
handle the user identity data. A trust relationship must thus exist. Currently, trust
is established based on static agreements that must be set by administrators out
of band before interaction, which makes the federation procedure slow. In other
cases, trust is assumed to exist by default. Pre-established trust relationships limit
the cooperation with potential new business partners, while not applying a trust
model poses important security risks. Making the federation process more agile is
specially relevant for dynamic and short-term collaborations, where the time and cost
of setting up a federation in the traditional way will probably not outbalance the
rewards of cooperation (see Section 3.4.3 for potential use-cases). For these reasons,
current specications come short in presenting solutions for dynamic environments,
and there is an important gap here.
2. Security. A serious concern in FIM is identity theft. Impersonation attacks with
stolen credentials are in fact very common nowadays. In the FIM case, problems
regarding a stolen identity aect all federation partners. An impersonation attack
can be performed by stealing an authenticated user's security token, and then use
it to access resources in the federated environment [Han et al., 2010]. A conse-
quence of this is that even systems with more secure authentication protocols than
username/password schemes, such as systems using two factor authentication, are
exposed to identity theft threats.
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There are important works on federation security research. Gro et al. [Gro, 2003]
initiated the security analysis of SAML-based SSO nding deciencies in the informa-
tion ow between the involved entities, which inuenced a revision of the standard.
More recently, the paper \On breaking SAML: be whoever you want to be" by So-
morovsky et al. [Somorovsky et al., 2012] showed how integrity protection in SAML
can be successfully circumvented by application of dierent XML Signature specic
attacks, so attackers can take \whatever identity they want".
In general, FIM specications contain security recommendations and a variable num-
ber of congurable security features. Depending on the selected options in imple-
mentation the achieved security level will be dierent.
3. Privacy. Privacy is a challenge in FIM [Glasser and Vajihollahi, 2010], and a recur-
ring topic among researchers. The key goal in FIM is to share personally identiable
data, while at the same time guaranteeing privacy, i.e., taking into account issues
such as data protection, user consent and compliance with legislation. In the case of
FIM systems, due to the distributed sharing of identity information, the security do-
main is blurred, which causes extra challenges. The enforcement of privacy policies is
a big concern, as pointed in [Squicciarini et al., 2008]. Even though there exists pri-
vacy policies, and users express their privacy preferences, there are no requirements
to enforce these policies and preferences through technology. Users should be able
to regulate the release and use of their own identity information, but specications
do not properly cover user empowerment in the control of their identities. There
is a lack of support to match users' consent with privacy policies and to congure
attribute release policies (ARPs) . Only Shibboleth v1.2, a SAML-based solution,
supports simple ARPs, but in a proprietary format.
4. Interoperability. Despite the standardization eorts in the FIM domain there are
still considerable challenges related to interoperability. As we detailed in Chapter 2,
there is a number of dierent specications for identity federation. FIM protocols
work well in homogeneous environments where all collaborating partners use the
same standard. However, there are situations, where partners adhere to dierent
standards, and this increases the complexity. Mechanisms to bridge protocols, to
perform token conversions and to combine FIM technologies are being developed to
address this gap [Pacyna et al., 2009] [Monjas et al., 2009]. But even with the use of
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one standard, there might be also interoperability challenges. In the case of SAML,
the high number of available protocol options and conformance variations are aspects
that cause diculties. Furthermore, the process of determining what are the nec-
essary identity attributes, and nding common data schemes for interorganizational
cooperation may be challenging [Bertino et al., 2009].
5. Assurance. According to Baldwin et al. [Baldwin et al., 2007], identity assurance
is the process of ensuring that identity management is under appropriate control.
Existing FIM frameworks do not provide information about the verication of iden-
tity data of the individuals enrolled and stored at each IdP. In FIM the identity
management process involves dierent organizations, which may have dierent risk
policies. The assurance process, i.e., demonstrating that controls and processes are
being followed and sucient to mitigate identied risks, is vital [Baldwin et al., 2007].
Without properly addressing assurance considerations, it is unlikely that FIM sys-
tems will be adopted for enterprise tasks. Currently, the SAML specications are
evolving to incorporate and convey information regarding the level of assurance.
6. Liability. Liability is the state of being legally obliged and responsible. It is widely
believed that the inability to solve the liability issue is at the root of the slow adoption
of federation technologies [Camp, 2010]. There are also challenges derived from
the fact that federated systems may span across multiple jurisdictions. In these
cases, there are dierences especially at national level related to privacy, labour, and
disclosure laws. All potential liability issues must be addressed before federating
identity and access systems, indicating what will happen and who is responsible if
something related to the FIM process goes wrong.
7. IdP Discovery. IdP discovery is the process of determining where to send authen-
tication requests when a user wants to access an identity based service [Maler and
Reed, 2008]. This is a problem in service-initiated Single Sign-On use cases, since
service providers (SP) can be congured to accept security tokens from numerous
identity providers. A common solution to this problem is to directly ask the user,
providing him with a list of IdPs from which he has to select the correct. This is espe-
cially a problem when the list of possible IdPs gets extensive, aecting also usability.
Another more elegant solution is to give the users a smart client that is smart enough
to know the answer. This is a compelling challenge and specications are neutral
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about the discovery process. Only OpenID provides a discovery protocol, but also
present challenges for hosted domains. The OpenID Foundation is currently working
to create a next-generation OpenID discovery protocol that address the open issues.
8. Bussiness model. A big issue in the adoption of federation, as for every other
technology, is business. As pointed in the recent paper [Landau and Moore, 2011],
the benets for all the involved parties must be balanced for a federation to succeed.
The study in [Sun et al., 2010] claims that the wide adoption of federation is not
happening because service providers do not have sucient incentives to become
relying parties. There is a need to dene models for monetizing identity services and
investigate business needs.
Of all the above challenges, we aim to address the trust establishment issue. The trust
topic has been widely investigated in computer science, where research contributed to the
development of modern open distributed and decentralized systems. Trust has been stud-
ied in the context of decentralized access control, public key certication, and reputation
systems for P2P networks. Now, with the emergence of distributed identity management,
it is important to evolve research in this context.
The specic research question we aim to solve is\Can trust in FIM be established in
a more dynamic yet secure way?". These considerations on dynamic trust aspects
assume an open federation environment (as Internet), where entities may come and go
dynamically, and thus may not be relevant in closed environments with more static par-
ticipants. But is our aim to contribute in this specic gap, since we are convinced that it
will foster new ways of collaboration and use-cases that will have an important impact on
the way business are conducted on the Internet (see Section 3.4.3).
On the other hand, our approach considers security, privacy, legal aspects and assurance
as basis for measuring the risk in cooperating with another entity. The combination of
risk and trust will be used to make the nal decision on cooperation.
Finally, before delineating our proposal and further clarifying its potential impact, we
summarize in Table 3.1 how current related work covers trust establishment issues. The
main goal with this is to highlight the novelty and dierences of the ideas presented in
this thesis.
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Proposal Year Approach Algorithms Dissemination New Elements
[Bertino et al., 2007]
(FAMTN)
2007 ATN based Policy Negotiation Policy, Tokens Trust Logic, Policy
Negotiation Proto-
col
[Boursas and Danciu,
2008]
2008 Trust and Rep-
utation (graph
based)
Trust path:
Breadth-rst
search, Trust
and Reputation
Computation:
hand-crafted
Central LDAP di-
rectory with trust
matrix, Protocol
primitives not
dened
Trust Logic, Dis-
semination Proto-
col
[Zuo et al., 2010]
(DFed)
2010 ATN based Policy Negotiation Policy Negotiation
Protocol (over WS-
Federation)
Trust Logic, Dis-
semination Proto-
col
[Xiang et al., 2010] 2010 Trust and Rep-
utation (graph
based)
Trust path: Di-
jkstra, Trust
Computation:
hand-crafted, Rep-
utation: PageR-
ank [Page et al.,
1999]
DYNFED proto-
col: based on link
state routing pro-
tocols, primitives
not dened
Trust Logic,
IdP Hub (pre-
congured), DYN-
FED protocol
[Gomez Marmol et al.,
2010] (TRIMS)
2010 Trust and
Reputation
(storage at
IdPs)
Trust and Reputa-
tion Computation:
hand-crafted,
Homomorphic
Encryption for
privacy
Global Storage
at IdPs, Protocol
primitives not
dened
Trust Logic, Dis-
semination Proto-
col
Dynamic Federa-
tion
2009-
2012
Trust, Reputa-
tion and Risk
(distributed)
Trust and Reputa-
tion Computation:
pluggable, Risk
Computation:
metric-based,
Aggregation:
Fuzzy-based
IdMRep Protocol
(over SAML)
Trust Logic, Dis-
semination Proto-
col
Table 3.1: Summary of related work compared to our proposal
The proposals shown in Table 3.1 are the most relevant and closer to our ideas of those
presented in the related work. For each of the proposals, we show the year of publication,
the type of approach, the algorithms used, and the dissemination mechanism to convey
trust data. There are two kinds of approaches, namely: based on ATN and based on
trust and reputation. Our approach (last row in the table) falls into the second category
and the principal novelty introduced is the risk model. Decisions are made on the basis
of trust reputation and risk, while on the other cases only trust is taken into account.
Furthermore, the solution is exible and not tied to a specic trust evolution algorithm.
Instead, any function may be plugged in our trust model as desired by the implementers.
Finally, from the central research question we propounded, a number of subquestions arise:
What information elements are most suitable for deriving measures of trust, reputation
and risk in FIM? How can these information elements be captured and collected? What
principles should we use for designing such systems? How should this information be
combined into the decision process? What role can these systems play in the business
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model of commercial companies? Do these systems truly improve the quality of online
trade and interactions?
3.4. Towards Dynamic Federation
3.4.1. Previous Clarications
With the goal to move from the conventional static bilateral agreements to automated
dynamic federation, we propose a federation scheme based on the combination of trust,
reputation and risk that allows trust relationships to be established on-demand. Here we
clarify the main assumptions and denitions in which our work relies.
Firstly, there are some subtleties inherently related to the term federation in identity
management scenarios that must be rst claried to properly understand the proposed
taxonomy. So, the verb federate as dened in the Merriam Webster Dictionary4 means:
\To link or bind two or more entities together". In the context of our research there
are two possible senses in which the word federation (and variants) can be employed
and still being coherent with the former denition. According to it, we can talk about:
(a) federation, meaning the act of establishing a relationship between providers; and (b)
identity federation, which exists when there is an agreement between various providers on
a set of identiers and/or attributes that are used to refer to a subject (i.e., the user).
Thus, an identity federation is not possible if providers are not federated.
But provider federation depends on the identity framework being used: it could be a
trivial process, as occurs with OpenID, where no trust model is required to cooperate;
or a extremely complex task, as happens with SAML-based systems, where contractual
frameworks must be statically established to set up a Circle of Trust.
We aim at designing an infrastructure exible enough to be applied to the dierent existing
FIM protocols. However, whenever particularization is required we will base our framework
on SAML, since this is the most consolidated and complete specication.
During this document we will take into consideration the well-known FIM baseline con-
stellation of 3 actors (User, Identity Provider and service Provider) depicted on Figure 3.1,
4http://www.merriam-webster.com/
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where a user access a service in the SP based on the authentication performed by the IdP.
Figure 3.1: Traditional triangle of parties involved in an identity information exchange.
We assume that the trust relationship between the providers may not exist previous to
interaction. In such a case, our infrastructure allows providers to decide: a) whether to
federate or not with the other and to which extent; and b) once federated, whether to
perform each particular transaction or not.
Furthermore, apart from these two kind of decisions, another use-case is possible: selec-
tion. For example, if a SP has to select an IdP between a set of available providers, our
infrastructure permits to rank all the possibilities and so the best option can be selected.
The quantication of trust and risk and the monitoring of their evolution make possible
to have more granularity in the decisions. Thus, the initial set of permissions and types
of allowed transactions assigned to an entity can change according to the variation of
trust and risk. Though not shown in the picture, the SP and the IdP will probably have
relationships with a number of other providers, and these relationships are used in our
framework to acquire trust knowledge.
Next, we illustrate how the concepts of trust and risk are treated in this thesis.
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3.4.2. Our Vision on Trust and Risk Relationship
We understand both trust and risk as complex multidimensional concepts. In the case
of trust, reputation is treated as one of its dimensions. The other dimension of trust we
consider is authentication. With these two components it is possible to determine trust:
we know about the entity's behavior, and we know about its identity (whether the entity
is who it claims to be).
But, as stated in [Solhaug et al., 2007] [Jsang and Presti, 2004], we believe that trust
is not always enough as a basis for the decision to cooperate, but a notion of risk is also
necessary. Risk is dependent on both the context of the application and on the assets in
place. In the FIM case, we have identied a number of dimensions that contribute to the
overall risk in making a decision (see Chapter 5).
Regarding the relationship between both concepts, trust and risk, we agree with the me-
diating relationship model: the existence of trust reduces the perception of risk, which in
turn increases the willingness to transact. Furthermore, as pointed out in [Solhaug et al.,
2007], the relationship is aected in extreme cases. For example, there are risks that are
too severe that will put a whole enterprise out of business, so they cannot be accepted
even if the trust level is good. Similarly, for untrusted entities or those with a very low
trust value, the risk should not be accepted even if is not too high.
Regarding the formation of trust and risk values, we agree with the point in [Gefen et al.,
2003] that while some antecedents of trust and risk may be the same, there are others,
which are not. For instance, a legal contract between two parties enables a transaction by
reducing risk, but does not aect trust. More specically, Figure 3.2 conceptually show
how trust and risk are constructed and combined in our model.
It is to say that we use two dierent terms: trustworthiness and decision trust. Trust-
worthiness refers to the trust value that is placed on the entity under evaluation, whereas
decision trust refers to the nal value obtained after combining trustworthiness with risk.
As shown in Figure 3.2, trust is derived from authentication and behavior data; whereas
risk is calculated from policies, SLAs, metadata and history of interactions. The common
antecedent in the formation of both values is precisely this history of interactions. Finally,
the aggregation of risk and trustworthiness is performed based on a set of rules that model
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Figure 3.2: Trust and risk formation.
the mediating relationship and take into account extreme values (see Chapter 7).
3.4.3. Potential Impact
Apart from the clarication of the problem we are solving and the assumptions we are
making, it is equally important to provide a description of the potential impact that our
solution may have. Here we elaborate our views on this issue.
Though business models should be properly investigated for FIM to be deployed at a wide
scale, we aim to highlight three potential scenarios where dynamic federation ts and can
provide enhancements:
Dynamic Business Networks. This type of networks, also referred as Smart Busi-
ness Networks, are dened as IT-enabled platforms for dynamically linking dierent
businesses having dierent `capabilities' to build a `networked business enterprise'
with innovative business strategies for competing in the changing markets and envi-
ronmental conditions [Vervest and Zheng, 2009]. The main concept in this business
paradigm is the formation of virtual organizations (VOs) or virtual enterprises (VEs).
Even more dynamic are the so-called instant virtual enterprises (IVEs), - tempo-
rary business entities executing dynamically composed, global business processes to
achieve a specied business goal [Grefen et al., 2009].
VO/IVE creation is opportunity driven. The possibility of rapidly nding a set of
partners that best t a concrete business opportunity and quickly congure them
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into a collaborative network to exploit that opportunity seems indeed a desirable
scenario to face the challenges of market turbulence.
In this kind of organizations, the rapid federation of the identity management systems
is required. Users of the dierent organization parts would probably have to access
resources in the domain of partners, and the creation of duplicated user databases
at each partner is not a good solution. Identity federation would allow a seamless
user experience across all the involved partners without the need of additional eorts
in IdM infrastructure. But today's FIM technology does not satisfy high demands
of agility. Thus, dynamic federation is key to enabling the complex ecosystems of
dynamic business networks.
The same idea of dynamic virtual organizations is also very appealing in other non-
business oriented contexts. An extreme case being the incident management and
disaster rescuing processes, when it is necessary to very rapidly engage and coordi-
nate activities of a large number of entities (e.g., re brigades, police, hospitals, local
government, non-governmental organizations). This very idea of groups of organi-
zations being able to rapidly congure themselves into some form of mission/goal-
oriented collaborative form embeds the notion of great agility [Camarinha-Matos
et al., 2005]. Regarding FIM application, the usage of SAML in these scenarios is
being investigated [Tran and Wietfeld, 2009].
Cloud Computing. Cloud computing is changing the way industries and enter-
prises do their businesses in that dynamically scalable and virtualized resources are
provided as a service over the Internet. As an example, an enterprise that has
a private cloud may want to burst workloads to a public cloud vendor. Enterprise
users will end accessing many applications on hybrid cloud computing environments,
which go beyond the boundary of the enterprise data center. In these scenarios,
Single Sign-on is a challenge. The enterprise typically uses access management to
integrate applications in dierent domains to an application portal, so that the end
user can access applications without re-authentication. Access management might
work well for the applications within the data center or within the same domain.
However, the cloud computing services are typically external to the data center and
located within a dierent domain and shared with multiple other tenants. Federa-
tion is thus a useful technology in cloud computing. In fact, the integration of FIM
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in cloud has been signaled as necessary in many recent research works and technical
publications [Gopalakrishnan, 2009] [Sengupta et al., 2011].
Furthermore, elastic cloud computing envisions that cloud services are to be con-
tracted on demand depending on the current needs of each enterprise. In this sense,
dynamic federation becomes an enabler to provide agility.
Consumer Electronics. The continuous advance in consumer electronics leads
to new scenarios (e.g. digital TV, media distribution, etc.), which evolve and of-
fer new experiences and interactions to consumers with a multitude of providers;
highlighting the importance of the role that mobile devices play in such environ-
ments. So, identity management is required in order to: a) avoid users dependence
on xed infrastructures, b) allow the interoperability between separated domains,
and c) support users' mobility, content adaptation and sharing, services delegation,
device heterogeneity, among others.
Summarizing, among other applications, dynamic federation will lower barriers for plug
and play B2B integration. It will permit to take dynamic decision on federation by calculat-
ing trust and risk on a per-transaction basis. Furthermore the risk evaluation mechanism
can be also used alone to asses the own risk level that the particular FIM conguration of
the entity poses. Finally the quantication of trust and risk allows also to rank a set of
providers that are potential collaborators and decide what is the more appropriate.
3.5. Conclusions
Identity management systems cannot be centralized anymore. Nowadays, users have mul-
tiple accounts, proles and personal data distributed throughout the web and hosted by
dierent providers. However, the online world is currently divided into identity silos forc-
ing users to deal with repetitive authentication and registration processes and hindering a
faster development of large scale e-business. Federation has been proposed as a technology
to bridge dierent trust domains, allowing user identity information to be shared in order
to improve usability. But the reality is that FIM has not been broadly deployed in the
wider Internet. It has functioned well in sectors in which the parties had rst established
contracts. On the \open" Internet, where IdPs and SPs might not previously have had
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a relationship, the uptake on federated identity management has been very slow. Conse-
quently, further research is required to shift from the current static model, where manual
bilateral agreements must be pre-congured to enable cooperation between unknown par-
ties, to a more dynamic one, where trust relationships are established on demand in a fully
automated fashion. We aim to address this gap by introducing a dynamic federation model
based on the combination of trust and risk assessment, which are computed whenever a
decision of potential collaboration between entities has to be made. We have responded
the initial questions suggested in the overview of the chapter, and also stated the main
research question. Next, we concentrate on the remaining interrogation: How?
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Chapter4
Architecture Proposal
\As a maturing discipline with no clear
rules on the right way to build a system,
designing software architecture is still a
mix of art and science."
-SoftwareArchitectures.com
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4.1. Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a global view of the architecture proposed to address the challenge
of dynamic federation. The description starts in Section 4.2 with a brief introduction
to system modeling denitions and basic concepts that contextualize the methodology.
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After this introduction, a general architectural model that is common to FIM systems
is presented as a reference to introduce our extensions. Based on this basic model, a
requirement analysis is performed.
Next, Section 4.3 introduces the contributions made in this thesis to extend the functional-
ity of the basic architecture satisfying the stated requirements. The new components and
the extended functionalities are explained and accompanied by a owchart that illustrates
how each architectural component interacts with the rest.
Finally, Section 4.4 ends with the main conclusions extracted from the architecture de-
nition procedure.
4.2. Design Preliminaries
As introduced in the previous chapters, the focus of this thesis is on contributing to make
federated identity management systems more dynamic. For this purpose, an essential rst
step is developing a system model. Firstly, in this preliminary section, we set the basis
for the model description following two steps: 1) introducing the concepts and denitions
required to contextualize the modeling methodology; and 2) describing the general archi-
tectural model supported by current identity management systems as a basis to derive the
requirements for a dynamic model that will drive our proposal.
4.2.1. System Modeling Denitions and Concepts
A system model constitutes the conceptual model that formally describes and represents
a system. When describing a system model in the IT eld, the software architecture dis-
cipline is commonly used. The software architecture discipline is centered on the idea
of reducing complexity through abstraction and separation of concerns. Software archi-
tecture as a concept has its origins in the research of Edsger Dijkstra in 1968 and David
Parnas in the early 1970s, who emphasized that the structure of a software system matters
and getting the structure right is critical. The study of the eld increased in popularity
since the early 1990s with research work concentrating on architectural styles (patterns),
architecture description languages, architecture documentation, and formal methods [Gar-
lan and Shaw, 1994]. However, to date there is still no universal agreement on the precise
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denition of the term \software architecture", as pointed out in the study performed by
the Carnegie Mellon University [Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI),
2006]. Some classical denitions of the term gathered in this study are:
\The structure of the components of a program/system, their interrelationships, and
principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time."- Garlan
and Perry, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 1995.
\A software system architecture comprises: A collection of software and system
components, connections, and constraints; A collection of system stakeholders' need
statements; A rationale which demonstrates that the components, connections, and
constraints dene a system that, if implemented, would satisfy the collection of system
stakeholders' need statements." - Boehm et al. USC Center for Software Engineering,
1995.
\An architecture is the set of signicant decisions about the organization of a soft-
ware system, the selection of the structural elements and their interfaces by which
the system is composed, together with their behavior as specied in the collabora-
tions among those elements, the composition of these structural and behavioral el-
ements into progressively larger subsystems, and the architectural style that guides
this organization|these elements and their interfaces, their collaborations, and their
composition" - Kruchten, The Rational Unied Process. Also cited in Booch, Rum-
baugh, and Jacobson, The Unied Modeling Language User Guide, Addison-Wesley,
1999.
More recently, modern denitions of the term appear in \Documenting Software Architec-
tures: Views and Beyond [Clements et al., 2003]",\Software Architecture in Practice" [Bass
et al., 2003], and \ANSI/IEEE Std 1471-2000, Recommended Practice for Architectural
Description of Software-Intensive Systems" [Jen and Lee, 2000]. All of them are closely
related and overlapping, and thus contain common points that can be summarized. A
simple and understandable denition, mainly based on [Bass et al., 2003], is:
\An architecture description is a formal description and representation of the set of struc-
tures needed to reason about the system, which comprises components, relationships between
them, and properties of both."
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The primary goal of architectural modeling is coming to a representation or understand-
ing with respect to how to build a system. The presented denitions put emphasis on
the fact that systems are comprised by several components and there are relationships,
dependencies and connections between them. Due to this complexity, a common issue in
architectural modeling is the need for various architectural views. A view is captured as a
combination of diagrams and text descriptions (such as use cases, technical specications,
or prose). Typical views include, e.g., logical, usage/business process, user interface, de-
ployment, data storage/transmission, etc., though there is not a consensus in regard to
the set of views that is required for a project. Not all views are relevant to all systems.
Instead, they should be chosen depending on the nature and context of the project. In
this sense software architecture is really the amalgamation of the multiple perspectives a
system always embodies.
There are also formal languages in order to describe all the views that comprise a software
architecture. These languages are called ADLs (Architecture Description Languages),
and several of them have been devised. Despite no consensus exists on which symbol-
set or language to be used for each architectural viewpoint, the UML (Unied Modeling
Language) is a commonly used standard [Fowler, 2004]. It is dened as a language that
can be used \for analysis, design, and implementation of software-based systems as well
as for modeling business and similar processes."
Having introduced the above denitions and concepts, we have the basis for describing our
architectural proposal. In presenting the architecture, we follow the denition in [Bass
et al., 2003], and we use UML diagrams and owcharts to depict the views. We use a
twofold view approach encompassing:
A Logical view, which describes how the system is structured in terms of compo-
nents or units of implementation. It shows dependencies between elements, interface
realizations, part-whole relationships, and so forth.
A Process view, which explains the system processes and how they communicate.
With the rst view we cover the static or structural part of the system, while the second
view depicts the dynamic or behavioral part. Diagrams will be always accompanied by
descriptive text in order to complete a whole description of the system.
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4.2.2. Requirements Analysis
Now that we have dened the methodology to be followed in the description of our model,
we can continue with the denition of the architecture. For this purpose, we rst analyze
the current architecture of FIM systems, since it will be the starting point to add the new
functionality.
In this regard, there is not a single FIM architecture denition. The only thing that
can be found in the literature are standards, specications, as well as guidelines and best
practices for implementation. But every organization deploying a FIM solution denes its
own architecture. In the specic case of SAML, which is the most important and complete
framework, there are two big implementations: Shibboleth in education environments and
SAML-based deployments in industrial/governmental environments. By extracting the
common features of them, we have elaborated an UML component diagram for a generic
identity federation architecture, depicted in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Generic architecture for identity federation
We use generic names for the components in Figure 4.1. However, it is worth noting that
modules may be called dierently across implementations despite their functionality is the
same. As it can be observed in the image, the architectural components in the providers
are:
CoT Conguration component. Both SPs and IdPs implement a Conguration
component, over which the services rely. This component is in charge of accessing
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local data stores to determine if a provider involved in a current identity-related
transaction is trusted. This decision is made basically by consulting the local data
stores to check if the entity is contained in a list of trusted entities and, if necessary,
if an explicit SLA exists between them. An external interface is oered to adminis-
trators in order to congure the static trust lists previous to interaction, a procedure
that is performed manually. Automatic inclusion of providers in the trust list is
possible in some cases, but in a limited way. More details will be given about these
procedures in Chapter 6.
Identity Services component. This component encompasses the services oered
by the identity framework, i.e., Single Sign-on, Single Log Out, Authentication,
Authorization, etc. Both kind of providers implement this component to allow the
communication and exchange of user identity data between them.
Cryptographic Services component. This component gives the cryptographic
support for the security processing required, i.e., encryption/decryption of assertions,
signing/validation, etc.
Logging component. Providers usually implement a Logging module in order to
monitor user and service activities. The registries are used by the identity services,
but an interface may be also provided for auditors (external parties).
Data store. It contains information used by the rest of the components, i.e., meta-
data documents, policies, SLAs, trust data, credentials, logs, session data, messages,
etc.
As it can be noted, the service and trust layers of the FIM model presented in the intro-
ductory chapter in Figure1.1 are implemented by the above components1 . However, the
trust layer functionality is limited, because it is just implemented as a conguration mod-
ule where relationships are inserted statically. Since the trust layer is the basis to achieve
exible models and allow scalability, our main goal in this thesis is to extend and enhance
this conguration component and make it evolve towards a more complete component. It
is important to note that we contribute on a specic part of the architecture, but without
losing the global perspective.
1for the sake of simplicity, we do not include the architectural components that cover the location and
translation layers. These topics are out of the scope of the research presented in this thesis, and so the
existence of components that perform location and translation functions is assumed
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Thus, having the generic architecture as a reference starting point, the next step is the
derivation of requirements to design an architecture that allows dynamic federation, i.e.,
automatic creation and maintenance of secure trust relationships. For this purpose, as
developed during the past chapters, we will introduce reputation data and risk assessment.
Reputation can be used as a basis for trust when the potential collaborator is unknown,
then the evolution of the trust relationship will be based on the direct interaction or
transaction history. In turn, risk evaluation gives an idea of the probability that the
collaboration results in an undesired output. In order to identify the requirements for
designing a suitable reputation/risk model to integrate in these scenarios, we rst divide
FIM into two dierent phases, as depicted in Figure 4.2:
1. Pre-Federation Phase (or Federation between providers). This phase con-
sists of the establishment of a relationship between providers: deciding on protocols
to interoperate, agreeing on common rules and policies, etc. It can be understood as
a Bootstrapping Phase, which allows parties to gather information about each other
and to initiate cooperation. The SLAs that govern the relationship are negotiated
in this phase.
2. Post-Federation Phase (or Transactions between federated providers).
This phase encompasses transactions between two federated entities (e.g., requesting
user attributes or accepting authentication claims). At this point, entities have basic
information to support their decisions. At least, the deciding entity will have data
derived from the Bootstrapping Phase and, if more interaction has taken place, it
will also maintain a history of transactions. It can be viewed as the Evolution Phase,
since entities progressively construct and consolidate their relationships.
In current FIM systems, Pre-Federation consists of establishing agreements between en-
tities in the federation and manually setting up a closed Circle of Trust. Then, in Post-
Federation it is assumed that everything will work, since interaction is only possible with
the entities that were pre-congured in the previous phase. Our goal is to allow entities to
dynamically move from Pre-Federation to Post-Federation with a certain degree of trust
and continually monitor and consolidate this trust relationship. We base our proposal
on the inclusion of external information (reputation) and the computation of trust and
risk values upon which decisions to cooperate can be made. For this purpose, the main
requirements we identify to operate in these two phases are:
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Figure 4.2: Pre-Federation and Post-Federation phases in FIM
Local computation of trust values
Local computation of risk values
Storage, dissemination and aggregation of reputation data to be included in the trust
computation procedure
Dynamic decision making based on trust and risk
In addition, in order to maintain and monitor the evolution of relationships in Post-
Federation, another functionality is also required:
Monitoring and adjustment of trust levels: transaction history, trust update, SLA
conformance evaluation, etc.
Basically, the goal in Pre-Federation is to make a decision whether to federate or not with
the other entity and to which extent. To make this decision, information must be gathered
regarding technical and operational issues, but also regarding reputation. In the case of
Post-Federation, the requirements are the same as in the previous phase but oriented to
make decisions about particular transactions instead of deciding whether to federate or
not. For this reason, additional mechanisms are required to monitor the current state of
the trust relationship and decide whether to give more privileges, deny some of them or
terminate the federation.
In order to cover the above requirements we present a solution for federation based on
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trust and risk. The detailed explanation of the proposed architecture is developed in the
next section.
4.3. Architecture Description
4.3.1. Components and Relationships
According to the requirements presented above, Figure 4.3 shows the architectural com-
ponents to be included in those entities that take part in the dynamic federation model,
namely IdPs and SPs.
Figure 4.3: Proposed architecture for dynamic federation between SPs and IdPs
Next, we explain the details of every element in the presented architecture, and how
they extend and enhance the functionality provided by the components in the generic
architecture. We consider two kind of Data (external and internal) and a set of components
denoted as Managers, which implement the logic to handle those data and allow dynamic
federation. Thus, the components are:
1. Internal Local Data
Each entity handles the following internal data:
Dynamic Trust List (DTL). In current implementations of FIM frameworks
it is usual that entities are congured with static lists of trusted entities. More
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specically, SAML-based deployments implement Trust Anchor Lists (TALs)
and, in some cases, also Business Anchor Lists (BALs), that must be pre-
congured before any interaction between parties takes place. These lists con-
tain the digital certicates associated to every other entity that is considered
trustworthy. Protocol messages whose digital signature cannot be validated
against the TAL/BAL are rejected. Thus, trust does not evolve over time,
because interaction experience is not taken into account, community knowl-
edge is not exploited, distrust and ignorance are treated in the same way, and
the automatic establishment of trust relationships between unknown entities is
impossible. The pre-congured TAL/BAL model poses important obvious lim-
itations in dynamic open environments. So, instead of static lists, the system
maintains an enhanced Dynamic Trust List with more complete information.
The DTL stores trust, reputation and risk data regarding other entities in the
FIM infrastructure and it is automatically updated according to the establish-
ment and evolution of trust relationships (see Chapter 6 for more details on the
DTL content). Furthermore, in order to maintain compatibility with existing
deployments and to allow the establishment of relationships based on previous
agreements, TALs and BALs can also exist and, when this is the case, they will
be used to initialize the contents of the DTL. Also, an external interface for
administrators to consult and/or modify the DTL content is provided through
the DTL Manager, explained below.
Policies, SLAs and Metadata. Entities must dene policies regarding dier-
ent aspects of FIM, such as the supported cryptographic algorithms, thresholds
and rules for risk, trust and reputation values, etc. Besides the policies, each
entity denes SLAs to describe the extent of federation relationships, e.g., the
service availability, the minimum level of assurance to be used in authentica-
tion, etc. Finally, each entity will have metadata documents, which are used to
specify the technical information required to congure a federation relationship
using a particular federation framework (e.g., SAML Metadata [Cantor et al.,
2005c]): supported federation protocols and use cases, digital certicates to be
used in communication, etc.
In regard with the internal data, the novelty lies on the extension of the information
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stored, which will be used as source to make decisions. With the new DTL data
structure and by extending the data in the local policies, SLAs and metadata to
include trust, reputation and risk related info, the storage requirements of our model
are satised.
2. External Data
In addition to the internal local data, entities need to obtain external information in
order to enrich their knowledge about the other entity in a transaction. Thus, the
external information to be gathered is:
Policies, SLAs and Metadata: When deciding about to federate or not
with another entity it is required to obtain these data to compare with the
local information and ensure that federation is technically, operationally and
legally feasible to some desired extent. If federation is not possible in this sense,
then there is no need to ask for reputation data to make a decision.
Reputation Data: If the entity is unknown, reputation data will be requested
in order to compute an initial trust level to make the decision whether to trans-
act or not. The mechanisms to obtain and include reputation data in the trust
computation procedure will be explained in Chapter 6.
These external data, once obtained, are stored locally and handled by the related
managers. The storage of data regarding cooperating providers is also contemplated
in the original generic architecture. The novelty here is the possibility to gather
reputation data as a source to calculate the trust to be placed in a collaborating
entity on the y.
3. Managers
In order to handle internal and external data (CRUD operations: create, read, up-
date and delete) and implement the logic for dynamic federation, the following com-
ponents are introduced:
DTL Manager. This component is in charge of handling DTL operations:
create, read, update and delete data. Essentially, it communicates with the
Risk and Trust Managers and performs the operations required by them. The
values contained in the DTL are used to make the trust and risk computations.
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The list is dynamically updated under specic events, e.g., when receiving rec-
ommendations from other entities or when a successful interaction ends.
Policy, SLA and Metadata Manager. This component is used by the Trust,
Risk and Decision Managers. It is in charge of the following main functions:
a) Communicating trust related rules to the Trust Manager module (e.g.,
thresholds for malicious entities, default trust values, etc.).
b) Communicating risk related rules to the Risk Manager module (e.g., risk
thresholds, minimum requirements, etc.).
c) Performing CRUD operations over the local data, e.g., if a trust relationship
evolves positively, the Trust Manager will notify this module in order to
extend the initial SLA and grant more permissions to the transacting entity.
d) Providing policy information to the Decision Manager, so it can combine
the computed trust and risk values and make a decision.
Logging Manager. This component is in charge of registering historical infor-
mation for auditing purposes. Apart from this functionality, it is required that
it monitors and registers the bad and good actions of the providers in order to
have an history of transactions for reasoning and deriving risk and trust values.
Trust Manager. This component is in charge of processing external and
internal trust information to compute a trust value related to a collaborating
entity. It reads data from the DTL Manager, the Policy, SLA and Metadata
Manager, and provides an interface to obtain data from external sources. Its
functionalities include: execution of a reputation (query/response) protocol to
obtain data about unknown entities, aggregation of opinions and calculation of
trust values.
Risk Manager. This component evaluates the risk attached to the current
transaction. It receives data from the DTL Manager, the Policy, SLA and
Metadata Manager. From these sources, the component obtains all the required
input information to compute risk.
Decision Manager. This component is in charge of deciding whether to ini-
tiate or not a transaction with another entity, in case of being a requestor; or
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whether to respond or not to a transaction request. The inputs for this module
are the computed trust value, the risk associated to the transaction and the
internal policies that will be used to govern the decisions. All these data are
obtained through the related managers.
The traditional architecture also provided means for accessing policies, metadata,
SLAs and trust lists through a Conguration component and by means of an ad-
ministrative interface. Here we have split this functionality into dierent dedicated
components. But the novelty lies on two main pillars: 1) the extension of the trust
functionalities in order to allow the inclusion of reputation data and the computation
of trust based on it; and 2) the introduction of a completely new module for risk
assessment. Furthermore, thought not shown in the picture in Figure 4.3, interfaces
are also provided for administrators to consult/modify data. Also, the Identity Ser-
vices and the Cryptographic Services components are not shown because we do not
add anything new to them, but they are also part of the architecture.
The Trust and Risk Managers may be fully implemented or not. For example, an
implementation may include only a Trust Manager with the reputation function-
ality, or only a Risk Manager combined with the original static trust management
functionality. The combination of risk and trust values is performed by the Decision
Manager, which is also a new component.
Finally, the Logging Manager simply extends the original Login component to reg-
ister information about the satisfaction of transactions, in order to aid in the trust
and risk computation.
With these set of managers, the design requirements listed in the previous section
are fullled.
Summarizing, since the trust and risk components include the functionality that consti-
tutes the main contribution of the thesis, a separate chapter is dedicated to dene each
of these components. Thus, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, develop the risk and trust models
to be implemented as part of the architecture. Then, Chapter 7 shows how the decision
manager combines the outputs of the trust and risk managers for decision making.
Finally, in order to complete the general picture of the architecture, next section explains
the general behavior of the architectural components through an operation owchart.
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4.3.2. Operation Flow
In order to show the behavioral part of the architecture, this section illustrates how the
dierent components interact with each other.
In a dynamic federation environment there can be two interaction scenarios for a provider:
a) Transacting with a federated provider. In this case both the SP and the IdP belong
to the same federation and they know each other from previous interactions, so trust
information is available in their DTLs.
b) Establishing a federation with an unknown provider. In this case, since entities are
unknown to each other because no previous interaction exists, there is no information
in the DTLs.
Next we explain the operation ow (Figure 4.4) that covers the above cases, referencing
which parts of the proposed architecture take part in the process. The aim is to provide
just a conceptual understanding so low level details are not yet given, but they will be
addressed in subsequent chapters.
Figure 4.4: Flowchart for interaction using the dynamic federation architecture
On the one hand, the steps followed in the case of known providers are:
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1. First, a user attempts to access a service oered by a SP.
2. The SP discovers the IdP that the user wants to use for identication and checks its
DTL to determine if the IdP is contained in it.
3. If the IdP is contained in the DTL, this means that entities are already federated,
congured to operate and a trust value exists. So the next step consists on extracting
the trust value, computing the risk value associated to the transaction and combining
both.
4. If the combined trust-risk value is enough for cooperation, then the SP will continue
with the transaction. On the contrary, the provider will not continue with the
transaction.
On the other hand, when the providers are not federated, just the rst two steps are the
same as in the previous case. But when checking the DTL:
3. If the IdP is not contained in the DTL, this means that entities are not federated
and the relationship must be established. Thus, the next step consists on obtaining
external data (i.e., reputation, metadata, etc.) about the IdP.
4. Next, the gathered external data are used to compute trust and risk values, and the
IdP is inserted in the DTL of the SP together with this information.
5. If the combined trust-risk value is enough for establishing a federation, then the SP
continues with the transaction. On the contrary, no federation is established.
In the presented cases, we show the operation from the point of view of an SP that wants
to transact with an IdP. Although not reected, the IdP on the other side also checks its
DTL and performs the same steps to determine if it should transact with the SP.
As far as the architectural components involved at each point of the operation ow, Step 2
of both scenarios is performed by the Trust Manager through the DTL manager. In both
cases, the calculations to obtain the trust, risk and combined values, are performed by the
Trust, Risk and Decision Manager, respectively. This happens at Step 3 in the federated
case, and Step 4 in the unknown scenario. The gathering of external data performed in
Step 3 of the unknown scenario is implemented by the Trust Manager, which uses the
DTL and the Policy, SLA and Metadata Managers to store the information. Finally, the
comparisons with the decision thresholds for the combined trust-risk value in the last steps
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of both cases are performed by the decision manager.
Finally, after presenting this general view of the architecture, we will develop the func-
tionality and low level details of the main modules in the next chapters.
4.4. Conclusions
It is clear that current FIM architectures are limited to provided secure and dynamic means
to establish relationships between providers. In this chapter we proposed an extended
architecture to ll this gap. The architecture is composed of a set of logical modules that
separate and encapsulate the functionalities required to achieve dynamic federation. The
pillars of the architecture are the risk and trust components, which constitute the main
contribution of the thesis. The mathematical models implemented by each part are thus
developed in the following chapters.
In conclusion, the extension of the architecture satises the intended goals, since it makes
possible to minimize pre-conguration requirements by allowing relationships to be estab-
lished on demand based on trust and risk analysis.
Chapter5
Risk Model Proposal
\If you cannot measure (or model) it, you
cannot improve it"
Lord Kelvin
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5.1. Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the proposed risk model that is to be included by participants in
federated identity management scenarios. The general goal of the model is to serve as a
tool for decision making that:
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provides a meaningful numerical value that condensates risk information
allows entities to include subjective preferences according to their interests
aids entities in deciding whether to collaborate or not with another entity
aids entities in deciding which entity in a set is the best alternative for cooperation
Between the dierent types of risk assessment methods (see Chapter 2), we choose to
follow a semi-quantitative approach. The reason is that pure quantitative analysis is not
possible since no statistical data are available to build the model. Qualitative scales are
thus required, but instead of staying purely qualitative, the mapping of these scales to
quantitative values permits the automation needed for dynamic federation. Thus, the
hybrid approach is the one that best ts our needs.
The methodology employed to dene the risk model consists of three steps. Firstly, we
design a taxonomy to capture the dierent aspects of a relationship in identity federation
that may contribute to risk. This approach allows us to decompose the complex problem
of risk assessment and to acquire a detailed knowledge. Secondly, based on the taxonomy
and aiming at developing a computational model, we propose a set of metrics as a basis to
quantify risk. Finally, we describe to aggregate the metrics into a meaningful risk gure,
coming to the nal formal denition of the model.
According to the stated goals and methodology, the chapter is divided in three sections
which develop the taxonomy, the metrics and the aggregation procedure, respectively.
5.2. Towards a FIM Taxonomy for Risk Metrics Derivation
5.2.1. Why a Taxonomy?
\Divide et Impera"
The exact denition of taxonomy varies slightly from source to source, but the core idea
behind the discipline remains the same: identication, naming, and classication. The
history of taxonomic classication is deeply rooted on biology, where theory and practice
of grouping individuals into species has been crucial for the understanding of biodiversity
and conservation. But the use of taxonomies has proved useful in many other elds, such
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as education [Anderson et al., 2000] or psychology [McGarty, 1999]. Indeed, anything may
be categorized according to some taxonomic scheme: animate objects, inanimate objects,
places, concepts, events, properties, and relationships.
As a general point of reference, the Oxford dictionary 1 denes taxonomy as a \scheme of
classication". Furthermore, Flood and Carson [Flood and Carson, 1993] point out that
a taxonomy serves several purposes:
Description: It helps us to describe the world around us, and provides us with
a tool with which to order the complex phenomena that surround us into more
manageable units.
Prediction: By classifying a number of objects according to our taxonomy and then
observing the `holes' where objects may be missing, we can exploit the predictive
qualities of a good taxonomy. In the ideal case, the classication points us in the
right direction when undertaking further studies.
Explanation: A good taxonomy will provide us with clues about how to explain
observed phenomena.
In the light of the utility of taxonomies to approach complex problems, we aim to make
a classication of the dierent aspects involved in establishing and cooperating in a fed-
eration between identity and service providers. The main goal, oriented to contribute
towards risk modeling, is to use the taxonomy as a tool that helps in the derivation of
metrics for risk assessment. Understanding risk as a complex multidimensional construct,
as we already claried in Chapter 3, the categorization of dierent contributor factors is
crucial as a rst step to nd the pieces that will conform the overall risk.
Taxonomies can be designed in dierent ways, being hierarchies the most common struc-
tures. In a hierarchical taxonomy, categories or nodes progress from general to specic.
Thus, each subsequent node is a subset of the higher level node. We followed a hierarchi-
cal approach because, once the metrics for each category are derived, risk can be easily
calculated following a hierarchical aggregation model directly grounded in the taxonomy.
Summarizing, we aim to design a generic taxonomy that gathers the features of contem-
porary federations, but also that allows to identify `holes', i.e., where to place adequate
1http://oxforddictionaries.com/
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metrics to be used for risk calculation in the dynamic federation scenario envisioned in this
thesis. For this purpose, we have studied all the requirements taken into account when
establishing a federation according to the dierent identity management specications (see
section 2.1) and organized them in categories. The whole rationale design and justication
of each category in the taxonomy is explained through the following section.
5.2.2. Rationale Design
This section goes through the proposed taxonomy justifying how we made every design
decision to model and classify the dierent categories in FIM where risk metrics may be
grouped.
First of all, based on the understanding of FIM as a two-phased procedure (idea proposed
in Chapter 4), we rst divide the taxonomy in two main categories: Pre-Federation and
Post-Federation. Since the justication of this division has been already well-argued,
no further elaboration is provided here. It should be clear that the decisions to make and
the available information are dierent in each phase; and so are the faced risks:
In Pre-Federation, an entity will presumably have to decide whether to establish
a relationship for further cooperation with another entity, i.e., to federate or not to
federate. The sources of information to compute a risk metric at this stage could be,
for example, the entity metadata, pre-congured relationships with other entities,
internal policies, and the Service Level Agreements being negotiated.
On the other hand, entities in Post-Federation phase will have to decide whether
to transact or not in the context of a particular service. Metrics to assess risk at this
stage can be calculated from the information available in the assertions and protocols
in use, the characteristics of the specic service transaction in process, and, also, by
leveraging the risk metrics from the previous phase.
The distinction of these two fundamental phases in FIM constitutes the rst level (L1)
of the proposed taxonomy, whose complete schematic is depicted in Figure 5.1. In the
following subsections, we explain and argument the dierent subcategories related to each
phase.
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Figure 5.1: Taxonomy for risk metric derivation in FIM
Pre-Federation Risks
Our approach to categorize risk metrics in Pre-Federation stage starts with nding the
answers to these questions:
1. What is required to move from Pre-Federation to Post-Federation? or, equivalently,
What are the requirements to establish a federation?
2. Which are the dierent aspects of these federation requirements that may contribute
to the global risk?
Consequently, in order to determine the dierent subsets to categorize Pre-Federation risk
metrics, we reviewed the dierent documents used to establish contemporary federations.
After the analysis, we saw that to establish a federation between providers, a set of agree-
ments must be put in place. For this purpose, there is not a standard or common xed
set of minimum requirements; instead every deployment follows its own rules based on
the federation framework in use, and on the goals and purpose of the federation itself.
Some identity management frameworks, such as SAML and Liberty ID-*, provide addi-
tional documents apart from the core specications that describe a set of guidelines for
federation and also recommend best practices. However, other identity frameworks are not
specic in this regard and simply assume in their general specications that cooperating
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entities are congured to be able to interoperate and trust each other.
Since the documents for federation establishment provide guidelines that are subject to
dierent interpretations, we aimed also (for the sake of completeness) to analyze how
federations are implemented in practice, to which extent are the agreements put in place
and which features are covered in these agreements. Nevertheless, there is no much public
information about how federations agreements are deployed in the real world, except for
the survey of Research and Education Federations (REFEDs) in [TERENA, 2012], carried
out by the Trans-European Research and Education Networking Association (TERENA).
In examining both the existing specications and the real world public data about feder-
ation establishment some common trends are worthy of mention:
1. In all the identity frameworks, security and privacy considerations are taken into
account to some extent.
SAML core documents recommend to apply digital signature mechanisms to pro-
tocol messages, and assertion encryption is supported as well. Furthermore, there
is a complete document dedicated to cover SAML security and privacy consider-
ations [Maler et al., 2005]. This document highlights the importance of applying
mechanisms to achieve condentiality, integrity and authentication at the transit
and message level. For this purpose, it recommends also to use SSL 3.0 [Freier et al.,
2011] or TLS 1.0 [Dierks and Rescorla, 2006] to secure the communication channel.
Likewise, the Liberty \Deployment Guidelines for Policy Decision Makers" [Varney
and Sheckler, 2005] addresses certain privacy and security related considerations that
federation participants should consider. Similarly, WS-Federation specications re-
quire agreement between parties on security claims and also state that agreement on
mechanisms for securely transporting those claims over unprotected networks may
be required. OpenID, OAuth and Information Cards also include security notes in
their specication documents and emphasize, for example, that the use of encryption
and digital signature mechanisms has an impact in the probability of being attacked.
On the other hand, security considerations are also present in most of the public
federation agreements in the REFEDs survey, specially regarding to privacy of user
personal data.
Consequently, security must be denitely taken into account when assessing federa-
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tion risks, since inappropriate protection may lead to attacks. The understanding
and agreement on a common set of security practices, which ensure that every
entity works within a desired risk context is necessary.
2. There is a clear need for interoperability.
At least entities must be able to communicate, i.e., to use the same protocols. Liberty
ID-* and SAML require that metadata is exchanged in order convey conguration
information required to interoperate. WS-Federation also requires the exchange of
metadata as a basis for interoperability. Furthermore, based on WS-Policy, web
services are allowed to use XML to advertise their policies on dierent issues (e.g.,
quality of service) and for web service consumers to specify their policy requirements,
guaranteeing thus interoperability. Apart from the specications, Liberty also pro-
vides a guidelines document [Sheckler, 2007] which recommends several relevant as-
pects that should be addressed to ensure robust relationships between participants
in a federation. More specically, the document points out the importance of agree-
ments on operational rules, technical standards for communication and applicable
laws according to the jurisdiction(s) in which the federation operates and the class
of business. In the case of OpenID, OAuth or Information Cards technologies, their
core specications assume that interacting parties are technically interoperable (i.e.
congured to understand the same set of protocols). Finally, the agreement upon dif-
ferent issues related to interoperability is also reected in public policies that govern
the federations surveyed in [TERENA, 2012].
We can thus conclude that interoperability has an impact in the risk when connect-
ing entities in a federation.
3. The required degree of knowledge regarding the other party involved in a federation
transaction may vary.
Depending on the identity framework, knowledge about the transacting entity is
required to interact or not. In those cases where knowledge is required, it may
be pre-congured (direct) or transitively obtained (indirect). And this knowledge
is used to place trust as it was explained in Chapter 3. In this regard, SAML,
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Liberty and WS-Federation provide well-dened models to derive knowledge based
on pre-conguration and using transitive relationships. In \OASIS Trust Model
Guidelines" [Boeyen et al., 2004], a classication of possible implementation models
is presented based on direct/indirect business knowledge and on direct/indirect
authentication knowledge. On the other hand, OAuth and Information Cards
simply state in the specications that the interacting entities should be known to
each other. Typically knowledge is maintained on lists of known entities, which are
manually updated by administrators. In turn, the OpenID framework considers
that interaction can happen even without the need for previous knowledge following
a \trust-and-accept-all-comers" philosophy. And nally, the federations surveyed
by TERENA require new entities to sign a membership agreement previous to
enter the federation, so the knowledge is based on direct contractual frameworks.
We conclude that knowledge inuences risk, since it is vital to determine a trust level.
Based on this thorough analysis of FIM specications, related best practices and recom-
mendations, and the reviewing of public data about how current federation deployments
were established, we conclude that the whole set of aspects to be considered before cre-
ating a federation are oriented to achieve security and privacy objectives, to establish
interoperability rules and policies for legal, technical and operational compliance, as well
as to determine the knowledge regarding the interacting party. The taxonomy proposed
here aims to cover all these aspects in order to be generic enough to abstract all the
federation frameworks. Accordingly, we divide the next level (L2) of classication in the
Pre-Federation phase into three main blocks or categories, namely: Security and Pri-
vacy, Interoperability and Knowledge.
Next, each of these L2 classes is explained in more detail and further divided into subcat-
egories.
The rst class, Security and Privacy , encompasses those risk metrics related to the security
and privacy features that are supported by an entity who wants to establish a federation.
These features, which constitute the subcategories located at level L3 in the taxonomy,
are:
Condentiality: disclosing information only to intended and authorized recipients.
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Integrity: guarding against improper information modication or destruction.
Authentication: conrming something (or someone) as authentic, verifying the
validity of the claims made by or about the so called subject.
Non-Repudiation: provides evidence that one party involved in a transaction sent
or received a message, so it cannot be denied.
Availability: ensuring that a system is operational and that it is accessible to those
who need to use it, so the business purposes can be met; loss of availability is often
referred to as \denial-of-service".
Accountability: the ability to associate a consequence with a past action of an
individual. It is required that the individual can be linked to action or event for
which he/she is to be held accountable.
Privacy: appropriate use and protection of information, which means seclusion
and selective disclosure of data according to law and policies. Privacy is sometimes
related to anonymity, dened as the wish to remain unnoticed or unidentied in the
public domain.
The above categories were chosen based on the features commonly considered in the secu-
rity literature.
Each of the above basic security services or \CIA" (i.e., Condentiality, Integrity and
Authentication) depends on the cryptographic characteristics of both the data exchanged
at the message level (ML) and at the transport layer level (TL). As mentioned before, most
of the FIM protocols strongly recommend the use of secure communication protocols,
such as Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). Thus, it is required to evaluate the quality of the
security services that can be provided at the message level and also with regard to the
communication nature. For example, a FIM transaction with encrypted assertions that
are also transmitted over a secure SSL connection would incur in less risks than if the
communication channel is not secured. This requirement is also reected in the taxonomy,
as a sub-classication (at level L4) to be evaluated for each basic security service.
The second subclass under Pre-Federation, called Interoperability, encompasses those is-
sues related to interworking between entities. Interoperability can be decomposed in three
dierent domains, located at level L3 in the taxonomy: Technical, Operational and
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Legal. The Technical category is required since there are many dierent technologies for
FIM. Furthermore, inside a specic framework there can be dierent implementations.
For example, two SAML enabled entities could not interoperate if they do not support
a set of common Proles. Thus, metrics are required in order to measure the technical
compatibility of the systems. Apart from technology related interoperability, it is also
important to evaluate if the policies of each entity are compatible to a certain degree. In
these sense, entities should measure, on the one hand, the interoperability regarding Op-
erational policies. On the other hand, legal compliance and applicable jurisdictions should
be also addressed, so cooperation is also interoperable at regulatory level. Therefore, if
cooperation implies risk of violating an entity policy, it should be avoided. Thus, the
interoperability metrics are computed based on the information gathered from metadata,
SLAs and policies of the other entity before deciding on interaction.
Finally, the last dierentiation to allocate risk contributing factors in Pre-Federation is
named Knowledge and involves those risk factors related to the previous information that
is known about the other entity. Risk metrics derived from this category will thus aid in
the quantication of the initial trust level that is assigned to the interacting party, being a
point of relation between trust and risk. Since each party has to decide whether to engage
in a relation with other party for future cooperation, it is reasonable to gather informa-
tion about its trustworthiness. In order to capture the dierent type of relationships,
Knowledge metrics are sub-classied into Direct and Indirect. The Direct Knowledge
metrics are related to pre-congured relationships (e.g., digital certicates or business
agreements); whereas Indirect Knowledge refers to the reputation data, information that
can be obtained from external sources [Gomez Marmol et al., 2010]. Consequently, the risk
level will vary according to the existing knowledge, because it is indirectly proportional to
the uncertainty.
One could argue that the taxonomy could be organized in another way, and it could be
indeed. For example, security could be included as a category under interoperability, since
it can be understood that entities are not interoperable regarding security objectives if
their policies on algorithms are not compatible. However, the design approach does not
limit the utility of the taxonomy as a tool for modeling aspects of federation relationships
and derive metrics for risk assessment. Furthermore, despite no other taxonomy has been
proposed to compare with our model, our classication is coherent with the roadmap for
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the study of trust federations proposed by Kantara2.
Post-Federation Risks
Here we follow the same methodology used for identifying the possible risk contributions
in Pre-Federation. Thus, we try to answer these two questions:
1. What kind of transactions are performed in Post-Federation?
2. Which are the dierent aspects of Post-Federation transactions that may contribute
to the global risk?
According to the specications of the dierent identity frameworks, after a federation
between providers has been established, transactions to exchange user identity data can
be performed between them. In this phase, risk must be assessed on a per-transaction
basis. Some facts are relevant at this phase: 1) rstly, the requirements and agreements for
interoperation have been already put in place so interoperability is assumed under a well-
dened Federation SLA; 2) depending on the context of the transaction (i.e., characteristics
of the service, required personal information, etc.), security and other service specic
features must be assured to dierent extents, 3) transacting entities will have additional
knowledge based on previous transactions apart from the initial pre-congured knowledge
data. Based on these facts, as shown in Figure 5.1, Post-Federation Risk metrics are
categorized in three main classes (level L2), namely: Security and Privacy, Service
Specic and Historical Interaction.
Next, each of the L2 classes under Post-Federation is explained in more detail.
In Post-Federation transactions it is relevant to measure how the security features are ful-
lled in order to know how they contribute to the total risk. Thus, the same classication
of Security and Privacy made for Pre-Federation applies here. The dierence is that the
Security and Privacy metrics taken in Post-Federation are related to the current transac-
tion and so they are used to decide whether to transact or not in the measured conditions.
However, metrics in the Pre-Federation phase are used to determine the global support of
security features and decide whether to federate or not.
2http://kantarainitiative.org/conuence/display/TFMMWG/TFM+Topic+Map
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Apart from the Security and Privacy related metrics, we consider a further distinction in
order to include Service Specic Risks and ensure completeness. This category allows the
risk model to be tailored for dierent types of services. Services dier in characteristics
such as required personal information, value of the resources owned by the SP, importance
of data availability and so forth. All these issues must be considered by every member in-
volved in a service transaction in order to create a risk context and decide about proceeding
with the transaction or not.
Finally, there is also a Historical Interactions category to consider those risk metrics re-
lated to the information and knowledge about the other entity involved in the transaction.
In this phase, in contrast to the Pre-Federation case, there is another source to com-
pute knowledge related metrics: the history of transactions. As more transactions are
performed, the entities will have a better direct knowledge about the behavior of other
entities. In addition, indirect knowledge could be obtained in anomalous situations. Con-
sequently, the involved risk level can be tuned accordingly.
All the above distinctions are captured in the schematic of the taxonomy depicted in
Figure 5.1.
Conclusions about the Taxonomy
To summarize, the taxonomy is organized into two major classes: Pre-Federation and
Post-Federation. These taxonomic classes are further divided into the subclasses repre-
senting the following aspects where risk metrics must be placed: Security and Privacy,
Knowledge, Interoperability, Service Specic and Historical Interactions. Finally, the last
levels contemplate the dierent dimensions in which every risk can be evaluated. The
taxonomy should be adopted by every entity in the system to enrich its intelligence and
independence and to be capable of making well-informed decisions.
The classication compiles the characteristics of FIM systems and makes possible risk
decomposition in small subsets. Besides, it is generic enough to be applicable to every fed-
eration framework (SAML, Liberty Alliance, OpenID, etc.), since the provided abstraction
levels allow to cover all the common features, as well as the specic ones. Furthermore,
exploiting the prediction capabilities of taxonomies, we observe a number of gaps that
need to be covered to allow dynamic federation, namely:
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1. The denition of standard formats to express security requirements/features.
2. The denition of standard formats to express legal, operational and technical fea-
tures.
3. The incorporation of knowledge information to those frameworks that do not address
this feature.
4. The introduction of mechanisms/formats to communicate this multi-protocol sup-
port for entities that support several identity protocols.
Finally, apart from serving as a basis for deriving risk metrics and identifying existing gaps,
the taxonomy can be used to dene an aggregation model for risk calculation. Its hierar-
chical structure makes it suitable to be the foundation of a hierarchical aggregation system.
And this is an important advantage since multicriteria decision making (MCDM) [Trianta-
phyllou, 2000] mechanisms and related mathematical techniques rely on the decomposition
of problems into a hierarchy of more easily comprehended sub-problems, each of which can
be analyzed independently. We will show how to perform risk aggregation based on the
taxonomy, but before this next section denes the metrics that will be used in our risk
model.
5.3. Risk Metrics
5.3.1. What is a Metric?
\More than 100 years ago, Lord Kelvin insightfully observed that measurement is vital to deep knowledge and
understanding in physical science. During the last few decades, researchers have made various attempts to
develop measures and systems of measurement for computer security with varying degrees of success [Jansen,
2010]"
A metric is, according to the denition in [Jansen, 2010], a proposed measure or unit of
measure that is designed to facilitate decision making and improve performance and ac-
countability through collection analysis and reporting of relevant data. Another denition
is that a metric is a measure for quantitatively assessing, controlling or selecting a person,
process, event, or institution, along with the procedures to carry out measurements and
the procedures for the interpretation of the assessment in the light of previous or com-
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parable assessments3. In [Jaquith, 2007] metrics are dened as management tools that
facilitate decision making and accountability through practical and relevant data collec-
tion, data analysis, and performance data reporting. As occurs with the concepts of trust,
risk and reputation, the denition of metric is not universal and there are ambiguities
and contradictions surrounding the term. In general all the denitions include the idea
that metrics facilitate decision making, which is the main feature that motivates the use
of metrics in the context of this dissertation. However, there are dierent opinions on
whether the nature of a metric must be quantitative or qualitative and its implications.
Some works, such as [Jaquith, 2007], suggest that qualitative assessments are bad met-
rics since they do not \count things" and so are subjective. It is true that, in general,
quantitative metrics are more desirable than qualitative ones. However, it is challenging
to nd quantitative metrics that depict phenomena such as information security or too
complex concepts such as trust. Furthermore, the distinction between quantitative and
qualitative metrics can be easily obscured. For example, quantitative measures can be
mapped to qualitative assignments and, in turn, numeric values can be used to represent
rankings that are otherwise qualitative. In this regard, the terms measure and metric
overlap in their denitions. Sometimes both concepts are referred as the same, but in
other cases they are dened as not equal but related concepts. The NIST agency- in its
project for software assurance SAMATE [Black, 2008]- makes the following dierentiation
between both terms: metrics are used for more abstract, higher-level, or somewhat sub-
jective attributes, while measures are used for more concrete or objective attributes. But
there are also contradictory opinions, such as the work in [Cugini et al., 1997] that denes
metric and measure concepts in a totally opposite manner. Since the important point in
describing a research work is to attach to a denition and be consistent, we will adopt
the denitions in [Black, 2008]. Thus, we understand metrics as high level interpretations
of objective measurements. Apart from the adoption of this denition we will focus on
a particular kind of metrics: assurance metrics or levels of assurance. Assurance metrics
represent objective condence that an entity meets some requirements and they are based
on specic evidence provided by the application of assurance techniques. The main fea-
ture of assurance metrics is that they provive certainty. As explained in [Vaughn Jr et al.,
2003], the term assurance has been used for decades in trusted system development as an
expression of condence that one has in the strength of mechanisms or countermeasures.
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metric (unit)
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Figure 5.2: Conceptual description of the risk model and metrics
To conclude, our approach for risk assessment is based on assurance metrics, which are
composed from low level measures. The measures are objective and built on well dened
assurance descriptions, so dierent repetitions of the measurement procedure will lead to
the same results. In turn, the assurance metrics are obtained from the combination of
measures. Metrics are assigned a qualitative scale and thus are more subjective. However,
the rationale behind the scale will be carefully explained. Finally, since is our goal to dene
a semiquantitative risk assessment framework, each qualitative category in the scale will
be assigned to numerical values. Figure 5.2 shows the relationship between metrics and
measures in our model and represents also the dierent metric categories that are grounded
on the proposed taxonomy.
Next section goes through the details on how we dene each metric. It starts with a review
of current metrics used in FIM systems and then explains the metrics used in the proposed
model.
5.3.2. Metrics for Risk Quantication in FIM
In our subject of study, risk assessment in FIM, there is still scarce work. Federated identity
management has been researched during the last decade and it is becoming more and more
important with the increasing segmentation on internet services and the penetration of
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the cloud computing paradigm. The need of sharing user identity data between online
entities (e.g., attribute providers, banks, telcos and so on) is paramount for a exible and
seamless cooperation. But this sharing imposes risks; it is not the same relying in your own
infrastructure for authenticating/verifying user's identity and give access to your services,
than giving access by relying on what another entity claims about the user. This is were
assurance comes into scene: it is crucial that the mechanisms used by cooperating partners
are well-dened and meet each other's requirements, it is necessary to have a degree of
certainty on which to build condence.
Regarding metrics designed for risk assessment in FIM, there is important research on
metrics for authentication assurance. More specically, the identity assurance model
developed by Kantara [Glade, 2012](originally started as the Liberty Alliance Identity
Assurance Framework [Cutler, 2007]) constitutes one of the main assurance frameworks
nowadays. Kantara denes the assurance levels that can be associated with a credential
as measured by the associated technology, processes, and policy and practice statements.
The Kantara framework defers to the guidance provided by the NIST Special Publication
800-63 [Nadalin et al., 2006], which outlines four levels of assurance, ranging in condence
level from low to very high. These four assurance levels, shown in Table 5.1, are used in
relying parties to address increasing levels of risk, i.e., the choice of an assurance level is
based on the degree of certainty of identity required to mitigate risk.
Level Description
1 Little or no condence in the asserted identity's validity
2 Some condence in the asserted identity's validity
3 High condence in the asserted identity's validity
4 Very high condence in the asserted identity's validity
Table 5.1: Levels of authentication assurance as dened by Kantara[Glade, 2012]
Besides the work on authentication assurance carried out by Kantara, the ETSI also iden-
ties metrics as a starting point for cooperation in federated environments [ETSI, 2011].
The ETSI vision is that there are several inuences to decision making. These inuences
are in itself multi-factored and adequate metrics have to be developed to quantify and
qualify them. Thus, apart from authentication assurance, they propose to include other
metrics such as reputation, as it was explained in Chapter 2. Following the idea of using
assurance metrics and inspired by the particular model of authentication assurance (the
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only well-dened assurance metric for FIM nowadays), we aim to design a comprehen-
sive set of assurance metrics for the dierent risk categories identied in our taxonomy.
We understand that assurance metrics directly aect the likelihood of attacks on related
vulnerabilities. For example, a high level of condentiality assurance will mean a low
probability of successful attacks that compromise condentiality, such as eavesdropping
attacks. Thus, all the metrics used in our model are related to the likelihood part in the
risk equation Risk = Likelihood x Impact . But in order to compute the risk, it is also
required to evaluate the impact. For this purpose, we consider that impacts are related to
each of the categories in the taxonomy, i.e., every assurance metric can be related to an
associated impact. Since we aim to dene a generic framework, we assume that impacts
are qualied or described in a scale of values high, medium, and low, that is assigned by
the entity evaluating the risk according to the value of its assets. These details will be
furhter claried at the end of the chapter, after all the assurance metrics are dened.
In the following we rst introduce the procedure for metric identication based on the
taxonomy. Next subsections will provide a description of the whole proposed set of basic
metrics that are to be applied for risk assessment in FIM. In this regard, if an already
existing metric ts in a taxonomic category, we will adopt this existing metric. However,
for such cases where no existing metrics apply - which are the majority -, we will dene a
new metric. Finally, our framework is intended to be generic and thus usable for any FIM
protocol. Based on this premise, the categories in the taxonomy cover general aspects
involved in establishing and maintaining a federation independently of the underlying
protocol. Nevertheless, the detailed denition of the metrics requires to be more specic
on certain aspects, such as the identication of the data sources for measurements. Thus,
whenever particularization is required, we will assume a SAML-based system.
Starting with the methodology to identify risk related metrics, the rst step is to
choose a terminal node in the taxonomy tree, e.g., Post-Fed->Security and Privacy-
>Condentiality->TL. Then, for this selected category, the possible threats can be de-
rived. In this example, if no condentiality is provided at the transport level, the system
could be subject of eavesdropping attacks or privacy violations. Consequently, transport
condentiality yields a contribution to the feasibility of the mentioned threats. However,
the nal risk will be aected by other components, such as the condentiality at the mes-
sage level. As previously mentioned, we rely on assurance metrics since they are inversely
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proportional to the feasibility of attacks related to the attribute being assured. Thus,
instead of exhaustively composing a list of threats and computing the likelihood of each
threat, we assume that the likelihood associated to an specic category generaly refers to
the whole set of threats related to the category. According to this reasoning, table 5.2
shows the semantic denition of the metric. To allow quantication, a numeric value can
be assigned depending on the cryptographic strength of the encryption algorithms sup-
ported by the entity willing to federate. We will later elaborate both on the qualitative
and quantitative description of the metrics.
Metric Condentitality at transport level (CONFTL)
Denition Measures condentiality assurance of information exchanged at the transport
level, depending on the encryption algorithm (e.g., based on strength, key
size...)
Considerations Source: can be obtained from the SAML entity metadata [Cantor et al.,
2005c]
Table 5.2: Semantic denition of the condentiality at transport level assurance metric
Following this strategy, we identify the rest of metrics. Another example is the level of
authentication assurance or LOA (see Table 5.3). It is usually dened as the degree of
condence in identifying an entity to whom a credential was issued, and the degree of
condence that the entity using the credential is indeed the entity that the credential was
issued to. For example, the NIST [Nadalin et al., 2006] agency denes four discrete levels
that are associated with the strength of the authentication methods. This way, simple
password challenge-response is categorized as LOA level 1, as well as hard cryptographic
tokens are considered level 4. The LOA, which falls into the Post-Fed->ServiceSpec cate-
gory, is a clear example of an existing concept that ts into the taxonomy and can be used
as a metric for risk assessment in FIM. Thus, the value expressed by the LOA metric can
be used by providers to decide whether an individual should be granted access to specic
protected resources or if a higher LOA is required.
Metric Level of authentication assurance (LOA)
Denition Measures the degree of condence in identifying an entity to whom a credential
was issued
Considerations Source: can be obtained from the SAML Authentication Assertion or from
the metadata [Cantor et al., 2005c]
Table 5.3: Semantic description of the level of authentication assurance metric
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Following the explained methodology we now derive assurance metrics for each of the
categories in the taxonomy. For every metric we dene its semantics, the procedures to
carry out measurements and the associated qualitative scale. Summarizing, we answer
these three questions:
What does the metric measure?
How is the measure performed?
What is the qualitative scale?
Existing Applicable Metrics
As mentioned before, the only metrics whose usage is being adopted in the context of
ad-hoc federation and trust management scenarios are levels of authentication assurance
(LOA). More specically, the NIST 800-63 denition, which is the reference followed by
Kantara, is the most important framework.
1. What does the metric measure?
The LOA metric measures the degree of condence in identifying an entity to whom a
credential was issued, and the degree of condence that the entity using the credential is
indeed the entity that the credential was issued to.
2. How is the measure performed?
The NIST 800-63 denition provides a model for categorizing the wide variety of authen-
tication methods into a small number of levels, typically based on some notion of the
strength of the authentication. As described in [Nadalin et al., 2006], the procedure con-
sists of evaluating the kind of tokens, credentials and protocols used for authentication,
as well as the user registration process. To give an idea, Table 5.4 shows a classication
of allowed token types at each LOA level. However, the set of features to be evaluated is
far more complex. We do not include here all these details for simplicity, but we refer the
interested reader to the original document.
In order to specify the source data that can be used in a FIM system to obtain the
LOA metric following the measurement procedures, we particularize for the SAML case.
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Token Type Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
Hard crypto token Yes Yes Yes Yes
One-time password device Yes Yes Yes Yes
Soft crypto token Yes Yes No No
Passwords & PINs Yes No No No
Table 5.4: Token types allowed at dierent LOA levels according to NIST SP 800-
63 [Nadalin et al., 2006]
To derive the LOA in a SAML based system, entities should support the \Level of As-
surance Authentication Context Proles for SAML 2.0" [E. Tiany, 2008]. This prole
denes how to use existing SAML mechanisms to express identity assurance information,
which can be done in two dierent manners: 1) using the SAML 2.0 Authentication Con-
text [Kemp et al., 2005] mechanisms in order to allow SAML authentication requests and
assertions to carry assurance information and 2) including extensions to SAML metadata
documents [Cantor et al., 2005c] to represent assurance certication information about a
SAML entity within the corresponding metadata.
The rst mechanism is based on the denition of new SAML Authentication Context
classes corresponding to dierent assurance criteria, thereby allowing the corresponding
URIs for those assurance-based classes to be inserted within authentication requests and
responses.
The second mechanism denes a SAML attribute prole that may be used to represent the
certication status of an issuer of authentication statements (i.e., an Identity Provider)
regarding its conformance with the requirements of an identity assurance framework. An
example of a metadata document including this information is shown in Figure 5.3.
In the example in Figure 5.3 a <saml:Attribute> element is placed in the IdP's
<md:EntityDescriptor> to indicate that the practices of the IdP have been certied
as compliant with the requirements of level of authentication assurance 1 (LOA1) accord-
ing to a ctional assurance framework (foo assurance framework) whose associated XML
schema is located in the URL http://foo.example.com/assurance/loa. A party rely-
ing on this metadata could use this value as input for its risk policy and use it to decide
whether to accept SAML authentication assertions from this IdP. Regarding the kind of
criteria used to categorize each level of assurance, not only the NIST 800-63 framework is
applicable. In fact, dierent denitions may be applied since the prole is not tied to a
specic authentication assurance framework. Furthermore, there is an ongoing IETF draft
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Figure 5.3: Example of SAML metadata including LoA information (©[E. Tiany, 2008])
aiming at establishing an IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) registry for LoA
proles [Johansson, 2012]. For example, apart from the NIST standard, there are other
denitions of LoA such as the provided by the STORK Project [Clowes and Brathwaite,
2009].
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As stated, the qualitative denition depends on the LoA framework in use. For the case
of using the NIST 800-63 denition, the qualitative scale is comprised of 4 levels, namely
Little assurance, Some assurance, High assurance and Very High assurance.
In conclusion, Table 5.5 summarizes the complete denition of the LoA metric.
While the LOA metric is applicable for category Post-Fed->ServiceSpec in the taxonomy,
no other well-dened assurance metrics were found that t in the taxonomy. Thus, we pro-
ceed with the denition of new metrics. In this task, we will propose assurance frameworks
to qualitatively evaluate each of the metrics. Whenever possible, the proposed framework
will be based in widely accepted expert knowledge available in the related literature. For
4www.ref.gv.at/AG-IZ-Sicherheitsklassen-Sec.1719.0.html
5www.ref.gv.at/Sicherheitsklassen.2329.0.html
6www.eid-stork.eu
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Metric LOA
Denition Level of authentication assurance. Measures the degree of condence
in identifying an entity to whom a credential was issued, and the
degree of condence that the entity using the credential is indeed the
entity that the credential was issued to
Category Post-Fed->ServiceSpec
Type Basic
Formula -
Measurement The procedure consists of evaluating the kind of tokens, credentials
and protocols used for authentication, as well as the user registration
process. Once the strength is determined, the LOA is assigned to a
qualitative category.
Source data SAML metadata [Cantor et al., 2005c] or SAML Authentication Con-
text [Kemp et al., 2005]
Qualitative Scale
Little condence, when the degree of condence in the as-
serted identity's validity is little or nonexistent;
Some condence, when there is some condence in the as-
serted identity's validity;
High condence, when the degree of condence in the as-
serted identity's validity is high;
Very High condence, when the degree of condence in the
asserted identity's validity is very high
Applied Framework NIST 800-63 [Nadalin et al., 2006]
Alternative Frame-
works
ATSC24, ATSC35, STORK6
Table 5.5: LOA Metric Denition
those metrics that fall in a eld where the available knowledge is scarce, a more high level
framework will be proposed. In this section, only the basic metrics (i.e., those in the tax-
onomy leafs) are dened, since the intermediate metrics will be described later together
with the aggregation procedure.
Proposal of New Metrics
Following the methodology previously explained, we use the taxonomy to identify the leaf
nodes and dene a set of basic metrics associated to them. These basic metrics will be
later used as as basis to dene aggregated metrics.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Condentiality->TL
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the CONFTL metric, which measures condentiality as-
surance of information exchanged at the transport level.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the condentiality assurance categories at transport
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level consists of: (a) determining the algorithms/protocols used for information en-
cryption; and (b) determining the assurance level according to the specic features
of the encryption algorithms/protocols, (i.e., based on strength, key size, etc.) Re-
garding the kind of criteria used to categorize each level of assurance, we propose a
simple framework, which is described in the following.
SAML specications [Maler et al., 2005] recommend the use of the SSL/TLS protocol
in order to protect the communications. The SSL/TLS server-client handshake in-
volves negotiating cipher suites to be used for protecting the Internet transaction. A
cipher suite combines four kinds of security features: 1) key establishment, 2) signa-
ture, 3) encryption algorithm, and 4) hash algorithm, and is given a name in the pro-
tocol specication. For example, the TLS DHE DSS WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
cipher suite uses:
1. The Ephemeral Die-Hellman key agreement, DHE,
2. The Digital Signature Standard, DSS (which implies the Digital Signature Al-
gorithm, DSA),
3. The Asynchronous Encryption Algorithm AES with 256 bits key size in CBC
(Cipher Block Chaining) mode , and,
4. The Secure Hash Algorithm, SHA-1 (used to compute a HMAC).
Here, since the purpose is to obtain a metric for condentiality assurance, we start
by providing a list of SSL/TLS cipher suites categorized according to the secu-
rity of the encryption algorithm in use, which is the main feature related to con-
dentiality. These algorithms vary from very weak exportable ciphers such as RC4
in 40-bit mode to stronger ciphers such as 3DES or AES. Thus, as remarked by
Rescorla in [Rescorla, 2001], \It is therefore necessary to choose a cipher suite com-
mensurate with the value of your data". For the elaboration of this list, depicted in
Table 5.6, we use as knowledge base the NIST's document \Guidelines for the Selec-
tion and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations" [Chernick et al.,
2005], the OWASP's \Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet" 7 and the SSL/TLS
specications [Dierks and Rescorla, 2006], [Dierks and Rescorla, 2008], [Hickman,
1995], [Freier et al., 2011].
7https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport Layer Protection Cheat Sheet
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Cipher Suite Encryption Algo-
rithm
Key Size
(bits)
Encryption
Strength
TLS DHE DSS WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
TLS RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
TLS DH DSS WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
TLS DH RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
TLS DH anon WITH AES 256 CBC SHA
TLS RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256
TLS DH DSS WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256
TLS DH RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256
TLS DHE DSS WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256
TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 256 CBC SHA256
AES 256 CBC 256 High
TLS DHE DSS WITH AES 128 CBC SHA
TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA
TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA
TLS DH DSS WITH AES 128 CBC SHA
TLS DH RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA
TLS DH anon WITH AES 128 CBC SHA
TLS RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256
TLS DHE RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256
TLS DHE DSS WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256
TLS DH DSS WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256
TLS DH RSA WITH AES 128 CBC SHA256
AES 128 CBC 128 High
TLS DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS DHE RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS DH DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS DH RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS DH anon WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH 3DES EDE CBC MD5
SSL CK DES 192 EDE3 CBC WITH MD5
SSL RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
SSL DH DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
SSL DH RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
SSL DHE DSS WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
SSL DHE RSA WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
SSL DH anon WITH 3DES EDE CBC SHA
3DES EDE CBC,
DES 192 EDE3 CBC
168 Medium
TLS RSA WITH IDEA CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH IDEA CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH IDEA CBC MD5
SSL CK IDEA 128 CBC WITH MD5
SSL RSA WITH IDEA CBC SHA
IDEA CBC 128 Medium
SSL CK RC2 128 CBC WITH MD5 RC2 128 128 Medium
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TLS RSA WITH RC4 128 SHA
TLS RSA WITH RC4 128 MD5
TLS DH anon WITH RC4 128 MD5
TLS KRB5 WITH RC4 128 SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH RC4 128 MD5
SSL CK RC4 128 WITH MD5
SSL RSA WITH RC4 128 MD5
SSL RSA WITH RC4 128 SHA
SSL DH anon WITH RC4 128 MD5
SSL FORTEZZA KEA WITH RC4 128 SHA
RC4 128 128 Medium
SSL FORTEZZA KEA WITH FORTEZZA CBC SHA
SSL FORTEZZA KEA WITH RC4 128 SHA
SSL FORTEZZA KEA WITH FORTEZZA CBC SHA
FORTEZZA CBC 96 Medium
TLS RSA WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS DH DSS WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS DH RSA WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS DHE DSS WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS DHE RSA WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS DH anon WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH DES CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 WITH DES CBC MD5
SSL CK DES 64 CBC WITH MD5
SSL RSA WITH DES CBC SHA
SSL DH DSS WITH DES CBC SHA
SSL DH RSA WITH DES CBC SHA
SSL DHE DSS WITH DES CBC SHA
SSL DHE RSA WITH DES CBC SHA
SSL DH anon WITH DES CBC SHA
DES CBC,
DES 64 CBC
56 Low
TLS RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
TLS DH DSS EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
TLS DH RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
TLS DHE DSS EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
TLS DHE RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
TLS DH anon EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH DES CBC 40 SHA
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH DES CBC 40 MD5
SSL RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
SSL DH DSS EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
SSL DH RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
SSL DHE DSS EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
SSL DHE RSA EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
SSL DH anon EXPORT WITH DES40 CBC SHA
DES 40 CBC 40 Low
122 CHAPTER 5. RISK MODEL PROPOSAL
TLS RSA EXPORT WITH RC2 CBC 40 MD5
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH RC2 CBC 40 SHA
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH RC2 CBC 40 MD5
SSL CK RC2 128 CBC EXPORT40 WITH MD5
SSL RSA EXPORT WITH RC2 CBC 40 MD5
RC2 CBC 40 40 Low
TLS RSA EXPORT WITH RC4 40 MD5
TLS DH anon EXPORT WITH RC4 40 MD5
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH RC4 40 SHA
TLS KRB5 EXPORT WITH RC4 40 MD5
SSL CK RC4 128 EXPORT40 WITH MD5
SSL RSA EXPORT WITH RC4 40 MD5
SSL DH anon EXPORT WITH RC4 40 MD5
RC4 40 40 Low
TLS NULL WITH NULL NULL
TLS RSA WITH NULL MD5
TLS RSA WITH NULL SHA
TLS RSA WITH NULL SHA256
SSL FORTEZZA KEA WITH NULL SHA
SSL NULL WITH NULL NULL
SSL RSA WITH NULL MD5
SSL RSA WITH NULL SHA
SSL FORTEZZA KEA WITH NULL SHA
NULL (No encryption)
Table 5.6: Encryption strength provided by algorithms in SSL/TLS cipher
suites
To break a communication session, an attacker can attempt to break the symmetric
cipher used for the bulk of the communication. So it is obvious that a stronger cipher
allows for stronger encryption and thus increases the eort needed to break it. For
this reason it is recommended to use strong ciphers with suciently large key sizes
and the classication we make in Table 5.6 is to be used for that purpose. In order
to decide on classication into High, Medium and Low categories, we have followed
these arguments:
 Algorithms with small key sizes (40, 56 bits) and DES are considered to provide
low encryption strength. The reason is that they are identied as deprecated
in [Chernick et al., 2005] and also these algorithms are not recommended as a
good practice in many security guides in the literature [Smart, 2010].
 Algorithms AES and 3DES are considered to provide high encryption strength.
The reason is that they are recommended as the most secure options in [Cher-
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nick et al., 2005].
 For the rest of algorithms that cannot be directly categorized as having low
or high strength according to the documentation used, we decided to apply
the key-length criterion: the longer the key, the more secure. Based on this,
those algorithms with a key size smaller than 128 are considered to provide low
encryption strength; and those whose key size is equal to 128, are considered
to provide medium encryption strength. .
It is to note that, despite there are around 200 known cipher suites, Table 5.6 in-
cludes only those listed in the SSL/TLS RFCs and specications. Thus, encryption
algorithms such as for example SEED or Camellia, are not considered in this clas-
sication despite the existence of cipher suites including them. However, we believe
that the analyzed subset of cipher suites is enough for federation scenarios, since
it covers the most frequently used algorithms and those used and recommended by
FIM specications.
Furthermore, apart from the encryption algorithm, the protocol version has also an
impact in the feasibility of condentiality-related attacks. Despite that the terms
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) are often used inter-
changeably, dierent versions of SSL and TLS are supported by clients and servers.
Weaknesses have been identied in SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0 and they have been success-
fully attacked, which makes these versions insecure. The best practice recommended
for transport layer protection is to only provide support for the TLS protocols -
TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and TLS 1.2. In situations where lesser security requirements
are necessary, it may be acceptable to also provide support for SSL 3.0. But in no
situation should SSL 2.0 be enabled , since its weaknesses are such that the provided
transport layer protection is not eective. According to that recommendations, we
apply also these additional rules for categorization:
 If the protocol in use is SSL 2.0, the encryption strength is penalized and
decreased to Low encryption strength.
 If the protocol in use is SSL 3.0, the encryption strength is penalized by de-
creasing the category to the immediate lower level (except in the case of low
strength, which is maintained as low since there is no lower level).
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In order to include these new rules in the construction of the condentiality assur-
ance metric, Table 5.7 shows the Protocol Penalized Encryption Strengths (PPES)
according to the combination of encryption algorithm and protocol.
Encryption
Strength
Protocol PPES
High
TLS High
SSL 3.0 Medium
SSL 2.0 Low
Medium
TLS Medium
SSL 3.0 Low
SSL 2.0 Low
Low
TLS Low
SSL 3.0 Low
SSL 2.0 Low
Table 5.7: Protocol Penalized Encryption Strength (PPES) provided by SSL/TLS cipher
suites
As the last step to dene the condentiality assurance metric, another part of the
SSL/TLS protocol must be considered due to its impact in condentiality: the key
establishment procedure. Key establishment is the process of establishing a shared
secret key (or the material to derive this key) that will be used for subsequent cryp-
tographic operations over a SSL/TLS connection (i.e., for encryption and hashing).
The key establishment algorithms used in SSL/TLS [Chernick et al., 2005] are 1)
RSA, 2) Die-Hellman in three possible variants (static, ephemeral, anonymous)
and 3) Fortezza-KEA. Options RSA, Fortezza-KEA and the static and ephemeral
variants of DH imply authenticated exchange; while anonymous DH means that no
authentication is performed during the exchange. We refer the interested reader
to [Chernick et al., 2005] for more details about these mechanisms, but the goal is
basically ensuring the safe generation and exchange of the secret keys that will be
used during the remainder of the session. Thus, weaknesses in the key exchange
phase can lead to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that allow the attacker gain-
ing access to the complete communication channel or make the per-session secret
keys easier to compromise. For these reasons, we apply a nal renement to dene
the condentiality assurance metric in Table 5.8. We divide the key establishment
procedures into authenticated with ephemeral parameters, authenticated with non-
ephemeral parameters and anonymous (i.e., non-authenticated). Then, we construct
our metric by applying the following rules:
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 If an authenticated key establishment procedure with ephemeral parameters is
used, the condentiality strength is maintained as is. The reason underlying
this rule is that [Chernick et al., 2005] recommends RSA or DSA authentication
with ephemeral Die-Hellman key agreement for maximum security, as it allows
perfect forward secrecy.
 If an authenticated key establishment procedure with non-ephemeral parame-
ters is used, the condentiality strength is penalized by decreasing its level to
the immediate lower level category (except in the case of low, which is main-
tained as is since there is no lower level). The reason underlying this rule is that,
as derived from [Chernick et al., 2005], authentication key exchange procedures
with non ephemeral parameters are less secure than ephemeral ones since they
do not provide perfect forward secrecy.
 If an anonymous key establishment procedure is used (i.e., no authentication),
then the penalized condentiality strength is decreased to the low level. The
reason underlying this rule is that anonymous key exchange mechanisms are
not recommended because they are subject to MITM attacks. As explained
in [Dierks and Rescorla, 2006], completely anonymous connections only provide
protection against passive eavesdropping. Unless an independent tamper-proof
channel is used to verify that the nished messages are not replaced by an
attacker, server authentication is required in environments where active man-
in-the-middle attacks are a concern.
PPES Kind of Key Estab-
lishment
Condentiality As-
surance -Transport
Level (CONFTL)
High
Authenticated
Ephemeral
High
Authenticated Non-
Ephemeral
Medium
Anonymous Low
Medium
Authenticated
Ephemeral
Medium
Authenticated Non-
Ephemeral
Low
Anonymous Low
Low
Authenticated
Ephemeral
Low
Authenticated Non-
Ephemeral
Low
Anonymous Low
Table 5.8: Condentiality Assurance Metric provided by SSL/TLS cipher suites based on
PPES and Key Establishment algorithms
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Of course the kind of authenticated mechanism will make the exchange procedure
more or less secure, but this aspect will be measured by the authentication assurance
metric dened later in this section.
Finally, another common option available to secure an Internet connection is the
creation of Virtual Private Networks (VPN) using the IPSec protocol. We have
focused in SSL/TLS because it is the model recommended by SAML (and the rest
of FIM standards) and the most commonly used in the scenarios that are object of
this thesis.
The source data to evaluate CONFTL assuming a SAML-based system can be the
metadata. There is a recent specication, entitled \SAMLv2.0 Metadata Prole for
algorithm support" [Cantor, 2010], which denes the extensions to convey this kind of
cryptographic information. The problem is that, so far, the specication is intended
to inform about the algorithms used at SAML message level. In our opinion it would
be reasonable and useful to add support to inform about the available cipher suites
at transport level, whether in the metadata or in specic security SLAs.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
The qualitative scale used for the condentiality assurance at transport level metric
encompasses three levels: Low, Medium, and High. Each of these levels represents
the assurance achieved in condentiality depending on the SSL/TLS cipher suite in
use, and according to criteria 1) encryption strength, 2) protocol version and 3) key
establishment procedure.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Condentiality->ML
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the CONFML metric, which measures condentiality as-
surance of information exchanged at the message level .
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the assurance categories encompasses the same steps
described for the CONFTL metric, but taking into account the algorithms used at
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the message level. Regarding the kind of criteria used to categorize each level of
assurance, we propose a simple framework, which is explained in the following.
SAML protocol messages can be protected in regard to condentiality by means
of XMLEncryption [Eastlake et al., 2002b]. As in the case of condentiality at
transport level, the degree of protection assurance will depend on the strength of
the encryption algorithms used. The XMLEncryption specication denes a set of
algorithms and the associated requirements for implementation. More specically,
for the block ciphers category it requires implementation of AES with key sizes 128
and 256 bits, and Triple DES; and recommends AES with 192 key size as optional
implementation. On the other hand, no specic stream encryption algorithms are
specied. Furthermore, the mechanism is extensible, and alternative algorithms may
be used- though no extensions have been dened to date. Based on this, we dene a
simple framework for condentiality assurance at message level, which is described
in Table 5.9.
Encryption algorithm Condentiality Assurance - Mes-
sage level (CONFML)
AES CBC 128
AES CBC 192
AES CBC 256
3DES EDE CBC
High
Table 5.9: Condentiality assurance at message level provided by encryption algorithms
in XMLEncryption
It is to note that the XMLEncryption standard was published after algorithms like
DES or those with small key sizes (80 bits and lower) had been declared as deprecated
due to well-known weaknesses. For this reason, only strong algorithms are included
as supported by the specication. Due to this fact, we only consider a single category
for the metric that maps these strong algorithms to a High condentiality assurance.
The source data to evaluate CONFML assuming a SAML-based system can be the
metadata, where supported cryptographic algorithms can be communicated accord-
ing to the extensions dened in [Cantor, 2010].
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the condentiality metric at transport level, the qualitative scale we
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aim to use for the condentiality assurance at message level is the three level scale
Low, Medium, and High. Each of these levels represents the assurance achieved in
condentiality depending on the strength of the encryption algorithm in use. Despite
currently there are only high assurance algorithms, the framework will evolve when
new algorithms appear and the current ones become less secure, and so the dierent
scale levels may have an algorithm mapping.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Integrity->TL
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the INTTL metric, which measures integrity assurance of
information exchanged at the transport level.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the integrity assurance categories at transport level
consists of: (a) determining the algorithms/protocols used for integrity protection;
and (b) determining the assurance level according to the specic features of these
algorithms/protocols. Regarding the kind of criteria used to categorize each level of
assurance, we propose a simple framework, which is described in the following.
As previously mentioned, SAML specications [Maler et al., 2005] recommend the
use of the SSL/TLS protocol for protection of the communications at transport level.
Now we analyze the available SSL/TLS cipher suites regarding their integrity capa-
bilities. In these sense the hash algorithm in use determines the integrity assurance.
Therefore, with the purpose of dening a metric for integrity assurance, we perform
an analysis similar to the employed in the denition of the condentiality at trans-
port level metric. First of all, the hash algorithms used in SSL/TLS cipher suites are
categorized according to the security provided. For the elaboration of this list we use
as knowledge base the same documents used for dening the condentiality metric at
transport level, plus and an additional NIST's document entitled \Recommendation
for Applications Using Approved Hash Algorithms" [Dang, 2008]. In this case, for
the sake of better readability, we have simplied the classication (see Table 5.10)
by eliminating the cipher suite names, since they were already listed in Table 5.6.
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Hash Algorithm Digest Length (bits) Integrity Strength
SHA256 256 High
SHA 160 Medium
MD5 128 Low
NULL - No Integrity
Table 5.10: Integrity strength provided by hash algorithms used SSL/TLS cipher suites
As shown in Table 5.10, SSL/TLS oers two options for a cryptographic hash algo-
rithm: SHA (with dierent digest sizes) and MD5. In order to decide on classication
into High, Medium and Low categories, we have followed these arguments:
 The MD5 algorithm is considered to provide low integrity. The reason is that
this algorithm is known to be weak and it is not recommended in [Chernick
et al., 2005].
 The SHA algorithm is considered to provide higher levels of integrity assurance
than MD5, since it is recommended as a better option in [Chernick et al., 2005].
Furthermore, since the strength of hash algorithms is higher when the size of the
digest is longer [Dang, 2008], SHA256 is considered to provide high assurance,
and SHA is considered to provide medium assurance.
Furthermore, there are two more factors that aect the integrity metrics. Firstly,
the SSL/TLS protocol version in use. And secondly the key establishment process,
since integrity is based on the combination of the hash function with a key (i.e., in
the HMAC code) that is set in this establishment phase. Thus, in order to include
the impact of both factors in the nal integrity assurance, we follow the same rules
used in the denition of the CONFTL metric.
Accordingly, Table 5.11 shows the Protocol Penalized Integrity Strength (PPIS), and
Integrity Strength Protocol PPIS
High
TLS High
SSL 3.0 Medium
SSL 3.0 Low
Medium
TLS Medium
SSL 3.0 Low
SSL 3.0 Low
Low
TLS Low
SSL 3.0 Low
SSL 3.0 Low
Table 5.11: Protocol Penalized Integrity Strength (PPIS) provided by SSL/TLS cipher
suites
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Table 5.12 summarizes the nal metric for integrity assurance at transport level.
PPIS Kind of Key Estab-
lishment
Integrity Assurance
-Transport Level
(INTTL)
High
Authenticated
Ephemeral
High
Authenticated Non-
Ephemeral
Medium
Anonymous Low
Medium
Authenticated
Ephemeral
Medium
Authenticated Non-
Ephemeral
Medium
Anonymous Low
Low
Authenticated
Ephemeral
Low
Authenticated Non-
Ephemeral
Low
Anonymous Low
Table 5.12: Integrity Assurance Metric provided by SSL/TLS cipher suites based on PPIS
and Key Establishment algorithms
As in the case of the CONFTL metric, the kind of authenticated mechanism will also
make the exchange procedure more or less secure, but this aspect will be measured
by the authentication assurance metric dened later in this section. Regarding the
source data to evaluate INTTL assuming a SAML-based system, the information
could be extracted from the metadata or from the SLAs, if appropriate mechanisms
to include this information are dened.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
The qualitative scale used for the integrity assurance at transport level metric en-
compasses three levels: Low, Medium, and High. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in integrity depending on the SSL/TLS cipher suite in use, and
according to criteria 1) integrity strength, 2) protocol version and 3) key establish-
ment procedure.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Integrity->ML
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the INTML metric, which measures integrity assurance of
information exchanged at the message level.
2. How is the measure performed?
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The procedure for obtaining the integrity assurance categories encompasses the same
steps described for the INTTL metric, but taking into account the algorithms used
at the message level. Regarding the kind of criteria used to categorize each level of
assurance, we propose a simple framework, which is explained in the following.
SAML specications contemplate that application messages can be protected in re-
gard to integrity by means of XMLSignature [Eastlake et al., 2002a] [Eastlake et al.,
2008], [Eastlake et al., 2012]. As in the case of integrity at transport level, the degree
of protection assurance will depend on the strength of the digest algorithms in use.
In this case, the digest is used in conjunction with a signature algorithm, so the
strength of this signature algorithm will also have an impact on the nal metric.
On the one hand , the XMLSignature specications contemplate the following digest
algorithms: MD5, SHA, SHA-256, SHA-384 y SHA-512. On the other hand, the
available signature algorithms are RSA, DSA and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA).
Based on this, we dene a simple framework for integrity assurance at message level,
which is described in Table 5.13.
In order to decide on classication into High, Medium and Low categories, we have
followed these rules:
 First, we categorize the strength of the digest algorithms into low, medium and
high levels by applying the same arguments as for the INTTL metric.
 Next, we categorize the strength of the signature algorithms based on the key
size: the stronger the key, the more secure is the signature. For this classica-
tion, we base on the framework for comparable key sizes in dierent algorithms
provided in [Barker et al., 2011] and follow their recommendations by applying
the following rules:
 Signatures performed using RSA/DSA with key sizes greater than or equal
to 3072 bits; or using ECDSA with key size greater than or equal to 256,
are considered as high strength signatures.
 Signatures performed using RSA/DSA with key sizes smaller than 3072 and
greater or equal to 2048 bits; or using ECDSA with key size smaller than
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Hash Algo-
rithm
Digest
Length (bits)
Digest
Strength
Signature Al-
gorithm -Key
size (bits)
Integrity Assurance
- Message level
(INTML)
S
SHA256,
HA384,
SHA512
256, 384, 512 High RSA/DSA
 3072,
ECDSA  256
High
RSA/DSA
 2048
and < 3072,
ECDSA  224
and < 256
Medium
RSA/DSA
<2048,
ECDSA <224
Low
SHA
160 Medium RSA/DSA
 3072,
ECDSA  256
Medium
RSA/DSA
 2048
and < 3072,
ECDSA  224
and < 256
Medium
RSA/DSA
<2048,
ECDSA <224
Low
MD5
128 Low RSA/DSA
 3072,
ECDSA  256
RSA/DSA
 2048
and < 3072,
ECDSA  224
and < 256
Medium
RSA/DSA
<2048,
ECDSA <224
Low
Table 5.13: Integrity assurance at message level provided by XMLSignature hash and
signature algorithms
256 and greater or equal to 224 bits, are considered as medium strength
signatures.
 Signatures performed using RSA/DSA with key sizes smaller than 2048
bits; or using ECDSA with key size smaller than 256, are considered as low
strength signatures.
 Finally, the digest strength is combined with the signature strength by choosing
the lowest value (e.g., if the digest strength is high and the key length is low,
the integrity assurance will be low).
The source data to evaluate INTML assuming a SAML-based system can be the meta-
data, where supported cryptographic algorithms can be communicated according to
the extensions dened in [Cantor, 2010].
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3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in integrity depending on the strength of XMLSignature hash
and signature algorithms in use.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Authentication->TL
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the AUTHTL metric, which measures authentication as-
surance at the transport level.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the authentication assurance categories at transport
level consists of: (a) determining the mechanisms used for authentication; and (b)
determining the assurance level according to the specic features of these mecha-
nisms. Regarding the kind of criteria used to categorize each level of assurance, we
propose a simple framework, which is described in the following.
Based on the recommendation of using the SSL/TLS protocol for protection of the
communications at transport level in SAML, we analyze now the authentication
capabilities oered by the protocol. In this regard, the protocol aspect related with
authentication is the key exchange procedure. This process serves two functions: 1)
ensuring the safe generation and exchange of the secret keys that will be used during
the remainder of the session; and 2) perform authentication, allowing at least one
party to verify the identity of the other party. Function 1) aects both integrity
and condentiality of the session and thus was considered in the denition of the
CONFTL and INTTL metrics. Function 2) is analyzed here with the aim to to dene
our authentication assurance metric at transport level.
In order to perform authentication, an entity involved in an SSL/TLS dialogue
presents its digitally signed certicate to the other party and additionally the entity
may also sign some data or use public cryptography. In either case, the client can
verify the certicate or signature to ensure that the parameters belong to the server.
Thus, presenting a valid certicate and proving possession of the private key authen-
134 CHAPTER 5. RISK MODEL PROPOSAL
ticates the presenter to the recipient. Based on the same documents used to dene
the CONFTL , we dene the authentication assurance metric at transport level as
depicted in Table 5.14.
Key Exchange
Mechanism
Description Key Ex-
change
Strength
Certicate
Key
Lengt
(bits)
Authentication
Assurance -
Transport
level
(AUTHTL)
DHE DSS
Ephemeral DH with DSS signatures High  3072 High
 2048; <
3072
Medium
<2048 Low
DHE RSA
Ephemeral DH with RSA signatures High  3072 High
 2048; <
3072
Medium
<2048 Low
RSA
RSA key exchange, RSA certicate
and public cryptography
High  3072 Medium
 2048; <
3072
Medium
<2048 Low
DH DSS
DH with DSS-based certicates Medium  3072 Medium
 2048; <
3072
Medium
<2048 Low
DH RSA
DH with RSA-based certicates Medium  3072 Medium
 2048; <
3072
Medium
<2048 Low
Fortezza KEA
Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA), DSS
signature
Low  3072 Low
 2048; <
3072
Low
<2048 Low
DH anon Anonymous DH, no certicate, no sig-
natures
No assurance
Table 5.14: Authentication assurance metric at transport level provided by SSL/TLS
cipher suites
In order to decide on classication into High, Medium and Low categories for the
authentication metric, we dene a framework based on the following rules:
 Firstly, the strength of the key exchange algorithm in regard to authentication
is rated. We consider as high strength algorithms those using an authenti-
cated method including signatures or public key cryptography. We consider
as medium strength algorithms those using authenticated methods with certi-
cates. Justication for this categorization lies on the fact that adding signatures
or cryptography provides an additional degree of authentication apart from just
presenting the certicate. In regard to the signature algorithm we make no fur-
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ther distinction because there are no proofs that choosing DSA over RSA or
viceversa is better from a security perspective. Furthermore, Fortezza is con-
sidered as a low strength algorithm because the IETF standards committee did
not include it in TLS 1.0. And, nally, anonymous algorithms are directly con-
sidered as providing no authentication assurance since they do not apply any
mechanism for this purpose.
 Then, the certicate key length is considered as a parameter to rene the cat-
egorization and to obtain the nal metric. This is because the stronger the
key, the more dicult it is to break the key exchange phase and more secure
is the authentication. Based on the recommendation in [Barker et al., 2011]
that security applications should use \at least 2048-bit public keys for securing
information beyond 2010 (and 3072-bit keys for securing information beyond
2030)" we consider:
 Key sizes greater than or equal to 3072 bits as high strength keys,
 Key sizes smaller than 3072 and greater or equal to 2048 bits as medium
strength keys, and
 Key sizes smaller than 2048 bits as mow strength keys
 Finally, the key strength is combined with the key exchange strength by choos-
ing the lowest value (e.g., if the key exchange is high and the key length is low,
the Authentication assurance will be low).
For the classication it is assumed that the certicate and/or the signatures are
valid. Also, for the sake of better readability the classication in table 5.14 does not
include the cipher suite names, since they were already listed in Table 5.6.
Regarding the source data to evaluate AUTHTL assuming a SAML-based system, the
information could be extracted from the metadata or from the SLAs, if appropriate
mechanisms to include this information are dened.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in authentication depending on the features of the authentication
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mechanisms in use.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Authentication->ML
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the AUTHML metric, which measures authentication as-
surance of information exchanged at the message level.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the authentication assurance categories encompasses the
same steps described for the AUTHTL metric, but taking into account the algorithms
used at the message level. Regarding the kind of criteria used to categorize each level
of assurance, we propose a simple framework, which is explained in the following.
SAML specications contemplate that application messages can be protected in re-
gard to authentication by means of XMLSignature [Eastlake et al., 2002a] [Eastlake
et al., 2008], [Eastlake et al., 2012].
To obtain the authentication assurance in this case we consider the signature options
available in XMLSignature. The specications contemplate the following signature
algorithms: RSA, DSA and ECDSA (Elliptic Curve DSA). The security level associ-
ated to the algorithm basically depends on the size of the keys used. Based on this,
we dene a simple framework for authentication assurance at message level, which
is described in Table 5.15.
Signature Algo-
rithm -Key size
(bits)
Authentication As-
surance - Message
level (AUTHTL)
RSA/DSA  3072,
ECDSA  256
High
RSA/DSA  2048 and
< 3072, ECDSA  224
and < 256
Medium
RSA/DSA <2048,
ECDSA <224
Low
Table 5.15: Authentication assurance at message level provided by XMLSignature signa-
ture algorithms
The categorization into High, Medium and Low level is performed as done for the
INTML metric based on the recommendations in [Barker et al., 2011].
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Regarding the source data to evaluate AUTHML assuming a SAML-based system, the
information could be extracted from the metadata, where supported cryptographic
algorithms can be communicated according to the extensions dened in [Cantor,
2010].
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in authentication depending on the strength of the XMLSignature
signature algorithm in use.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Non Repudiation
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the NON-REP metric, which measures the degree of non-
repudiation assurance.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the non-repudiation assurance categories consist of: (a)
determining the mechanisms used to achieve non-repudiation; and (b) determining
the assurance level according to the specic features of these mechanisms. Regarding
the kind of criteria used to categorize each level of assurance, we propose a simple
framework, which is described in the following.
Non-repudiation is generally implemented through the use of digital signatures, but
more complex protocols and mechanisms have been developed that provide higher
levels of assurance [Kremer et al., 2002]. In the case of SAML, the use of XMLSigna-
ture is recommended to sign the exchanged messages, but no additional mechanisms
are sugested to improve non-repudiation. With the aim to contemplate both features,
we propose the assurance levels summarized in Table 5.16.
The classication into High, Medium and Low levels is based on the fact that signa-
tures alone provide less non-repudiation guarantees than if additional techniques are
applied. And, in the case of using digital signatures, the key size makes a dierence
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Mechanism description Non-repudiation
assurance (NON-
REP)
Usage of signatures plus additional non-repudiation mecha-
nisms
High
Usage of signatures with key sizes RSA/DSA  2048, ECDSA
 224
Medium
Usage of signatures with key sizes RSA/DSA <2048 bits,
ECDSA <224 bits
Low
Table 5.16: Non-repudiation assurance framework
in the the security strength, as analyzed before.
As source data to measure non-repudiation assuming a SAML based system, meta-
data and SLAs can be used.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in non-repudiation depending on the strength of the XMLSigna-
ture signature algorithm in use.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Availability
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the AV metric, which measures the degree of availability
assurance.
2. How is the measure performed?
The system availability is a well dened value that represents the average percentage
of time a service is available. The availability is in fact a typical security feature
included and well dened in SLAs. Based on this, the procedure for obtaining the
availability assurance provided by a system consists of gathering the availability value
and determining its associated assurance category. Regarding the kind of criteria
used to categorize each level of assurance, we propose a simple framework, which is
depicted in Table 5.17.
SAML specications do not include recommendations on availability, neither provide
a standardized way to convey this information. For these reasons, we dene a simple
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Average availability
(aav) range
Availability Assurance
(AV)
aav  99% High
 97% aav < 99% Medium
 95% aav <97% Low
Table 5.17: Availability assurance framework
high-level framework based on the categorization of availability values in ranges.
The source data could be the SLAs, if appropriate mechanisms to include this infor-
mation are dened.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in availability depending on the value of the average percentage
of time the service is available.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Accountability
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the ACC metric, which measures the degree of account-
ability assurance.
2. How is the measure performed?
Since accountability is dened as the ability to associate a consequence with a past
action of an individual, information logging is required for an entity to be account-
able. Depending on the information stored in these logs, on the time this informa-
tion is stored and on a number of other features, the accountability strength will be
dierent. Based on this, the procedure for obtaining the accountability assurance
provided by an entity consists of evaluating the accountability requirements fullled
by the entity and determining its associated assurance category. Currently, there is
not a well dened list of requirements, neither recommendations that can be used
as objective criteria to elaborate a detailed framework. Thus, we propose a simple
high-level framework, which is depicted in Table 5.18.
As it can be seen, the framework denition provided in this case abstracts the un-
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Accountability As-
surance (ACC)
Description
High If a range of 70% 100% of optional accountability require-
ments is fullled apart from the mandatory ones
Medium If a range of 35% 70% of optional accountability requirements
is fullled apart from the mandatory ones
Low If the set of minimum accountability requirements is fullled
Table 5.18: Accountability assurance framework
derlying criteria. It is assumed that a list of standard requirements is provided that
can be checked against a local policy to determine the assurance. In general, there
is a lack of applicable standards at this time, so providers and customers must work
together to determine the information needed and how to make it available. In the
particular case of SAML, we have reviewed publicly available policies from federa-
tions deployed in the real world [TERENA, 2012] and the requirements with regard
to accountability are variable. For example, some federations require that specic
information is logged by the dierent entities (e.g., username, timestamp, etc.) and
retained for a specied period of time; while other federations do not impose re-
quirements on auditing or let the involved entities free to choose and apply their
own policies. Thus, it is clear that an accountability approach requires organiza-
tions to establish policies consistent with recognized external criteria. Due to the
lack of information and the scarce work on the eld, the identication of a set of
standard requirements for FIM accountability and the analysis of their strength will
be proposed as a future research line.
Assuming a SAML-based system, the source data to obtain the accountability metric
can be the metadata, SLAs and policies if appropriate mechanisms are dened.
For example, the UK Federation8 policy documents dene a mechanism for using,
metadata to indicate the support of user accountability.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in accountability depending on the strength of the accountability
policies in use.
Pre-Fed->Security and Privacy->Privacy 1. What does the metric measure?
8http://www.ukfederation.org.uk/library/uploads/Documents/federation-technical-specications.pdf
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In this category we dene the LOP metric, which measures the Level of Protection
assurance, i.e., the degree of data protection in regard to privacy.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the privacy protection assurance provided by an entity
consists of evaluating the privacy requirements fullled by the entity and determining
its associated assurance category. A general, hihg-level framework is proposed in
Table 5.19.
Privacy Assurance
(LOP)
Description
High If a range of 70% 100% of optional privacy requirements is
fullled apart from the mandatory ones
Medium If a range of 35% 70% of optional privacy requirements is
fullled apart from the mandatory ones
Low If the set of minimum privacy requirements is fullled
Table 5.19: Privacy assurance framework
As it can be seen, the framework denition provided in this case abstracts the un-
derlying criteria. The reason is that, there is ongoing research work on dening a
list of privacy requirements to be used for ranking levels of privacy assurance. More
specically, in the eld of FIM, Kantara recently started a working group 9 to de-
velop a privacy framework.Their idea is to to provide a description of the privacy
components and derive a set of levels of privacy that can be widely accepted in the
same way as LOAs. To give an idea of the kind of criteria to be evaluated for the
privacy metric, we list here some of these criteria according to the documentation
publicly available from Kantara:
 Purpose of processing personal data
 Relevance of attributes
 User consent
 Informed consent
 Data protection directives
 Release of data when the entities operate in dierent countries
9http://kantarainitiative.org/conuence/display/p3wg/
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3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance achieved in privacy depending on the strength of the mechanisms used for
this purpose.
Pre-Fed->Interoperability->Technical
Pre-Fed->Interoperability->Operational
Pre-Fed->Interoperability->Legal
We group the denition of the interoperability metrics, since the frameworks are
very similar.
1. What does the metrics measure?
In this categories we dene the INTEROPT, INTEROPO and INTEROPL metrics,
which measure the degree of technical, operational and legal interoperability between
the involved parties, respectively.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the interoperability metrics consists of evaluating the
technical, operational and legal requirements fullled by the entity and determining
its associated assurance category. We dene general frameworks for this purpose in
the same way as the frameworks for LOP and ACC were dened (see Tables 5.18 and
5.19). That is, assurance categories are obtained based on the coverage of mandated
and optional requirements.
Since interoperability means that two entities are able to work together from a
technical, operational or legal point of view, the lower level implies as a minimum
that interoperability is guaranteed. Higher levels in the categorization contemplate
additional aspects where entities are interoperable.
Regarding technical aspects, SAML leaves deployers a lot of options, like how to pass
attributes, what information should be signed/encrypted or what binding to use. An
unwanted eect of all these available choices is that two SAML deployments may
not work as smooth together as expected. As an example of minimum set of bind-
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ings and rules that needs to be followed we can cite [Solberg, 2011], which species
behavior and options that deployments of the SAML V2.0 Web Browser SSO Prole
are required or permitted to rely on. For the case of operational interoperability,
a lot of options are possible as well, such as metadata caching intervals, frequency
of certicate renewal, procedures for certicate validation, etc. Finally, for the case
of legal interoperability, there are also a number of options. For example, special
directives may be required when dealing with health related data. Thus, each en-
tity using these frameworks should dene its minimum set of requirements at each
interoperability dimension.
In the case of a SAML-based system, metadata, SLAs and policies may be used as
source data for the interoperability metrics if appropriate mechanisms are dened.
A full list of possible interoperability requirements should be investigated.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents
the assurance achieved in technical, operational or legal interoperability assurance
depending on the fullled requirements.
Pre-Fed->Knowledge->Direct
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the KNOWD metric, which measures the direct knowledge
assurance about the other party.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure to obtain the direct knowledge assurance is simpler than for the
rest of the metrics, and it consists of checking the internal data to determine if the
evaluating entity has an entry for the entity under evaluation in its database or trust
lists. There are only two possible outcomes for this process and thus, the metric is
binary.
The source for this metric are the internal data structures (e.g., trust lists) where
information about external entities is stored.
144 CHAPTER 5. RISK MODEL PROPOSAL
3. What is the qualitative scale? In this case we use a binary scale with values True
and False for the cases where direct knowledge exists or no, respectively.
Pre-Fed->Knowledge->Indirect
1. What does the metric measure?
In this category we dene the KNOWI metric, which measures the indirect knowledge
about the other party.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure to obtain the indirect knowledge assurance is the the same as for the
direct knowledge metric. In this case, it consists of checking the internal data to
determine if the evaluating entity has indirect information about the entity under
evaluation in its database or trust lists. There are only two possible outcomes for
this process and thus, the metric is also binary.
The source for this metric are the internal data structures (e.g., trust lists) where
information about external entities is stored.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
In this case we use a binary scale with values True and False for the cases where
indirect knowledge exists or no, respectively.
Post-Fed->Service Specic
This category encompasses metrics related to the specic service in which the current
transaction is performed. The metrics in this category are related to Service Level
Objectives (SLOs), i.e., metrics which dene characteristic of a service in precise,
measurable terms. The LOA is a well-known SLO in identity services. Here we
include only this metric under the service specic category, but each service should
dene its own specic metrics (e.g., throughput, bandwidth, etc.)
Since the LOA metric was already described at the beginning of the section, the
description is not included here.
Post-Fed->Historical Interactions
1. What does the metric measure?
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Measures the degree of condence that the collaborating entity will operate as ex-
pected in the context of the current transaction.
2. How is the measure performed?
The procedure for obtaining the metric consists of: 1) calculating the a posteriori
probability of a satisfactory interaction, and 2) assimilating it to an assurance value.
For the rst step, based on the number of satisfactory (sat(Ci)) and unsatisfactory
interactions (unsat(Ci)) with the entity under evaluation, the a posteriori probability
of a satisfactory interaction (p(+)(Ci) is obtained by applying formula 5.1
p(+)(Ci) =
sat(Ci)
unsat(Ci) + sat(Ci)
(5.1)
Where Ci refers to the type of the current transaction, assuming an entity can operate
in a set of transaction types C = C1, C2, : : :, Cn.
Based on this, the procedure for obtaining the HINT metric consists of determining
its associated assurance category. Regarding the kind of criteria used to catego-
rize each level of assurance, we propose a simple framework, which is depicted in
Table 5.20.
We dene a general framework for this purpose in Table 5.20.
Historical Interac-
tions (HINT) As-
surance
Description
High If p(+)(Ci)  99%
Medium If 97%  p(+)(Ci) < 99%
Low If 95% p(+)(Ci) < 97%
Table 5.20: Historical Interactions assurance framework
In order to have a source data to obtain the HINT metric, it is required that entities
implement a monitoring system to assess transactions and count the number of
satisfactory and unsatisfactory ones.
3. What is the qualitative scale?
As in the case of the metrics dened so far, we adopt a three level qualitative scale
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that encompasses Low, Medium, and High levels. Each of these levels represents the
assurance related to the history of interactions depending on the probability that
the current transaction is satisfactory.
After completing the risk metric derivation procedure based on the taxonomy, the set of
basic metrics that we have dened are summarized in Table 5.21:
Category (L2) Metric Name Description
Security and Privacy
CONFTL, CONFML Measure condentiality of information exchanged at
transport level and message level, respectively.
INTTL, INTML Measure integrity of information exchanged at trans-
port level and message level, respectively
AUTHTL, AUTHML Measure authentication of information exchanged at
transport level and message level, respectively.
NON-REP Measures the degree of Non-repudiation.
AV Measures the degree of availability.
ACC Measures the degree of accountability.
LOP Level of Protection measures the degree of data pro-
tection that either an IdP or a SP provides for identity
information entrusted to them by a user.
Interoperability
INTEROPTT Measures the degree of technical interoperability be-
tween the involved parties
INTEROPO Measures the degree of interoperability between the
operational policies of the involved parties
INTEROPL Measures the degree of interoperability between the
legal policies of the involved parties
Knowledge
KNOWD Measures the degree of direct knowledge about the
other party
KNOWI Measures the degree of indirect knowledge about the
other party
Service Specic LOA Level of Authentication Assurance (LOA) measures
the degree of condence in identifying an entity to
whom a credential was issued
Historical interactions HINT Measures the degree of condence that the collaborat-
ing entity will operate as expected in the context of
the current transaction
Table 5.21: Basic set of metrics for risk quantication in FIM
Table 5.21 shows the set of basic metrics derived from the proposed taxonomy and their
semantic denition. From this basic set, the aggregated metrics will be developed in the
next section. Furthermore, a comprehensive catalogue with the denition of all the metrics
can be found in Appendix B. So far, we have provided a semantic high-level denition of
the metrics, and assigned a linguistic scale to each one. In the following, we will explain
how to map this qualitative scales into numeric values and aggregate them to obtain nal
risk gures upon which decision making is possible.
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5.4. Risk Assessment
The purpose of this section is to present the aggregation problem in more detail and
complete the whole quantitative risk model for identity federation. Thus, after the iden-
tication of risks terms and analysis in sections 5.2 and 5.3, we proceed now with the
evaluation or aggregation. As stated before, the main goal is to obtain a representative
value that can be used in decision making. And this value depends on multiple criteria
that we have identied step by step with the design of the taxonomy. Considering these
features, the aggregation problem perfectly ts in the framework of multicriteria decision
making (MCDM) [Triantaphyllou, 2000].
The MCDM theory is a sub-discipline of operations research that explicitly considers
multiple criteria in decision-making environments based on the premise that structuring
complex problems well and considering multiple criteria explicitly leads to more informed
and better decisions. In summary, MCDM approaches are a tool to integrate multidi-
mensional evaluations and frequently rely on decision hierarchies (such as our taxonomy),
features that t with our goals and design and which led us to build our risk evaluation
model under this theory.
There are two main approaches of MCDM, namely multiattribute utility theory
(MAUT) [Keeney and Raia, 1993], and the preference modeling approach [Fodor and
Roubens, 1994]. In multiattribute utility theory, an absolute score is given to each al-
ternative with respect to each criterion, and the global score, taking into account all the
criteria, is obtained by aggregating all the partial scores. By contrast, in preference mod-
eling, a preference degree is assigned to every ordered pair of alternatives, with respect
to each criterion. Then, a global preference degree is obtained by aggregating all the
partial preference degrees. Due to the nature and dierent semantics of the quantities to
be aggregated in MAUT and preference modeling (i.e., scores or preference degrees), the
approaches are also referred as\cardinal approach"and\relational approach", respectively.
Another interesting approach comparable to preference modeling is the usage of Multi
Dimensional Scaling (MDS) techniques [Borg and Groenen, 2005]. MDS allow to rank
entities based on the calculation of their similarities or dissimilarities regarding dierent
dimensions. In fact, there is work that builds on MDS to solve, e.g., the problem of
selecting the most appropriate network or peer to interact with based on a set of criteria
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(cost, distance, security) [Daz Sanchez, 2008] [Daz et al., 2006].
In our case, the decisions to be made in a federation scenario are, as previously stated in
the chapter goals, the following:
whether to collaborate or not with another entity
which entity in a set is the best alternative for cooperation
For the rst kind of decision, absolute evaluation is required since we do not have alter-
native options for comparison. Consequently, the MAUT technique is more suitable to
aggregate the multiple risk dimensions and to obtain a nal value upon which to decide.
In the second kind of decision, both preference degrees and absolute scores may be used,
so any approach is applicable. For these reasons, we adopt the MAUT approach and adapt
it to our application, since it allows us to cover both kinds of decisions.
Whatever the MCDM approach to be taken, the involved phases are common [Marichal,
1998]. Thus, multicriteria decision making procedures consist of three main steps:
1. Modeling phase: In this phase we look for appropriate models for constructing
the partial scores/preference degrees and also for determining the importance of each
criterion (i.e., the weights).
2. Aggregation phase: In this step we try to nd a unied (global) score for each
alternative, on the basis of the partial scores and the weights.
3. Exploitation phase: In this phase we transform the global information about
the alternatives either into a complete ranking or into a global choice of the best
alternatives.
To describe MAUT formally we adopt a terminology similar to that in [Marichal, 1998]:
P = A, B, C, . . . is a non-empty set of objects or alternatives (in our case the
providers), among which the decision maker must choose.
We have a collection of criteria N = 1, . . . , n we desire to satisfy. Each criterion i
is represented by a mapping gi from the set of alternatives P to a measurement scale
Si 2 <. The value gi(A) is then called the partial score of alternative (provider) A
with respect to criterion i.
5.4 Risk Assessment 149
The value gi(A) is then called the partial score of A with respect to criterion i. In
most applications, it is assumed that each Si is the unit interval [0, 1].
According to this notation, the global score of an alternative A using MAUT is calculated
by means of an aggregation operator which takes into account the weights associated to
criteria. Although a wide diversity of techniques have been recommended for resolving
multiattribute decision problems, most are ultimately based on a weighted linear model.
Thus, the linear aggregation is used in MAUT as shown in expression (5.2):
nX
i
!i  gi(A) (5.2)
Here, gi(A) is the evaluation of object A on the i-th value dimension, !i is the weight
determining the impact of the i-th value dimension on the overall evaluation (also called
the relative importance of a dimension), and n is the number of dierent value dimensions.
The key points of the method are: identifying what is important for the evaluation (di-
mension hierarchy), identifying how well each alternative does on each criterion (score gi),
and identifying the importance (weights !i). In the following, we explain how we fulll
these points and how we apply and adapt the MAUT method to construct the whole risk
model.
Firstly, the taxonomy previously developed in Section 5.2 contributes to the modeling
phase in MAUT by providing the criteria to be assessed. In our model, the criteria are
the dierent assurance dimensions contemplated in the taxonomy. There are two contexts
to assess risk, namely Pre-Federation and Post-Federation. The criteria and sub-criteria
to be taken into account in each case are modeled by the hierarchy under them. Having
identied the criteria, we dene the mapping functions gi based on the assurance metrics.
For this purpose, we establish a qualitative to quantitative correspondence for the dened
assurance scales of our metrics according to Tables 5.22 and 5.23:
Qualitative Assur-
ance Value
Quantitative Assur-
ance Value
High Assurance 3
Medium Assurance 2
Low Assurance 1
No Assurance 0
Table 5.22: Quantitative mapping of qualitative assurance scale levels for ordinal metrics
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Qualitative Assur-
ance Value
Quantitative Assur-
ance Value
True 1
False 0
Table 5.23: Quantitative mapping of qualitative assurance scale levels for binary metrics
As shown in Table 5.22, numbers have no other meaning that dening an order relation
on the scale. In Table 5.23, however, the quantitative numbers provide binary semantics
indicating if the criteria is satised or not. Since there are dierent scales involved in the
problem, normalization is required to conduct the ulterior aggregation. Consequently, we
dene the mapping function gi(A) to obtain the normalized scores for each criteria as in
formula 5.3:
gi(A) =
AssuranceV alue Min(AssuranceV alue)
Max(AssuranceV alue) Min(AssuranceV alue) (5.3)
As we can observe, the values move now on the interval [0,1].
Accordingly, we give a couple of examples considering the criteria at taxonomic level L2:
If a provider A in the set of alternatives P has a high privacy assurance (LOP =
High), its corresponding partial score for this criterion would be gi(A)= 3-0/3-0 = 1.
In case the decision maker has direct knowledge about a provider A (KNOWD =
True), its corresponding score for this criterion would be gi(A) = 1-0//1-0 = 1.
Formally, each provider A 2 P can be assimilated with the vectors of its partial scores
(i.e., [g1(A), . . . , gn (A)] 2 S1  : : : Snn .) For example, according to the security
dimensions, a provider A with a vector [3/3 0 0 2/3 1/3 3/3 3/3] means that its assurances
in condentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, availability, accountability,
privacy are 3, 0, 0, 2, 1, 3 and 3, respectively. The scores are then obtained depending
on the features of the providers based on the metric framework described in the previous
section.
Having dened the scores, the next step to nish the modeling phase and start with the
aggregation, consists of determining the weights of each criteria. Since the criteria may
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not have the same importance, it is then useful to dene a weight !i associated to each
criterion i. Such a weight represents the strength or importance of this criterion. We aim to
detail the election of the weights by doing aggregation tests applying the MAUT expression
in 5.2. In this regard, it is to note that our hierarchies (see gure 5.1) have multiple levels,
i.e., there are criteria and also sub-criteria under them. However, in contrast with other
mechanisms, MAUT does not support sub-criteria hierarchies directly. But it can instead
be applied recursively until obtaining a nal value. Consequently, due to the multi-level
nature of the taxonomy, this is the approach followed here. Accordingly, the adapted
formula we use for aggregation is:
Aggk;j(A) =
nX
i
!k+1;ji  gk+1;ji (A) (5.4)
Which indicates that the aggregated assurance value for a provider A with respect to
criterion j at level k (Aggkj (A)) is the weighed summation of the assurance values of A for
all the criteria i at level k+1 that are a sub-criterion of j. The weights !k+1;ji represent
the relative importance of the criteria and hold
Pn
i !
k+1;j
i = 1
Using vectorial notation we denote:
WVk;j = [!k;j1, . . . , !
k;j
n] as the Weights Vector at level k regarding criteria j.
SVk;j(A) = [gk;j1(A), . . . , g
k;j
n(A)] as the Score Vector for provider A at level k
regarding criteria j.
So expression 5.4 can be rewritten as in 5.5:
Aggk;j(A) =WV k;j  SV k;j(A)T (5.5)
The methodology then consists of recursively reducing the problem by aggregating sub-
criteria into global values until we have a single unique value or criterion. Thus, the
hierarchy is used in a recursive bottom-up way. The intermediate aggregated values are
called aggregated assurance metrics and these values are the inputs (gi(A)) used for ag-
gregation at the immediate upper level. Furthermore, we decided to apply an additional
treatment at each iteration to include risk policies and to satisfy minimum requirements.
The adaptation of the method and election of weights are shown by example in the vali-
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dation chapter (see Chapter 8).
5.5. Conclusions
In this chapter we have dened the risk assessment model that is implemented by the Risk
Manager component of the proposed architecture for dynamic federation. The model is
based on the MAUT theory, which allows to combine criteria of dierent nature into a
single value to be used in decision-making. The criteria in this case are the dimensions of
risk. Since the process of identifying the dimensions of risk in FIM is not a trivial task,
we started by designing a taxonomy to capture the dierent aspects of a FIM relationship
that may contribute to risk. Based on this analysis, we derived the set of quantitative
metrics to be aggregated following the MAUT approach.
In regard to aggregation, the risk dimensions are weighed according to the preferences
and risk policies of the evaluating entity. The adjustment of the weights is presented
in Chapter 8 together with the validation tests. Finally, a catalogue containing detailed
information about all the proposed risk metrics can be found in Appendix B.
Chapter6
Trust and Reputation Model proposal
\Without trust we cannot stand."
Confucius
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6.1. Chapter Overview
The diculty of capturing the notion of trust in formal models in a meaningful way has
sometimes led to reject it as a computational concept. However, the formal denition of
trust is required. We need to formalize it because our lives are so technically-mediated that
we need devices and applications to act as our proxies, and to act on the basis of the same
concepts we ourselves rely on in our daily lives. Having a formal model to compute and
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represent trust as a number provides a basis for easy implementation and automation.
With these premises as foundation, this chapter focuses on developing the trust model
that is to be implemented as part of the architecture for dynamic federation. Section 6.2
denes the trust metric, detailing the evidences used, and how they are combined to obtain
a quantitative value. Basically, authentication information is merged with behavior data,
i.e., reputation or history of interactions. Next, Section 6.2 elaborates on the mechanisms
dened to share reputation data in the FIM ecosystem. Finally, the main conclusions of
the chapter are summarized in Section 6.4.
6.2. Designing a Trustworthiness Metric for Trust Manage-
ment
Since their origins trust management systems have been used in order to assist entities
that have to interact with others in a system, being a useful tool for the decision-making
process. In order to establish the trust relationship a trust management system is usu-
ally composed of a symbolic language for representing trust and a way of measuring trust
(trust metrics), that derives the trust assessment. In this sense, the computational for-
malization of trust plays a crucial role. Having a formal model to compute and represent
trust as a number provides a basis for easy implementation and automation, as well as
a common understanding of what is measured. As pointed by Marsh in his widely cited
PhD thesis [Marsh, 1994], the expected benets of a computational trust formalism are
increasing reliability and performance of electronic communities, and an achievement of
more cooperation in open and less protected environments.
In the particular case of FIM systems nowadays, trust management models basically con-
sist on the pre-conguration of lists in such a way that if an entity is contained on (or
reachable through) the list, then it is trusted. These mechanisms are thus static and
highly dependent on administrative conguration tasks. And since decisions are the result
of binary assessments, the exibility is limited.
Furthermore, there are no formal computational models that map these FIM trust proce-
dures to numerical expressions. Here we aim to ll this gap by formalizing a model that
captures the features of current FIM systems and introduces new dimensions to add ex-
ibility and richness. This enhanced model will favor better informed decision-making and
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foster collaboration with previously unknown entities. The formalization of a trust model
in a specic domain is a multi-stage process. For the denition of the trust management
model, we will follow these steps:
1. Trust evidences identication: Since the design of any trust management solu-
tion is highly inuenced by the problem being addressed, the rst step consists in
identifying and selecting the proper input data, i.e., the trust evidences in the FIM
context. We will conduct an analysis to identify the existing evidences that are being
used, but also introduce new ones.
2. Quantitative mapping: The trust evidences are represented in a quantitative
scale, whose semantics are also detailed. For this purpose, we rely on the terminology
and formalizations in the literature and build on them.
3. Evidences combination: A trust computation is performed over the evidences
to produce a trust value, which reects the estimation of the trustworthiness of an
entity.
The result after the completion of the above steps is a trustworthiness metric, which will
be the basis for making trust decisions. The explanation of its usage within the decision
making procedures completes the denition of the whole model.
6.2.1. Trust Evidences Identication
The most complete document that conceptually describes and provides guidelines for trust
models in the FIM context is [Boeyen et al., 2004]. Thus, we base on this document to
conduct the analysis of the initial trust evidence space. The document describes dierent
alternatives for trust establishment based on the notions of business trust and authen-
tication trust. The following denitions, contained in the document, are the basis to
understand the trust models:
Trust Anchor List (TAL). Entities accepting cryptographic authentication of
other entities will maintain trust anchor lists, identifying the entities and associated
keys (typically within digital certicates) that they trust for authentication purposes
and upon which validations will be based. If indirect authentication is accepted, the
TAL must contain the intermediary entities through which an authentication path
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can be derived. Entities in a TAL are called Trust Anchors.
Business Anchor List (BAL). Entities requiring business agreements in order to
interoperate with other entities will maintain business anchor lists identifying the
entities with which direct business trust relationships have been established. If an
entity accepts indirect business agreements, its BAL must contain the intermediary
entities through which a business agreement path can be derived. Entities in a BAL
are called Business Anchors.
Based on the above denitions, the possible taxonomy of contemplated cooperation models
is shown in Figure 6.1
Figure 6.1: Trust model taxonomy for SAML-based FIM systems (©[Boeyen et al., 2004])
On the one hand, regarding business, entities may operate under direct agreements, indi-
rect agreements, or without any agreement. On the other hand, direct or indirect authen-
tication should exist. The combination of these possibilities leads to pairwise, brokered or
community models, with direct or indirect authentication.
Accordingly, the process to determine whether a requesting entity can be trusted or not,
could be summarized with the work-ow presented in Figure 6.2.
For an entity A to determine whether a suitable basis exists to carry out trusted trans-
actions with another entity B, it operates on the following data: B's identity, A's TAL,
A's BAL, and A's operational policies, indicating the types of paths it accepts. And the
6.2 Designing a Trustworthiness Metric for Trust Management 157
Figure 6.2: Trust Management model work-ow (©[Boeyen et al., 2004])
necessary processing at a conceptual level, which starts when A receives a transaction
request from B, consists of the following steps:
SP B sends 
Requlo'st 
Check Trust Poli ci es 
Model NO 
allowed? >-----, 
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Trust PQlic i"8 
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1. Validation of an authentication trust path. This process begins by determining
whether A's TAL contains an entry for B. If so (e.g., in the Figure 6.2 example, if B's
identity is Fidelity.com), Direct Trust applies, and A possesses the key required to
authenticate messages and/or connections received from B. If not, A must determine
whether one or more of the entries in its TAL enables it to construct an authentica-
tion path to B. If an authentication path can be constructed and validated, Indirect
Trust applies, and A can traverse that path to obtain the key required to authenti-
cate messages and/or connections received from B. If no path can be constructed,
then A is unable to authenticate B.
2. Validation of a business agreement path. This process begins by determining
whether A's BAL contains an entry for B. If so (e.g., in the Figure 6.2 example, if
B is Yahoo.com), Pairwise Trust applies. If not, A must determine whether one or
more of the entries in its BAL enables it to construct a business agreement path to
B. If a business agreement path can be constructed (e.g., in the Figure 4 example, a
path to Travelocity.com via Excite.com), Brokered Trust applies. If not, no business
agreement applies between A and B, and any transactions must be carried out based
on a Community Trust model.
3. Policy checking. At this stage in the process, A has identied the \shortest"
applicable type of authentication path (Direct or Indirect) and of business agreement
path (Pairwise, Brokered, or Community) reaching to B. It must now determine
whether these paths satisfy its policies and, if so, whether they dictate any limits
or constraints on the transactions that it will be willing to undertake with B; a
peer reachable via Pairwise Trust, e.g., might be accorded broader rights than one
reachable only at the Community Trust level.
There are two important constraints in the procedure that make it rigid and static. Firstly,
if a key/certicate or a path to a key/certicate is not available through the TAL, then
transaction is directly aborted. There is no other mean to obtain the key/certicate
dynamically and assign a trust level to it. Secondly, it is assumed that the addition and
removal of entities to both TAL and BAL lists are serious decisions that should normally
happen only as a result of explicit administrative actions.
Consequently, there are two sources for deriving trust, namely TAL and BAL. Also, it can
be noted that the BAL is always a subset of the TAL. That is, an entity only conducts
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transactions with direct or indirect authenticated entities, but business contracts may exist
or not. Since being in the TAL is indispensable for trusting an entity, it constitutes, from
our point of view, the main trust evidence or input to compute the trustworthiness metric.
The agreements on the BAL however are related to the risk computation and they are
already contemplated on the risk part of our architecture.
But the authentication trust alone is limited. Having installed a valid certicate means
that we have assurance that the entity willing to cooperate is the holder of the private key
associated to the public key contained in the certicate. We know this binding is authentic;
the entity is who it claims to be and we have a cryptographic tool to establish secure
communications. However, we know nothing about its actual behavior. For this reason,
we argue that other trust evidences containing this behavior information are desirable to
complement our knowledge. Behavior can be inferred from previous transactions, if they
exist; or from reputation, in case no previous history of direct interactions is available.
Reputation data has proven useful as a mean to convey empirical information and improve
trust, providing a notion of behavior when no direct knowledge exists. Numerous studies
in the eld of distributed computing demonstrate this fact. However, the application of
this dimension of trust to FIM scenarios has not been yet fully addressed, and here we
aim to show and evaluate its utility.
Summarizing, the trust dimensions we consider to be the basis of the FIM trust model
are: Authentication Trust (TAuth) and Behavior Trust (TBehav) , as depicted in
Figure 6.3. The trust evidences taken as input data at each dimension are the digital
certicates and the transaction history or reputation, respectively.
Figure 6.3: Dimensions of the trustworthiness metric
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6.2.2. Quantitative Mapping and Evidence Combination
Computational trust models provide accurate trust assessment based on the usage of
numeric values. Here we map the conceptual procedure for trust management in current
FIM described in Figure 6.2 to a numeric computational procedure1. Next, over this
starting point, we include extensions to make the trust model more exible.
The common implementation of TALs is PKI-based [Adams, C. and Farrell, S., 1999], i.e,
the TAL contains digital certicates and certicate validation procedures are performed
over the list. From the trustworthiness point of view, PKIs are binary systems: a certi-
cate is either trustworthy or not trustworthy. Certicate validation (thoroughly detailed
in [Freeman, T. and Housley, R. and Malpani, A. and Cooper, D. and Polk, W., 2007])
consists of checking its integrity, expiration status and revocation status. If these aspects
are valid and the issuer is considered a trusted source, then the certicate is trustworthy.
If the validation fails at any of these aspects, the certicate is not trustworthy. For path
validation, all the certicates in the path must be valid. On the other hand, commonly
used values in the trust literature for full trust and full distrust are 1 and 0 respectively.
Considering this, the quantitative mapping to computationally formalize the \validation
of an authentication path" procedure is:
If a direct entry exists in the TAL with a certicate for B ant the certicate is
valid, then authentication trust is equal to 1. If the certicate is not valid, then
authentication trust is equal to 0.
If an indirect entry exists in the TAL that allows the construction of an authentica-
tion path to B, and the whole path is valid, then authentication trust is equal to 1.
If the certicate path is not valid, then authentication trust is equal to 0.
If no direct certicate entry or certicate path can be constructed through the in-
formation in the TAL, then authentication trust is 0.
As it can be observed, the metric is purely binary. Furthermore, following this procedure,
unknown entities are considered untrustworthy and they are not given a chance to operate.
In a similar way, pre-congured entities are considered fully trusted without knowing
anything about their actual behavior. This assignment of numeric values to TAuth is
1Only the process for obtaining authentication trust is mapped, since the business trust will not be used
in the trust model but in the risk one
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depicted in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4: Proposed work-ow and quantitative mapping for the FIM trust management
model
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But to get a better measure of trustworthiness a continuous scale must be used that
allows precise representation of computed trust values. We propose to use trust values in
the range [0, 1], and -1 to denote lack of information. We propose to improve the trust
metric calculation procedure in three ways:
1. Allowing non-binary values for TAuth
2. Allowing the dynamic inclusion of certicates with no trusted anchor in the TAL
3. Adding behavior information
These three aspects are depicted with dotted boxes in the ow diagram of Figure 6.4.
Firstly, to allow more exibility and granularity in the validation, alternative assessment
mechanisms may be used. For example, if the status of the certicate cannot be checked
due to the temporal unavailability of the revocation server, the validation value is assigned
a value proportional to the probability that it is revoked instead of being considered not
valid. This technique is called probabilistic validation. Thus, we only have a 0 value when
the certicate is really not valid, a 1 value when it is totally valid, and numeric values
in between when the validity can be assured to a certain level. Proposals that map this
certicate validity assurance to quantitative numbers exist in the literature [Haenni, R.,
2005]. It can be noted that, by applying this approach, TAuth will have a value in the
continuous range [0,1].
Secondly, the models in Figure 6.1 assume that an entity that is unreachable from the
TAL is untrustworthy. However, as remarked in [Boeyen et al., 2004], entities may be able
to establish trust between them through exchange of trust metadata. Thus, our model
includes a step to directly ask for the exchange of certicates on the y when no Trust
Anchor on the TAL is useful.
After TAuth is computed according to the above procedures, the third step consists of gath-
ering behavior information in order to compute TBehav. Next, both values are combined
into a trustworthiness metric to be used in decision-making. At this point, the assignment
of quantitative values to TBehav is performed this way:
If there is no previous interaction between the parties, i.e., the current transaction
is the rst, then the evaluating entity asks for reputation (TR) about the requesting
entity. If a reputation value is obtained, then TBehav = TR. In the extreme case
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that TR is equal to -1, i.e., no reputation information exists, TBehav is assigned a
trust disposition value d. This value, in the range [0,1], indicates the disposition of
the entity to trust another one when there is no data about its behavior.
If previous interaction between the parties exists, i.e., the current transaction is not
the rst, the value of TBehav based on the history of transactions until the current
one is used. For this purpose, after each transaction, the behavior value must be
updated taking into account the existing trustworthiness value and the satisfaction on
the current transaction (sat(i)). Several models have been proposed in the literature
to model the evolution of trust as a function of the satisfaction on the transactions.
We recommend and base on the mathematical trust evolution scheme used in the
PTM [Mendoza et al., 2011] model.
After TBehav is calculated, the global trustworthiness is computed as the product
TAuthxTBehav. Mathematically, the expressions to model these procedures are shown
in equations 6.1 and 6.2, based on the trust parameters we have dened (summarized in
Table 6.1).
Trustworthiness(i) = TAuth(i)  TBehav(i  1) (6.1)
TBehav(i) =
8>>><>>>:
8<:TR if TR 6=  1d otherwise when i = 0
fevol(trustworthiness(i); sat(i)) when i > 0
(6.2)
Parameter Description
trustworthiness(i) Measures the trust that can be placed on an entity after i transactions
TAuth(i) Authentication Trust at transaction i
TBehav(i) Behavior Trust after transaction i
TR(i) Reputation Trust
d Trust disposition
f evol Trust evolution function
sat(i) Satisfaction on transaction i
Table 6.1: Parameters for the FIM trust management model
Trust values in Table 6.1 (i.e., trustworthiness, TAuth, TBehav, TR) take values in the
continuous scale [0,1]. The trust disposition factor d, also in the scale [0,1], as well as
the function fevol for the evolutionary model, are selected by the evaluating entity and
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congured in its policies. The value range for sat(i) will depend on the fevol used in order
to update TBehav after each transaction. Typically, discrete values 0 and 1 are used to
express satisfying and unsatisfying transactions, respectively.
Now that the process to compute trust has been dened, we elaborate on the mechanisms
to obtain and aggregate the reputation data in a FIM scenario.
6.3. Handling Reputation
The main novelty of the trust management model proposed here is the inclusion of rep-
utation information. Reputation is central to all kinds of human interaction, including
interpersonal relationships, international diplomacy, stock markets, etc. Computationally,
reputation has been introduced in Internet applications proving useful to improve collab-
oration in environments where uncertainty is present. Specially, in P2P networks (e.g.,
for le sharing) there has been an intensive research in the last decade [Homan et al.,
2009]. Here we aim to adapt the existing knowledge on decentralized reputation protocols
to adapt and dene a solution that is applicable in FIM scenarios. Far from reinventing
the wheel, we rst analyze the best know reputation protocols, and then select the more
suitable and adapt it.
A reputation protocol is generally composed of a component for gathering behavioral
information, and a component for scoring entities. In turn, each component requires
a combination of mechanisms to function. For dening the protocol we follow the rec-
ommendations in the RFC \Writing Protocol Models" [Rescorla, 2005]. Accordingly, a
protocol model is described by answering three basic questions: 1.) What problem is the
protocol trying to achieve?, 2.) What messages are being transmitted and what do they
mean?; and 3.) What are the important, but unobvious, features of the protocol?. The
response to the rst question, already motivated, is to include reputation data in FIM en-
vironments with the goal of fostering more dynamic and secure collaborations. Next, we
develop the protocol model answering questions 2 and 3 in the following sections. During
the process we also highlight the dierences with current protocols, and what parts are
new, specic and necessary in the context of FIM.
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6.3.1. Protocol Overview
As a previous knowledge base for dening the reputation protocol in the FIM context, we
rst reviewed the most notable systems. Perhaps the most widely used reputation system
is that of eBay, which consists of a single trusted entity that collects all transaction reports
and rates each user. But since it is a centralized system, it is not applicable to our scenario.
In the envisioned FIM scenarios, there is not a single trusted third party to collect the
ratings, but entities belonging to multiple unknown domains willing to cooperate. Thus,
decentralized reputation systems, as the proposed for P2P environments, are more suitable.
Regarding P2P reputation systems, two proposals outstand over the existing research,
Eigentrust [Kamvar et al., 2003] and P2Prep [Cornelli et al., 2002]. Eigentrust computes
a single performance score for each peer, reecting their past behavior in pairwise inter-
actions. Although the protocol is distributed, it ultimately relies on a xed set of trusted
nodes at which it roots the computation of trust. On the other hand, P2Prep is designed
for completely decentralized system. From the point of view of dissemination, and with
the aim to make FIM systems decentralized, the strategy followed by P2Prep is directly
applicable.
Based on this, we start the description of the IdMRep reputation protocol, which builds
on the special features of FIM systems and introduces the desired P2P behavior. To apply
the P2Prep dissemination, the FIM network can be modeled as a decentralized network
based on the knowledge in the DTLs. We now detail the network model, as well as the
protocol messages.
FIM Network Model
In order to achieve our goal to shift to a Peer-to-Peer behavior when establishing new
federation relationships, entities should have a distributed way to nd reputation infor-
mation. For this purpose the data contained in the entities' DTLs can be used to dene
a new trust logic overlay.
The trust overlay is built in the following way: if a participating entity has a DTL entry
for a specic entity in the FIM network, then there is a directed edge from the former
to the latter. And this network model is what we call \unstructured P2P based on
DTL" (see Figure 6.5). Since information will be only exchanged among trusted parties,
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Figure 6.5: Unestructured P2P based on DTL
only trusted entries are used to build the logic overlay. On bootstrapping, DTLs are
initialized based on the pre-congured trust relationships and agreements existing in each
entity's TAL or BAL, and so the overlay is created based on these data. Then, the overlay
will dynamically change according to the current state of the trust relationships based
on entities' behavior, and on the entities joining/leaving the system. This improves the
current and closed CoT model.
Over this DTL-based unstructured P2P model, we can now apply a dissemination protocol
to gather reputation data. For this purpose, we dene two new roles for entities partic-
ipating in the reputation protocol, namely: ReputationRequester and ReputationRe-
sponder. Any IdP/SP in the network adopts these roles for asking and communicating
reputation data, respectively.
Dissemination
In order to gather reputation data about an unknown entity the dissemination approach,
which we call \Query Flooding based on DTL", consists of broadcasting messages
through the trust overlay. The protocol messages involved in this dissemination approach,
conceptually depicted in Figure 6.6, are:
ReputationRequest. This message is used to ask for reputation, it contains the
following elds:
 Message_ID: Message identication number
 ReputationRequester_ID: The entity (SP or IdP) asking for reputation data
 Subject_ID: The subject of the reputation or \reputee", i.e., the entity (SP or
IdP) whose reputation score is being calculated
=> 
• 
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 Time to Live (TTL): Number of times the ReputationRequestis to be for-
warded through the FIM network
 Context (Cx): Reputation is associated to a context. In FIM, since the same
entity can implement roles of SPs and IdP, these are considered contexts. That
is, an entity can ask for the reputation of another as an SP or as an IdP. Appart
from this role related contexts, a time context is also considered to allow the
entities to ask for reputation data collected since a particular moment in time.
ReputationResponse. This message is used to convey reputation data in reply to
a ReputationRequest, it contains the following elds:
 Message_ID: Message identication number (the same as in the request)
 ReputationResponder_ID: The entity sending the reputation data (i.e., the
\reputor")
 Timestamp: Time when the reputation message was issued
 Reputation data: Associated to the entity identied by Subject_ID, regarding
role contexts specied in the Cx eld, and since the initial time specied in Cx
Figure 6.6: IdMRep Protocol Messages
The envisioned dissemination approach in the IdMRep protocol is based on P2Prep, which
relies in turn in the dissemination mechanisms in the P2P Gnutella network [Gnutella,
2003]. Accordingly, the above messages are used to gather reputation data by applying
the following rules:
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1. If an entity wants to gather reputation data about another one, then a Reputation-
Request message is constructed and sent to the trusted entries in its DTL. A timer
is set to wait for responses to this request
2. When receiving a message asking about the reputation of a specic subject (i.e., a
ReputationRequest message), the entity must check its DTL to determine if there
is an entry for the reputee. If an entry exists, then it must construct and send a
response with the reputation data back to the requester (i.e., a ReputationResponse
message)
3. An entity should forward incoming ReputationRequest messages to the trusted
entities in its DTL, except to the one that delivered the incoming query and to the
reputee (if it is in the DTL)
4. An entity receiving a message with the same Message_IDand reputee as one it has
received before, must discard the message
5. After receiving all the RequestResponsemessages (when the timer expires), the re-
questing entity must aggregate them to obtain a nal global reputation value. The
reputee is then added to the DTL with its associated computed reputation value.
ReputationResponse messages are sent directly to the requester instead of being routed
backwards through the same way traversed by the ReputationRequestmessage. This is
dierent as in P2Prep, which follows the Gnutella backwards routing. This choice of direct
response means less overhead in terms of messages sent. Another dierence with is in the
primitives, which here are adapted to the specic semantics of FIM.
In Figures 6.7 and 6.8 we show a sample FIM network and the protocol sequence diagram
for a particular transaction example in this network. More specically, Service Provider
SP1 wants to initiate a transaction with Identity Provider IdP2, which is unknown (no
previous interaction). Thus, it executes the IdMRep protocol to obtain a TR value and
use it to compute a trustworthiness value for IdP2.
As far as the storage strategy is concerned, the DTL is used as the key element in order
to maintain reputation related information.
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Figure 6.7: Sample FIM Network
Figure 6.8: Sample IdMRep sequence diagram for the FIM network in 6.7
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6.3.2. Further Details
Once the protocol model has been sketched, we provide an explanation of other complex
aspects, namely the nature of the reputation data and its aggregation. Furthermore, issues
such as security are discussed and some implementation guidelines are also given.
Reputation Scoring
Regarding the kind of information that is transmitted to convey reputation, there are
dierent possibilities. Systems in the p2p reputation literature normally send its local
trust value for the reputee computed with its own trust function based on interactions; or
a single deterministic vote that express the opinion about the reputee. This vote can be
binary, e.g., 0 if the repute is considered not reputable or 1 otherwise; or it can be a scaled
integer, e.g., 1 to 10. But, this vote is also calculated based on the transaction history and
applying the policies of the sender of the reputation.
These approaches are thus subjective in the sense that the reputation depends on the view
of the reputation sender. In order to comply with our goal of making reputation more
portable and less dependent on the reputor subjectivity, an approach that sends the raw
history of transactions is more adequate. Thus entities can apply its own function over
the transactional histories received in order to obtain a reputation value.
Any entity in the system must store transactional histories about the other entities with
which they have interacted. The log system or repository stores for every transaction a
tuple h Time, EntityID, Role, Result i , which contains the identier of the entity
with which the transaction was made, the role of that entity in the transaction, as well
as de result (good or bad), all preceded by a time stamp. When a ReputationRequest is
received, the elds in the ReputationRequest are used to lter the logs per entity and role,
as well as to obtain the data from the origin time specied. Over these data, the number
of bad and good transactions is calculated and packed into the ReputationResponse.
Having dened how to convey reputation data and extract a reputation value from it, the
next decision point in modeling the reputation system is how to aggregate the data from
multiple sources. An easy and widely adopted approach is to use the arithmetic mean to
obtain the average. But the choice will be application dependent.
According tho the above descriptions, the process to derive the nal TR value to be
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introduced in equation 6.2 is depicted in Figure 6.9. The rst step consists of obtaining the
transactional histories received from providers 1:N in the ReputationResponse messages.
Then, step 2 involves the derivation of reputation values associated to each history (i.e.,
TR
1:TR
N ). These values are obtained by means of the fevol function used, which models
the evolution based good and bad actions. Finally the third and last step consists of
aggregating the TR
1:TR
N values into a global TR
Figure 6.9: Derivation of TR from Reputation Assertions
Integrating IdMRep in a SAML-based FIM network
Normally, the primitives of a reputation protocol are implemented to be transported over
the underlying protocols of the system where they are applied. For example, in reputation
systems designed to improve le sharing in p2p networks, primitives are implemented over
the p2p protocol used in that network. Similarly, since our reputation protocol is to be
deployed in FIM networks, it is logical to implement it over FIM protocols (e.g., SAML,
openID, etc.).
Since SAML is the best known standard FIM protocol, we detail how to implement the
IdMRep protocol over it. SAML provides extension mechanisms that can be used for
this purpose. Adding reputation support to SAML implies modications to both asser-
tions and protocols. The Reputation data in the IdMRep ReputationResponse primitive
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is thus expressed in the form of a SAML assertion. Regarding how the assertion is ex-
changed, it can be done as for a normal Assertion over the standard SAML protocols.
More specically, by using the SAML Assertion Query and Request Protocol, which is
the basis to request or query for an Assertion. To achieve this, we dene a new kind of
assertion: the Reputation Assertion. Such Assertion contains a custom statement type,
called <ReputationStatement> .
The structure of the Reputation Assertion has an initial part or header, whose content
is the same that is dened in the standard assertions. This common section includes the
assertion identier, the names of the issuer and the subject, and information about the
instant in which the assertion was issued. The XML tags are <Assertion ID>, <Issuer>
, <Subject> and <IssueInstant>, respectively. And the content for this tags will be the
value of Message_ID, TimeStamp, ReputationResponder_ID, and Subject_ID, dened in
the IdMRep ReputationResponse primitive.
Apart from this information, the statement has a body section, which contains all the data
related to the reputation metric. The tag <ReputationStatement> has been dened for
this purpose. This tag includes the attribute ReputationInstant, to indicate the instant
in time that is the origin of the history of transactions. Inside the <ReputationState-
ment> there are three more elements: <ReputationContext>, <GoodTransactions> and
<BadTransactions>. The rst element is used to indicate the role (SP, IdP) for what
the reputation is expressed regarding the subject. The other two elements indicate the
number of good and bad transactions that the subject performed with the issuer of the
assertion. This assertion is conveyed as a SAML protocol <Response> .
On the other hand, in order to ask for a Reputation Assertion, we dene a new ele-
ment <ReputationQuery> used to make the query\What assertions containing reputation
statements are available for this subject?" This element contains a context attribute that
contains a string indicating the role (SP, IdP) for which the reputation about the subject is
requested. An aditional timeContext attribute is also dened to express the initial time
since the issuer wants reputation data about the subject. In order to express the subject, a
reputee attribute is used. Furthermore, a TTL attribute is dened to indicate the horizon
for request forwarding. Accordingly, Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show a sample SAML request
message to ask for a Reputation Assertion, and a sample associated response message,
respectively.
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23.
For conveying the assertion, any binding dened in the SAML standard can be used as
underlying transport mechanism, without requiring any further modication.
We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype, which is explained in the validation
chapter (Chapter 8) and provides further technical details on the implementation issues.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the choice of implementing the IdMRep messages as
SAML assertions is an advantage in the sense that most of the FIM protocols are able to
convey SAML tokens. So messages can be used in other applications. When no SAML
bearing mechanism is available, a translation service, to extract the assertion contents and
translate into another token format can be used.
Security Issues
Regarding security, we rely on the SAML security mechanisms for the exchange of As-
sertions. These mechanisms are documented in the \Security and Privacy considerations
for the OASIS Security Assertion markup Language (SAML) v2.0" [Maler et al., 2005].
Basically, by using SSL/TLS as transit protection protocol, condentiality authentication
and integrity in the communications between every pair of nodes is assured. It provides
protection against eavesdropping attacks, message modication insertion or deletion and
man-in-the-middle attacks. The selected cipher suite and the combination of transport
layer security with message layer protection will lead to dierent security assurance levels,
as it will be discussed in the risk chapter.
But these considerations are applicable only to the exchange of messages between two
federated providers. However, the dissemination approach for querying and obtaining
reputation data poses new security challenges. Similarly, the introduction of reputation
makes the system vulnerable to attacks or aws that are specic to reputation systems.
We briey discuss both kinds of security challenges:
Dissemination related security issues.
With the dissemination strategy described here, reputation data may be obtained
from dierent sources. These sources may be direct trusted entities or totally un-
known entities. For the case were the information comes from unknown providers,
the credibility of the source may be questionable. Theoretically, the responding en-
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tity has been reached through a chain of trusted providers, but the requester does
not know all the intermediate nodes (and their trustworthiness). Furthermore, any
node in the forwarding chain knows about the poll and can use the data on the
assertion with malicious purposes, e.g., submitting a bad fake reputation.
There are several ways to address these issues. One possibility is to adjust the
TTL value to 1. If the horizon is the set of direct trusted neighbors (i.e., trusted
entities in the DTL), the reputation data will come always from trusted sources.
The inconvenient is that the network knowledge is limited to those peers located at
a 1-hop distance.
Another mechanism is the modication of the protocol, so the ReputationResponse
messages are routed back to the requester following the path of the Reputation-
Request in such a way that every node in the chain adds information about his
neighbor. In the end, the requesting node will have the reputation data of the sub-
ject for which the query was made, but also the length of the path through him, all
the nodes traversed and the reputation of each of these nodes as seen by its direct
neighbor in the chain. This approach has the benet that nodes that route back the
ReputationResponse, can store the reputation assertion in their DTLs and use it
in future transactions. On the other hand, this type of routing increases the number
of IdMRep messages required.
Another possibility is to incorporate a credibility measure that is assigned to un-
known providers that send ReputationResponse messages and that allows to lter
incorrect rates. For example, if the reputation data sent by an unknown provider
is very dierent from that obtained from direct trusted providers, it can be consid-
ered as false and be discarded. Dierent credibility mechanisms are proposed in the
literature that may be applicable.
Reputation related security issues.
There are threats that particularly aect reputation systems. The authors in [Mar-
mol and Perez, 2009] do a good work in summarizing some of the most important
and critical security threats that could be applied in reputation schemes designed
for distributed systems.
The simplest threat is the existence of individual malicious peers. And the way of
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preventing such a misbehavior is by decreasing the level of trust or reputation of
those participants who always provide bad services, categorizing them, therefore, as
malicious peers. This threat is correctly addressed in our model, which is able to
identify bad entities and isolate them (see Chapter 8).
Another kind of threats are related with the fact that entities may provide incorrect
feedback to raise or decrease others reputation. The way of solving these problems
is by introducing a notion of credibility of the entities in order to evaluate its trust-
worthiness also as reputors. This is not explicitly dened in our model but can be
done easily by considering unfair reputation as a bad action. This will decrease
the trustworthiness of the reputor and nally will be discarded also as a Service or
Identity provider.
Most of the threats of reputation p2p systems come from two important features
of these networks: there is usually no underlying security, i.e., cryptographic chan-
nels that allow the information to be exchanged condentially; and there are usu-
ally non permanent identiers assigned to participants. Not providing in transit
security makes more feasible the injection of false reputation messages or modica-
tion/deletion of the messages. The non-persistent identiers issue allows peers to
perform bad actions until they are discovered and then disappear and start again
with a new clean history (whitewashing). Furthermore, if the creation of identities
is not very costly, the system is also susceptible of sybill attacks [Douceur, 2002].
In our case however, the cost of creating identities is high, since setting up a provider
with FIM support is not an easy task. What is more, in FIM networks, providers
have a well known identier or URL. Behaving bad would be very costly to their
reputation, which is dicult to recover again. They may end being excluded of the
network, with the consequent economic losses.
To conclude, the improvements provided by including reputation in the FIM trust model
are an increased exibility and the tackle of uncertainty. The information gathered helps
in acquiring knowledge about new providers facilitating cooperation with the trusted ones
and preventing the selection of malicious ones. The incentive for good behavior is the
winning of reputation, that will help in being admitted as cooperator by other providers.
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6.4. Conclusions
In this chapter we have dened a computational trust model that captures the features
of current FIM systems and introduces new dimensions to add exibility and richness.
With this, we move from the binary-based decision model currently used into a model
that allows granularity. Trust is computed as a continuous numeric value and continually
adjusted taking into account the behavior of the entities. An important part of the model
is the inclusion of reputation data, which is a new research line in FIM that opens the
door for further investigation. Here we just outlined a very simple protocol model that,
far from reinventing the wheel, is based in the existing reputation protocols designed
for p2p systems. We have dened the main features for the protocol to be applicable
in FIM, the data that should be included and also how it can be implemented over a
concrete specication (SAML). But further work can be done in determining the best
possible protocol: studying the forwarding mechanisms that are more suitable, analyzing
the threats and attacks, etc. All these potential studies are suggested as future research
line in Chapter 9.
Furthermore, our proposal aims to combine trust with risk assessment in order to get a bet-
ter informed decision-making procedure. Next chapter (Chapter 7) focuses on describing
this procedure.
178 CHAPTER 6. TRUST AND REPUTATION MODEL PROPOSAL
Chapter7
Decision making scheme: To federate or
not to federate
Although the future is uncertain, decisions
have to be made, often in the light of
incomplete and possibly incorrect
information
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7.1. Chapter Overview
Not knowing an entity beforehand should not be a handicap to establish a federation. It
is simply required that knowledge is gathered and, afterwards, make the decision based
on this gathered knowledge in a dynamic fashion.
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In the traditional FIM model entities were added and removed as entries in trust lists
only as a result of explicit administrative action, reecting changes to agreements with
direct partners. The aim here is that these operations are performed automatically based
on the Decision Manager output. This architectural component, outlined in Chapter 4,
combines the trust and risk values associated to a transaction, and generates a nal value
that represents the decision. Thus, this Chapter concentrates on dening the operation of
the Decision Manager, detailing the aggregation model followed.
7.2. Decision Manager: Rationale Design
7.2.1. Design Principles
In the proposed architecture for dynamic federation establishment and management, the
Decision Manager is a key component. As introduced in Chapter 4, the function of this
module is deciding whether to initiate or not a transaction with another entity, in case
of being a requestor; or whether to respond or not to a transaction request. Thus, the
goal in the Pre-Federation phase is to make a decision whether to federate or not with
the other entity and to which extent; whereas in the Post-Federation phase, decisions are
made about cooperating in particular transactions.
The inputs for this module (in terms of assurance), are the trustworthiness value of the
other entity, the risk associated to the transaction, and the internal policies that will be
used to govern the decisions. Then, the decision procedure consists of aggregating two
metrics in order to obtain a nal meaningful gure that can be compared to a decision
threshold. We denote this nal aggregated metric as decision trust, and its components
are depicted in the image of Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Dimensions of the decision trust metric
The process for obtaining the trustworthiness metric was detailed in Chapter 6. Similarly,
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the process for obtaining the assurance metric, which is directly proportional to the existing
risk, was developed in Chapter 5. In this latter case, the MAUT theory was used to
aggregate the several dimensions of risk, because this is a useful technique to combine
criteria of dierent nature.
Since the dimensions that have to be aggregated for obtaining the decision trust value
are also criteria of dierent nature, the application of MAUT for the aggregation of trust-
worthiness and assurance is reasonable. MAUT models permit to allocate dierent kind
of aggregation functions, being additive linear functions the simplest ones and the most
usually adopted. Yet, simple models such as weighted sums are not always sucient. One
assumption that must be held to apply linear aggregation in MAUT is that criteria are
independent. Classically, if mutual preferential independence can further be assumed, the
weighted arithmetic mean is used. That was the case in the aggregation of risk dimensions
in Chapter 5. But this independence property is not present in the risk-trust relationship.
For example, normally the higher the trust, the higher the risk we are willing to assume
(see section 3.4.2).
To demonstrate the unsuitability of the basic MAUT aggregation, Figure 7.2 shows the
matrix of results after aggregating trustworthiness and assurance by applying the most
common function: the arithmetic mean. The surface for the decision trust applying this
aggregator is depicted in Figure 7.3.
Figure 7.2: Aggregation of trustworthiness and assurance by applying the arithmetic mean
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Figure 7.3: Decision Trust surface for aggregation using the arithmetic mean
As we can observe in the decision trust values represented in Figure 7.2, there are cases
in which very low values of trustworthiness combined with high values of assurance lead
to nal acceptable values, because of the compensation eect of the aggregator. A 0.5
value can be e.g., obtained by the aggregation of maximum assurance and minimum trust-
worthiness, as well as for minimum assurance and maximum trustworthiness, and also for
intermediate values. The nal result does not provide these semantics and the dierence
is important. If combinations of extreme values were equally preferred, then the property
of additive independence would hold, and the arithmetic mean aggregator would t well.
Thus, we can see that an operator such as the weighed mean cannot express any interaction
between criteria. Important behavioral features that should be fullled by the decisor
are not captured. More specically, to contextualize the problem, the features that the
Decision Manager must fulll are detailed below:
Combine a trustworthiness value in the continuous range [0,1] with an assurance
value in the continuous range [Amin, 1]. The 0 in the trustworthiness scale means
distrust, 0.5 is ignorance and 1 is full trust. In the case of the assurance metric,
the scale goes from a minimum assurance value Amin until 1, which means full
assurance. It should be noted that, following the methodology in Chapter 5, the
assurance assigned to transactions which do not fulll the minimum requirements
is equal to 0. Thus, all the values below this Amin threshold are assimilated to 0
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and can be ltered before performing the nal aggregation. That is, transactions
with assurance under the Amin level are directly rejected. For the cases above Amin,
assurance is combined with trustworthiness to make the decision. Assuming then
that the assurance satises the minimum, the combination of this dimension with
the trustworthiness must be performed in such a way that:
 If the level of trustworthiness is low, i.e., the entity is considered untrustworthy,
then the decision must be to not cooperate.
 If the level of trustworthiness is high, i.e., the entity is considered trustworthy,
then the decision must be to cooperate. However, depending on the assurance,
value the extent of cooperation may be dierent.
 If the level of trustworthiness is dubious (e.g., close to 0.5), there is more uncer-
tainty on whether the entity will behave good or bad. In these case, cooperation
should be only permitted if the assurance level is high (i.e., low risk). If the
assurance is low, even if acceptable, transactions should be avoided.
Provide an output value, the trust decision metric, in the range [0,1]. A cooperation
threshold (cth) must be dened in the policies, e.g., typically 0.5.
These premises are the design principles for our Decision Manager. The decision model
has indeed to be rich enough to model the decisional behaviors explained above. Since
linear aggregation functions are not satisfactory, we need to dene a dierent aggregation
model. The desired decision surface, expressed in a matrix form, is shown in Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Matrix for the decision surface
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7.2.2. First Approach: Hand-crafted Aggregation
Thinking on the above premises, we can design a hand-crafted aggregation function that
meets them. For example, assuming that:
a) trustworthiness is considered low under 0.4, dubious between 0.4 and 0.6, and
high over 0.6;
b) minimum assurance is 0.2, acceptable assurance is from 0.2 to 0.8, and high over
0.8;
c) the cth is 0.5, i.e., a decision trust value equal or over 0.5 means a positive decision,
we have the cooperation map depicted in Figure 7.5.
Figure 7.5: Cooperation map for Decision Manager with xed thresholds
In order to obtain coherent output values, a piecewise function can be applied that guar-
antees values lower than 0.5 in the \no cooperation zone", and values equal or over this
threshold in the \cooperation zone". Formulas 7.1 and 7.2 fulll the desired behavior.
Its associated surfaces are depicted in Figure 7.6 for equation 7.1, and Figure 7.7 for
equation 7.2.
DT =
8<:T A if T < 0:4 or if 0:4  T  0:6; A  0:80:5  T + 0:5 A otherwise (7.1)
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DT =
8<:0 if T < 0:4 or if 0:4  T  0:6; A  0:80:5  T + 0:5 A otherwise (7.2)
where DT is decision trust, T is trustworthiness and A is Assurance.
Figure 7.6: Decision trust surface for aggregation with equation 7.1
Figure 7.7: Decision trust surface for aggregation with equation 7.2
However, despite the above hand-crafted functions are able to model the desired features
of the decisor, some limitations exist. According to the propositions stated above for
the operation of the decision making module, the decision trust varies according to the
values of assurance and trustworthiness, which are described in a qualitative fashion: low,
acceptable, etc. But the numeric ranges for these categories will depend on the view of the
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evaluating entity, and so are subjective. For example, a 0.4 value for trustworthiness may
be dubious from the point of view of a particular entity, or may be considered low from
the point of view of another entity. Furthermore, when using a hand-crafted function a
change on the selected thresholds may lead to incoherent results and so the aggregation
function needs to be redened.
7.2.3. Second Approach: Fuzzy Aggregation
To capture the vagueness and imprecision of the operation propositions, as well as the
existent subjectivity, a richer model needs to be dened. Furthermore, the model has to
be parametrizable, so the aggregation function does not require changes when the ranges
of the categories vary.
In this sense, fuzzy aggregation [Beliakov and Warren, 2001] techniques are appropriate
to be applied. Fuzzy logic provides a mathematical formalism for a unied treatment of
vagueness and imprecision that are ever present in decision support and expert systems in
many areas. In fact, in the specic context of risk-trust relationship, Manchala [Manchala,
2000] proposes to express the interaction of both concepts by using a fuzzy logic trust
matrix (similar to the representations in Figures 7.4 and 7.5 ). This work points out that
the fuzzy trust matrix could be replaced by a set of fuzzy membership functions that
could be useful in reasoning. Thus, we will base on this theory to build the model for our
Decision Manager system.
In fuzzy set theory (FST), membership functions of fuzzy sets play the role similar to the
utility functions in MAUT (the role of degrees of preference). Consequently, we have just
to design the system including the membership/utility functions and perform aggregation.
More specically, Mandani fuzzy inference systems (FIS) are widely used in particular for
decision support applications since they are intuitive and easy to interpret. In order to
construct a Mandani FIS, the following steps are performed: (1) Fuzzication, which com-
prises denition of the input and output parameters and its associated levels or linguistic
labels; (2) Denition of If-Then Rules, which will be used for reasoning about input values
and obtain the output; and (3) Deuzication, which refers to the calculation of a single
output number after the rules are applied.
The rst step allows us to obtain the MAUT utility functions to be aggregated. In our case,
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the two input variables for the FIS are trustworthiness and assurance. For the input
variable trustworthiness, we dene three linguistic labels, namely: untrusted, dubious, and
trusted. The quantitative values assigned to each label depend on two thresholds dened
in the decision making policies, namely:
Dubious distrust threshold (dth). For values of trustworthiness below this threshold
an entity is considered untrustworthy.
Dubious trust threshold (tth). For values of trustworthiness over this threshold an
entity is considered trustworthy
For the input variable assurance, we dene two labels: acceptable and high. The threshold
that separates both categories is called high assurance threshold (ath), and must be also
dened in the policies. For values over this threshold, assurance is considered high.
These features of the input variables are depicted in Figure 7.8. In the trustworthiness
graph, it can be observed that thresholds dth and tth determine the range of the linguistic
categories. Furthermore, there is a zone where values overlap. For example, a particular
value between dth and 0.5 can be interpreted as distrust or as dubious. The membership
function () indicates how much the value belongs to each category, e.g., the trustwor-
thiness value associated to an entity can be a 60% distrust and a 40% dubious. That is,
it belongs to both categories with dierent degrees of membership. This feature of fuzzy
logic allows to capture subjectivity.
In the assurance graph, the ath threshold determines from which point the assurance can
be considered 100% high. In order to introduce a degree of fuzziness, such as the dubious
range in trustworthiness, we dene an assurance exibility index af as the range in which
the assurance could be considered both high and acceptable.
For the output variable decision trust, we dene four labels: non-cooperation, low,
medium and high. The quantitative values assigned to each label depend on a set of
thresholds dened in the decision making policies. These thresholds are:
Cooperation threshold (cth). For values of decision trust below this threshold the
decision to cooperate will be negative.
Low Cooperation threshold (lcth). For values of trustworthiness over this threshold
the decision to cooperate will be positive, and the extent of the cooperation low.
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(a) Fuzzy trustworthiness (b) Fuzzy Assurance
Figure 7.8: Trustworthiness (a), and assurance(b)
Medium Cooperation threshold (mcth). For values of assurance over this threshold
the decision to cooperate will be positive and the extent of the cooperation medium.
High Cooperation threshold (hcth). For values of assurance over this threshold the
decision to cooperate will be positive and the extent of the cooperation high.
Apart from these thresholds, we also dene the exibility indexes lcf , mcf , and hcf , to
dene fuzzy ranges in which categories overlap. The decision trust output variable is
depicted in Figure 7.9
Figure 7.9: Fuzzy decision trust
Having dening the inputs and the output, the next step is the denition of the If-Then
Rules for reasoning in order to obtain an aggregated output. A fuzzy rule is dened as a
conditional statement in the form:
\IF x is A AND y is B, THEN z is C"
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where x and y are the linguistic input variables; z is the linguistic output variable; and A,
B and C are the linguistic values of the variables, respectively. Dierent logical operators,
or combinations of them, can be used to formulate the rules (e.g., disjunction OR).
The complete set of rules we have dened to model the desired component for the Decision
Manager are presented in Figure 7.10. All of them are formulated using the conjunction
operator AND. To give an example, the logical formulation of the rst rule would be:
\IF trustworthiness is distrust AND assurance is acceptable, THEN decision trust is
no-cooperation"
Figure 7.10: Fuzzy inference rules (knowledge base for the Decision Manager)
By applying the rules in in Figure 7.10 and defuzzifying the output to get a quantitative
value, the decision trust is obtained. The aggregation process is graphically shown in
Figure 7.12. There are various mathematical operations underlying the whole process:
maximum, minimum, products, t-norms, etc. More details can be found in [Fodor and
Roubens, 1994].
Now that the whole aggregation model is dened, we show in Figure 7.11 the decision
surface obtained when assigning the thresholds to the same values assumed in the example
described in 7.2.2. That is tth= 0.6 , dth = 0.4 for the trustworthiness; and ath= 0.8 for
the assurance. The assurance includes a exibility index af=0.05.
As it can be noticed from the image in Figure 7.11, the decision surface is similar to
that obtained when applying the hand-crafted functions in equations equation 7.1 and 7.2.
However it has the advantage that is parametrizable, so thresholds can be changed without
the need to redening the system. This FIS-based system properly models the richness
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Figure 7.11: Decision trust surface with Mamdani FIS based aggregation
Figure 7.12: Mamdani FIS based aggregation
of the Decision Manager and allows to obtain an output mapped in multiple categories,
which are useful to constrain the extent of the cooperation (e.g., using dierent SLAs for
each category).
7.3. Conclusions
The acceptance of risk and the means, via trust, to cope with and assimilate it into
decisions, enables humans to exist in the complex society which is around us [Luhmann,
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1979]. The formalization of these social concepts into mathematical models make them
usable in technically-mediated interactions, so they can be performed on the basis of the
same concepts we ourselves rely on. Thus, with the introduction of these mechanisms in
FIM, decisions can be made in an automated and more dynamic fashion.
Based on these premises, this chapter described how to combine trust and risk to output
a decision to cooperate. We started the denition procedure by trying the simplest aggre-
gation model, i.e., a lineal additive function. However it resulted to be limited due to the
complex relationship between the trust and risk concepts. The next step consisted on the
denition of an ad-hoc function, that leads to the desired results but is limited in regard
with exibility, i.e., if the entity policies change, then the function must be redened.
Finally, we evolved towards a fuzzy-based aggregation system, that is parametrizable,
exible, allows to model complexities in the trust-risk relationship and captures the sub-
jectivity of entities.
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8.1. Chapter Overview
This chapter is dedicated to cover the validation of the ideas presented in this thesis. Its
central part is organized in three main blocks that are related to each of the main contribu-
tions. Firstly, section 8.2 presents a formal analytical validation of the mathematical risk
model and the adjustment of its parameters. Secondly, section 8.3 describes a simulation
model used for the evaluation of the benets of including reputation data to build trust in
a FIM network. Thirdly, section 8.4 develops the validation of the proposed architecture
through the implementation a proof-of-concept prototype.
Finally, section 8.5 concludes by remarking the main results derived from all the the
validation tests performed, as well as identifying which aspects still need to be covered.
8.2. Risk Model Validation: Aggregation Tests, Examples
and Discussion
This section is dedicated to validate the risk model and assessment procedure proposed
in Chapter 5. Validation, based on NIST Special Publication 500-238 denitions [Wallace
et al., 1996], is understood as the process of checking whether the proposed solution satises
its expected requirements. That is, we conduct validation with the aim to demonstrate that
the model works in conformance to the associated principle guidelines, that the output
is correct. More specically, we test how the model is capable of handling the set of
quantitative metrics dened and use them as an input to generate the associated risk
value. We show that the nal risk value:
is relative to the perception, assets and needs of the provider that is making the
evaluation
provides information on the assurance level coverage
can be used in decision making. The nal value allows to discard those entities that
do not satisfy minimum requirements; and also to make a comparative ranking of
entities when there are several options available
We go through the validation process starting with aggregation tests at the lowest level
in the risk hierarchy (level L4) and at the immediate upper level (level L3), and then we
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provide a complete aggregation example involving the whole Pre-Federation risk branch.
It is to mention that through the tests we rene the model and complete its denition.
Thus, recommendations are given below on how to implement aggregation.
8.2.1. Test 1: Aggregation of L4 Metrics
Taking the Pre-Federation branch of the taxonomy for risk assessment metrics, we have
the hierarchy in Figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: Pre-Federation hierarchy
The rst step for obtaining the global Pre-Federation assurance of a provider A under
evaluation is applying MAUT to aggregate the criteria located at level 4 and reduce the
problem from a 4-level to a 3-level hierarchy. The proposed set of security related criteria
includes three cases where aggregation must be performed: condentiality, integrity and
authentication. All of them are to be calculated by combining the assurance provided both
at transport and at message layers. To analyze the aggregation at this level we take as
example the condentiality dimension, but the procedure would be the same for integrity
and authentication. According to the hierarchical aggregation formula in 5.5, the global
Condentiality Assurance score is obtained as:
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Agg3;1(A) =
nX
i
!4;1i  g4;1i (A)
T
=WV 4;1  SV 4;1T (A)
=WV 4;1  [jCONFTL(A)j; jCONFML(A)]T
Where jCONFTL(A)j and jCONFML(A)j represent the normalized values for the conden-
tiality metrics at transport and message layers respectively. Table 8.1 shows the aggregated
values for all the possible sub-criteria combinations under the condentiality dimension
applying dierent weights.
CONFTL g1
4;1 CONFML g2
4;1 weights [0.5,0.5] weights [1,0] weights [0,1]
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1/3 0 0 1/6 1/3 0
2 2/3 0 0 1/3 2/3 0
3 1 0 0 1/2 1 0
0 0 1 1/3 1/6 0 1/3
1 1/3 1 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
2 2/3 1 1/3 1/2 2/3 1/3
3 1 1 1/3 2/3 1 1/3
0 0 2 2/3 1/3 0 2/3
1 1/3 2 2/3 1/2 1/3 2/3
2 2/3 2 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3
3 1 2 2/3 5/6 1 2/3
0 0 3 1 1/2 0 1
1 1/3 3 1 2/3 1/3 1
2 2/3 3 1 5/6 2/3 1
3 1 3 1 1 1 1
Table 8.1: Condentiality Assurance as a result of aggregating normalized CONFTL and
CONFML using dierent weights in the aggregation
As shown in Table 8.1, the aggregated results present important variations depending on
the chosen weights. Applying extreme weights (0 or 1) leads to take into consideration
only one of the criteria. On the other hand, for the case of using equal weights (equivalent
to an arithmetic mean), the result is a balanced combination of the criteria. However,
meaningful dierences in the partial contributory factors may be hidden in the nal value.
For example, the nal condentiality assurance value using equal weights is the same for
an entity that provides the maximum assurance on the transport layer and no assurance
on the message layer, but also for an entity that provides no assurance at transport and
maximum assurance at message. One could think that the higher the security assurance
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the better, but a higher assurance is not representative since it may contain low values in
specic provisions that can be important for the party evaluating risks.
These facts point out the need of improving the aggregated metrics adapting the weights in
order to convey more information about the partial contributory factors and allow better
informed decisions. The weights must be then calculated according to the interests of
the evaluating party. Our approach for their derivation is another contribution to the
modeling phase and it is based on the minimum risk requirements of the evaluating party.
We are building a risk model but so far we have just talked about assurance. The assur-
ance values show only partial risk information. For example, condentiality risk at trans-
port layer is inversely proportional to the condentiality assurance provided at this layer
(CONFTL). The more the condentiality assurance, the less the probability (PCONFTL) of
incurring in risks related to condentiality (PCONFTL  1/CONFTL). But, on the other
hand, every organization will have dierent sensitivities to dierent attacks depending on
the value of the assets under its control and other contextual features. So risk is also pro-
portional to impacts (I). In this case, it means that RISK-CONFTL = PCONFTL x ICONFTL .
Based on this, a qualitative scale for PCONFTL that reects the inverse relation with the
assurance is shown in Table 8.2.
CONFTL PCONFTL
High (H) Low
Medium (M) Medium
Low (L) High
None (N) Very High (VH)
Table 8.2: Inverse relationship between probability and assurance
Then, having the CONFTL value, the condentiality risk can be obtained by means of a
risk matrix including both impact and probability dimensions, as shown in the example of
Table 8.3. This kind of matrices is to be dened in the local policies of entities according
to their risk criteria.
I High (100) I Medium (50) I Low (10)
P Very High (1) VH (100) H (50) L (10)
P High (0.9) H (90) M (45) L (9)
P Medium (0.5) H (50) M (25) L (5)
P Low (0.1) L (10) L (5) L (1)
Table 8.3: Example of risk matrix
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The numeric values for probabilities and impacts in the risk matrices are to be dened also
in local policies. Here, for the sake of illustrating the methodology with a numeric example,
we use values similar to the ones in the NIST risk assessment methodology [Stoneburner
et al., 2002]. Normally, when evaluating an entity for cooperation it is interesting that it
satises some minimum requirements in regard to dierent criteria. For example, in regard
to condentiality a local policy may say that, as a minimum requisite, low assurance must
be provided at both transport and message layers. However, it is impossible to tell if
minimum requirements are met from the global aggregated values presented in Table 8.3.
With the idea to solve this problem we rene the aggregated metrics. For this purpose,
the following notation is used:
RVk;j is a Reference Vector such that RVk;j(i) contains the minimum required value
for the i-th assurance metric in SVk;j .
j[ SVk;j j the number of metrics in the score vector of a provider (SVk;j) that are
greater or equal than the minimum required value (i.e., the number of metrics that
fulll SVk;j(i)  RVk;j(i))
Based on the above notation and inspired by the compliance metric proposed in [Luna
et al., 2011], let us apply their concept to the FIM environment and dene the Assurance
Compliance Index (ACI ) as in expression 8.1:
ACIk;j =
8><>:
1 if SV k;j(i)  RV k;j(i) 8 i
j [ SV k;j j
n
otherwise
(8.1)
Thus, an ACI equal to 1 means that the minimum requirements are satised; otherwise
it gives an idea of the requirements coverage. Based on this compliance index, we de-
ne the Constrained Aggregated Assurance in expression 8.2, which improves the original
aggregation in 5.5, making it more meaningful:
CAggk;j =
8<:Aggk;j if ACIk;j = 10 if ACIk;j 6= 1 (8.2)
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Based on this, and assuming that entities have risk matrices for every criterion, the fol-
lowing steps must be followed to derive the minimum assurance requirements that fulll
risk needs and construct the reference vector RV(k;j):
1. consult the local policies to determine the impacts and maximum assumable risk for
each criterion;
2. use the risk matrices to identify the corresponding desired probabilities of incurring
in risk using the impact-maximum risk pairs; and
3. derive the required minimum assurance level for each criterion based on the desired
probabilities
The reference vector, apart from showing the minimum requirements, it also gives a notion
of which criteria are more important. It is rational to assume that if the requirements on
a particular dimension are higher with respect to the other dimensions, then the relative
importance between them is high. Based on this, and following MAUT recommendations
for weighing, we rate each criterion with the minimum required assurance and divide by
the summation of all the elements in the reference vector to get the corresponding weight.
Mathematically, expression 8.3 shows how to obtain the weights:
WV k;j =
RV k;jPn
i RV
k;j(i)
(8.3)
Thus, by deriving the weights as in 8.3 and applying formula 8.2, the metrics at level 4 are
aggregated and the hierarchy is reduced to a 3-level hierarchy. And a nal single value is
obtained after two more iterations. In the following subsection we show how this procedure
is applied to aggregate security criteria at level L3, since this branch of the taxonomy is
more complete and thus suitable to better illustrate the benets of the approach.
8.2.2. Test 2: Aggregation of L3 Metrics
For the Pre-Federation branch depicted in Figure 8.1, there are three criteria that have
sub-criteria at hierarchy level 3 that must be aggregated: security, interoperability and
knowledge. Here we show examples on the aggregation of security sub-criteria. To ag-
gregate security characteristics into a single value that conveys risk information using our
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Figure 8.2: Representation of security assurance dimensions for two example entities
framework, the seven dimensions depicted in Figure 8.1 must be combined. Table 8.4
shows an example of two providers A and B with dierent security characteristics, also
graphically depicted in Figure 8.2. The value for the aggregated Security Assurance (SA)
is shown based on a reference vector associated to the evaluating party. The results that
would be obtained by using the arithmetic mean are also shown to observe the dierences.
SA Subcriteria SV21 Provider A SV
2
1 Provider B RV
2
1 WV
2
1
Condentiality 3/3 1/3 1/3 1/8
Integrity 0 2/3 1/3 1/8
Authentication 0 1/3 1/3 1/8
Non-Repudiation 2/3 3/3 2/3 1/4
Availability 1/3 1/3 0 0
Accountability 3/3 2/3 2/3 1/8
Privacy 3/3 2/3 1/3 1/8
SA = Agg21 0.66666667 0,458333333
SA (%) 66.67% 45.83%
ACI21 0.71428571 1
CAgg21 0 0.458333333
CAgg21 (%) 0% 45.83%
Mean 0.571428571 0.571428571
Table 8.4: Aggregation of security assurance dimensions with minimum requirements con-
straints
Using the arithmetic mean operator, both entities provide the same security assurance,
despite their security proles are very dierent and only B fullls the minimum require-
ments. This is graphically shown in Figure 8.3. As it can be seen, the usage of the weights
allows to better rate the provider whose security criteria values are better according to the
risk policy of the evaluating party. Furthermore, by means of the compliance index, the
. 00 ," 
. '" 
. r,>," 
. NO'<-'" 
.. ,' 
. r,oc 
. '0 
8.2 Risk Model Validation: Aggregation Tests, Examples and Discussion 201
Figure 8.3: Score vectors for security sub-criteria of Provider A and Provider B (left), and
their comparison with respect to a sample reference vector (right)
minimum risk requirements are directly embedded. Thus, the information conveyed by
the aggregated value is twofold: on the one hand, it shows whether the minimum security
risk requirements are satised; and on the other hand, when requirements are satised, it
shows the security assurance level provided.
To give another example, let us assume that the evaluating entity risk policy says that
the impact on an integrity attack is High, and the maximum integrity risk to be assumed
is Low. This leads to a desired Low probability to incur in risks (see Table 8.3) and,
consequently, to require a minimum condentiality assurance equal to High. The rest of
the security dimensions are not so relevant for the provider and no assurance is required as
minimum. Its reference vector is then RV21 =[0 3/3 0 0 0 0 0]. Graphically, it means that
entities whose SV lines do not contain the RV line associated to the evaluating entity,
do not satisfy its risk policies. For example, entities A and B described in the previous
example do not satisfy the risk requirements, and this fact is reected in their nal CAgg
gure, which is 0 for both of them. However, an entity C with SV21= [1/3 3/3 1/3 0 0 0 0],
despite having a simpler security prole, it does satisfy the minimum risk requirements
and so its ACI is equal to 1 and the CAgg is dierent from 0. Figure 8.4 illustrates this
example.
To give a last interesting example, for a reference vector RV21 =[1/3 3/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3], a provider with score vector SV21 =[1 2/3 1 1 1 1 1] would have the same Agg value
than a provider with score vector SV21 =[1/3 3/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3]. However, only the
second provider satises the security requirements. The introduction of the ACI permits
CONF CONF 
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Figure 8.4: Score vectors for security sub-criteria of Providers A, B (left) and C (right)
compared to a sample reference vector
to properly distinguish in this case, and to make a correct decision.
With this test, we can observe three important facts. Firstly, the aggregated values Agg
depend on the reference vector, which allows us to model and include the subjectivity of
the evaluating party. Secondly, the weights modulate the aggregation to better rate those
dimensions that are more important for the evaluator. However, MAUT is a compensatory
decision methodology because alternatives that are decient with respect to one or more
criteria can compensate by their good performance with respect to other criteria. In this
sense, we see the importance of including the minimum requirements to overcome possible
undesired choices as a side eect of this compensatory features of MAUT.
Having shown the aggregation procedure for the security branch, the method for the rest
of the nodes is applied in exactly the same way. To conclude with this section, we give an
example of the whole aggregation to calculate Pre-Federation Assurance.
8.2.3. Example: Assessing Pre-Federation Risk
In this example we will use real data about a federation named RedIRIS-SIR. This feder-
ation, operational since 2008, is composed by 102 IdPs and 200 SPs1 operated by research
and education institutions. Metadata documents and policies for joining the federation are
publicly available at the RedIRIS website2. For the example, we have chosen two providers
from the federation, namely 1) University Carlos III de Madrid as IdP, and 2) Springer
1Data from the federation survey in [TERENA, 2012], date 29February 2012
2http://www.rediris.es/sir/
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online library as SP. Both are already federated after following a manual administrative
process. Here we show how the risk could have been calculated before deciding on feder-
ation based on the available information. Thus, we show how the SP would evaluate the
risk involved in establishing a federation with the IdP.
In order to apply out risk model, we start by summarizing the available information in
the SP and IdP metadata and policies regarding the three dimensions in Pre-Federation.
Based on this, we extract the metric values and construct the SP's reference vector and
the IdP's score vector. Next, aggregation is performed to obtain the nal risk value from
the calculated vectors.
Information Gathering
The information obtained regarding the three dimensions of Pre-Federation is the folowing:
Security and Privacy.
The SP metadata declares support for XMLSignature with RSA signature algorithm
and SHA digest algorithm. Also encryption is supported using the XMLEncryption
standard with AES algorithm and 128 bits key size. The IdP metadata supports also
RSA-SHA for signature, but no support for encryption is declared. However, despite
the above mentioned cryptographic support, both indicate that assertion signing is
not required.
The mentioned data are related to condentiality, integrity and authentication at
message level. Information about the same dimensions at transport level is also found
in RedIRIS policies, where the usage of TLSv1 or SSLv3 with a minimum of 128 bits
key size and RC4 ciphersuite is recommended. Furthermore, the certicates used are
RSA certicates with key size 2048. This aects the above security dimensions and
also aects non-repudiation. With regard to the rest of security dimensions, few or
no explicit information is provided. There are no data about availability. In the case
of accountability it is required that the IdP collects appropriately timestamped logs
containing at least requesting IP, user's NetID and opaque unique ID. Finally, in
regard to privacy, the IdP must accept that the purpose of the federation is research
(non-commercial), implement user consent and informed consent mechanisms (not
a detailed policy for this), and adhere to the stipulations of the currently valid EU
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Directive on Data Protection regarding processing of personal data when releasing
attributes to 3rd countries.
Interoperability.
The SP and IdP metadata indicate support for a set of protocols, nameID formats,
and bindings. Furthermore, a set of attributes that must be supported are detailed
in the policy documents. All the mentioned data are related to technical interoper-
ability. A summary of the main features is provided in Table 8.5.
Tech. Support SP IdP
Protocols \urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" \urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:protocol",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
NameID formats \urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-
format:transient",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-
format:persistent",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-
format:emailAddress",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-
format:unspecied",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-
format:WindowsDomainQualiedName",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-
format:kerberos",
\urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-
format:X509SubjectName",
\urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:nameIdentier"
\urn:mace:shibboleth:1.0:nameIdentier"
Services/Bindings SSO, SLO over HTTP-Redirect,
HTTP-POST and SOAP
SSO, SLO over HTTP-Redirect
Attributes ePTI, ePA, sHO, ePE and sPUC3 ePTI, ePA, sHO, ePE and sPUC
Table 8.5: Suported technical features by the SP run by Springer and the IdP run by
University Carlos III
Knowledge.
In regard to knowledge, the available information declares that the CA that should be
accepted as trusted for federation purpose is the Terena Certicate Service (TCS) 4.
Metrics Derivation
Based on the above data and a set of assumptions we will detail, the frameworks for
the metrics can be rened and the values of these metrics obtained. The values for the
4https://www.terena.org/activities/tcs/
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reference vector of the SP and the score vector of the IdP are shown in Table 8.6 according
to the notation in Appendix B.
Metric Vector Syntax RVIdP SVIdP
CCONF [jj CONFTL jj, jj CONFML jj] [1/3, 0] [1, 0]
CINT [jj INTTL jj, jj INTML jj] [1/3, 0] [2/3, 0]
CAUTH [jj AUTHTL jj, jj AUTHML jj] [1/3, 0] [1/3, 0]
CSA [ CCONF, CINT, CAUTH, jj NON-
REP jj, jj AV jj,jj ACC jj, jjLOP jj]
[1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0, 0, 1/3,1/3] [1, 2/3, 1/3, 0, 0, 1/3, 1/3]
CIA [jj INTEROPT jj,jj INTEROPOjj,jj
INTEROPLjj]
[1/3, 0, 0] [1/3, 0, 0]
CKNOW [jj KNOWDjj,jj KNOWI jj] [1, 0] [1, 0]
PreFedA [CSA, CIA, CKNOW] [1/3, 1/3, 1] [8/15, 1/3, 1]
Table 8.6: Score Vectors for Aggregated Pre-Federation Metrics
For the calculation of the values in Table 8.6, we have considered that:
The minimum ciphersuite required is TLS RSA WITH RC4 128 SHA. However, af-
ter testing the support by the IdP server, we saw that it can provide as highest
strength ciphersuite DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA. According to this and to the rest of
the security information, the values for the security metrics were obtained following
the methodology in Chapter 5.
We assume an Accountability Assurance Framework for the SP that requires as mini-
mum log information: timestamp, requesting IP, user's NetID and opaque unique ID.
Other elements such as time for caching the logged data would be optional elements
in the framework. We assume that the IdP satises the minimum requirements in
LOP and does not provide any additional feature.
We assume a LOP Assurance Framework for the SP that is composed by elements
purpose, user informed consent and privacy directives. The purpose can take the
values \commercial", \non-commercial". The user informed consent can take values
\non required", \at IdP discretion", \uApprove"5. The privacy directives can take the
value \EU Directive on Data Protection". According to the information gathered,
the values \commercial", at \IdP discretion" and \EU Directive on Data Protection"
are the minimum required, while the rest would be optional. We assume that the
IdP satises the minimum requirements in LOP and does not provide any additional
feature.
5uApprove is an implementation of a user consent module for Shibboleth IdPs (http://www.switch.
ch/aai/support/tools/uApprove.html)
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We assume a Technical Interoperability Assurance Framework for the SP composed
by the elements in table 8.5: protocols, nameID formats, services/bindings and at-
tributes. The possible values for each element are those shown in the SP column. In
the case of the protocol element, \urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" is required.
In the case of nameID formats, it is required that at least one of the formats is sup-
ported and the rest are optional (the higher the coverage percentage, the higher the
interoperability value). In the case of services/bindings, we assume that SSO over
HTTP-Redirect is the minimum required.
Furthermore, regarding operational interoperability, no data are available to dene
a framework so we assume that there are no requirements. Also, for the legal inter-
operability, since no other laws apart from the privacy regulations (covered in the
LOP metric) are mentioned, we assume that there are no further legal requirements.
We assume that the entities need to have and have a valid TCS root certicate that is
trusted. So direct knowledge must exist, but no any additional indirect information
is required.
Risk Aggregation
Applying the aggregation model to the values in Table 8.6, the nal Pre-Federation assur-
ance value is 0,773333333 (or an assurance of 77.3%) . It reects that all the minimum
assurances required by the SP in the dierent dimensions of the hierarchy are covered by
the IdP (otherwise the value would be 0). And gives an idea of the provided assurance in
a quantitative scale from 0 to 1.
This example together with the rest of the performed tests prove that our model works ac-
cording to the design goals. But to validate results in the context of risk assessment, apart
from testing that the model is correct in regard to the design requirements, researchers
have proposed other three main approaches [Fenz and Ekelhart, 2011]: 1) using experts,
2) using alternate decision processes, and 3) using statistical evidence. The rst approach,
nominating technology experts, involves asking them to compare the ndings of an ap-
plied approach with the results they would expect based on their intuition. The second
approach consists of running at least one alternate decision process on the exact same
problem. Finally, the statistical evidence approach involves analyzing internal reports and
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incidence related data and test the model against them to see if the risk-based decisions
are correct.
Approaches 2) and 3) are more complicated since usually no other tool for decision making
is available tailored to the scenario under analysis and, in the case of statics, organizations
often refrain from making these data publicly available since the publication of threats
incidence (such as data loss and fraud) may lead to a loss of reputation. This is exactly
the case for FIM, i.e., no other risk-based decision tools exist and threat data are not
publicly available.
The rst approach, though more subjective than the others, is easier to accomplish and will
be our next step in validation. The results so far, i.e., the denition of the taxonomy, the
initial aggregation model the and metrics, were already disseminated in publications [Arias,
2011]6 and [Arias et al., 2012b].
8.3. Trust Model Validation
This section is dedicated to the validation of the trust model proposed in Chapter 6.
More specically, we want to prove the benets of including reputation data in FIM net-
works. This aspect is complex to test in a real world scenario since it is would imply the
deployment of a complex infrastructure with a high number of providers, which is not a
trivial task. Thus, we have opted for a simulation-based validation using OMNeT++ [OM-
NeT++, 2012]7, which is an open source C++ simulation framework widely used in the
scientic community.
This section describes the simulation tests performed with OMNeT++, showing relevant
aspects of the system behavior. The results obtained have been analyzed in order to
validate the feasibility of the proposed framework. Finally, we summarize the results and
give recommendations on how to implement the protocol depending on the features of the
underlying FIM network.
6This work received the Best PhD Forum Contribution Award at PERCOM conference 2011
(http://www.percom.org/2011/)
7The OMNeT++ model for testing the reputation protocol over FIM networks was developed during a
research stay at NEC Laboratories Europe in Heidelberg
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8.3.1. Goals and Metrics
As an initial goal, we wanted to set up experiments for the reputation protocol in order
to nd a balance between a good accuracy and a good overhead. To this end, we made
several studies to investigate the scalability of the solution and the impact of introducing
dierent fractions of malicious nodes in the network. For future work our goal is also to
learn how other parameters (such as thresholds, trust formulas, contexts, etc.) should be
optimally tuned.
We consider the following metrics in order to analyze and evaluate the IdMRep protocol:
The message overhead. We look at the overhead caused by the extra messages
issued when using the reputation protocol. The message overhead for a node i (MOi)
in a FIM network is calculated as shown in equation 8.4:
MOi =
RepRequesti +RepRespi
IntendedTransactionsi
(8.4)
where RepRequesti and RepRespi refer to the number of ReputationRequest and
ReputationResponse messages sent by node i, and IntendedTransactionsi is the
number of transactions initiated by the node. We use this metric to determine
how much extra overhead IdMRep adds regarding to the regular overhead in a FIM
network, i.e., the cost of introducing a new protocol.
The accuracy (or success rate), which reects the percentage of successful transac-
tions. We calculate the success rate for a node i (SRi) as the number of interactions
with good entities plus the avoided interactions with malicious entities over the total
number of transactions performed by the node, as shown in equation 8.5:
SRi =
TransGoodi +AvoidedTransMali
TotalTransactionsi
(8.5)
where TransGoodi is the number of transactions accepted by node i coming from a
good entity; AvoidedTransMali is the number transactions rejected by node i and
coming from malicious entities; and TotalTransactionsi is the total number of trans-
actions in which node i can participate during the running of a simulation (i.e., for
a SP, the number of ReputationRequest messages sent; and for an IdP, the number
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of ReputationRequest messages received). We use this metric in order to reect
the number of correct decisions made, i.e., how accurate the protocol is.
8.3.2. Simulation Setup
For the performance analysis of the reputation protocol, the metrics dened in Section 8.3.1
have been measured in various scenarios. First of all, we dierentiate between two kinds
of FIM networks:
A) networks where there are relationships only between SPs and IdPs; and
B) networks with SP-IdP and IdP-IdP relationships. Both types of network graphs
are represented in Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6, respectively.
A relationship between providers means that they can transact with each other following
a federation protocol. We chose these two network cases because, according to FIM proto-
cols, there can be relationships only between IdPs and SPs (IdPs send user information to
SPs in order for the users to gain access to services), but also there can exist relationships
between two IdPs (e.g., an IdP may delegate some identity tasks to another IdP). As we
will see later, the simulation results show that network type B improves the connectivity
and so the obtained accuracy is better.
Figure 8.5: FIM network of type A with 25 SPs and 5 IdPs.
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Figure 8.6: FIM network of type B with 25 SPs and 5 IdPs.
Besides, Table 8.7 compiles all the possible parameters that can be congured regarding
network model, trust and reputation model, entity behavior model, IdMRep forwarding
model and regarding the simulation itself. In order to simplify the experiments we use the
formulas 6.1 and 6.2 presented in Chapter 6 for trust and reputation aggregation assuming
that:
TAuth is always equal to 1. We assume authentication is always correct and evaluate
only the behavioral part.
The evolution function fevol is a lineal aggregation function in the form shown in
equation 8.6:
fevol(i) =   trustworthiness(i) + (1  )  sat(i)) (8.6)
Where  is an adjustable parameter used for tuning the importance of recent and
older transactions. The same evolution function is used to compute the reputation
using as input the set of received votes.
The congurable parameters regarding trust and reputation shown in Table 8.7 are related
to the mentioned formulas, but any other evolution formula could be used. Furthermore,
we consider for this set of initial experiments that only SPs can act maliciously, since this
8.3 Trust Model Validation 211
is the most probable scenario .
FIM Network Model
#IdPS Number of Identity Providers
#SPs Number of Service Providers
ConnectivitySI Connectivity Degree between SPs and IdPs, den-
ing the preexisting relationships
ConnectivityII Connectivity Degree between IdPs and IdPs, it
dening the preexisting relationships
Network Type Connections between SPs-IdPs (A) or Connections
between SPs-IdPs and IdPs-IdPs (B)
Trust and Reputation Model
d Trust disposition, i.e., initial default trust value as-
signed to an entity when no reputation data about
it are available
 Parameter in the trust model to adjust the impor-
tance of new transactions and old transactions
MALTHRESHOLD Trust threshold for decision making (i.e., if lo-
cal trust for entity i is greater or equal than
MALTHRESHOLD, then a transaction can be ini-
tiated/accepted)
Entity Behavior Model MalRate Fraction of malicious entities in the Network
IdMRep Forwarding Model
TTL Time To Live for reputation Requests
N Number of Nodes in the DTL to forward reputa-
tion requests
Simulation #repetitions Number of repetitions per experiment
Table 8.7: Congurable Parameters
The operation for each simulation running implies that nodes randomly chose another
node in the network to transact with and, according to the logic explained in Chapter 6,
the IdMRep protocol is executed if there is no entry in the DTL for the chosen node.
After gathering reputation opinions, the initial node makes a decision whether to transact
or not. This behavior is constantly repeated through the duration of the experiment.
The simulation time is chosen to be long enough to potentially cover a huge number of
interactions.
We also introduce dierent fractions of malicious entities in the system in order to analyze
the impact on the success rate. Each experiment is repeated 5 times with varying random
seeds. The seed inuences the order in the sequence of initiated transactions. Whenever
the condence intervals are shown in the plots, the condence level of these intervals is
95%. To summarize, Tables 8.8 and 8.9 show the list of xed parameters and the list
of variable parameters chosen for the congurations used in the performed experiments,
respectively.
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Parameter Value
SPs 25
ConnectivitySI 0.2
ConnectivityII 0.075
MALTHRESHOLD 0.5
 0.5
N Size of DTL
#repetitions 5
Table 8.8: Fixed parameters used in the simulations.
Parameter Value
#IdPs 5, 10, 15, 20, 25
Network Type A,B
d 0.5, 0
MalRate 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5
TTL 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Table 8.9: Congurable parameters used in the simulations.
Basically, we look at the overhead and accuracy under dierent choices of TTL and con-
sidering the impact of the fraction of malicious nodes (MalRate) and of the number of
IdPs (#IdPs) in the network. We do that for the two types of network graphs and also
using two possible values for the initial trust (d) to be placed in unknown entities.
8.3.3. Simulation Results
Initial Results under \Nice" Conditions
Before performing the set of experiments described in the previous section, we rst an-
alyze the protocol and take measurements supposing \nice" conditions in the simulated
environment, that is, without adding malicious nodes.
For this analysis we decide to choose the parameters in Table 8.10. The main goal is to
observe the behavior of the protocol when varying the TTL in terms of overhead and per-
centage of successful transactions. In this case we use refer to the accuracy metric as the
\transaction rate" because when there are no malicious entities, all the completed trans-
actions will be successful. Thus, the transaction rate reects the percentage of completed
transactions over the total of intended ones.
We performed two opposed experiments: (a) with entities willing to cooperate even if no
reputation data are found about other unknown providers (i.e., d = 0.5); and (b) with
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Parameter Value
#SPs 25
#IdPs 5
#Network Type B
ConnectivitySI 0.2
ConnectivityII 0.075
MALTHRESHOLD 0.5
d 0.5, 1
 0.5
N Size of DTL
Malrate 0
#repetitions 5
Table 8.10: Fixed parameters used for the simulations supposing nice conditions.
entities that only transact with other unknown entities if reputation data are available (i.e.,
d= 0). The aim of these experiments is to show the benets of IdMRep with respect to the
current FIM frameworks. Thus, we previously identied that there are two FIM models
nowadays: the \accept-all-comers" model, which means that entities always trust every
other unknown entity; and the rigid trust model, which means that no other entity will
be considered trusted, except those that have been manually pre-congured . Hence, with
experiment (a) we test the benets and disadvantages of applying IdMRep to the \accept-
all-comers"model. Similarly, with experiment (b) we test the benets and disadvantages
of introducing the reputation protocol in a rigid FIM model.
The results for experiment (a) are shown by the graphs in Figures 8.7 and 8.8. The
average transaction rate is 100% since entities always trust. Thus, in a nice environment
may seem useless to introduce reputation, but the results in the next section will show the
benets of the approach when there are malicious entities in the system. Also, in a \nice"
environment, dierent good reputation values may help to decide on giving or denying
dierent kinds of transactions. From the point of view of the overhead, we can see that
this is not high: once the entities are recognized as trustworthy and inserted in the DTLs,
the overhead remains low.
On the other hand, the results for experiment (b) are shown by the graphs in Figures 8.9
and 8.10. The average transaction rate in this case is not 100%, since now entities do not
trust other entities if there is no reputation available. Instead, the transaction rate value
is around 60% for all TTL cases, which drastically improves the case of using a rigid trust
model where the percentage of transactions with unknown entities is 0%. As a negative
counterpart, the average overhead for SPs is a bit higher than the obtained in the case
of using a trust disposition factor = 0.5. It is to note that in any case, the overhead is
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(a) Average overhead for SPs (b) Average Overhead for the IdPs
Figure 8.7: Average overhead for SPs(a), and for IdPs(b) when varying the TTL param-
eter, d = 0.5
Figure 8.8: Average transaction rate when varying the TTL parameter, d = 0.5
reasonably low to positively consider the introduction of the protocol in FIM networks.
Furthermore, the TTL value does not inuence signicantly the overhead. This behavior
will be also observed later in the rest of the experiments.
To conclude, in case (a) the transaction rate is the same as if we do not apply the protocol
but the reputation will help to identify malicious entities, as we will see in the experiments,
and also to provide entities with dierent granularity levels regarding the trustworthiness
that can be placed in another entity. It can help in allowing/denying transactions depend-
ing on the trustworthiness levels.
Hence, the proposed protocol allows us to achieve a tradeo between the\trust-all-comers"
and the rigid trust model, imposing a reasonably good overhead. After analyzing and
proving the usefulness of the proposed framework under \nice" conditions, we present a
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(a) Average Overhead for the SPs (b) Average Overhead for the IdPs
Figure 8.9: Average overhead for SPs(a), and for IdPs(b) when varying the TTL param-
eter, d = 1
Figure 8.10: Average transaction rate when varying the TTL parameter, d = 1
set of tests designed to study the inuence of malicious nodes in the system.
Results under Impact of Malicious Entities
Aim to study the impact of certain parameter variations, namely the TTL value, the
percentage of malicious entities, the number of IdPs and the type of network.
In Figures 8.11 and 8.12 we show the accuracy obtained in a network of type A, where
the d value assigned to unknown entities is 0.5. The number of IdPs is increased from
an initial value of 5 to a nal value of 20 according to Table 3. Besides, the results are
presented for TTL values between 1 and 6, and percentage of malicious nodes ranging
from 0% to 50%.
Having 5 IdPs, the obtained accuracy is always over 99% and it decreases with the percent-
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(a) Accuracy for increasing percentage of malicious nodes varying the TTL, Network type
A, d=0.5, #IdPS=5
(b) Accuracy for increasing percentage of malicious nodes varying the TTL, Network type
A, d=0.5, #IdPS=10
Figure 8.11: Accuracy measured in Network type A with parameter d = 0.5 varying TTL,
MalRate and #IdPs= 5,10
age of malicious entities. As it can be observed, increasing the TTL value does not have a
signicant impact on the accuracy. The same tendency regarding malicious behavior and
TTL variations is observed in the rest of the graphs for networks with 10, 15 and 20 IdPs.
On the other hand, the accuracy gets lower when the number of IdPs increases: around
98% for 10 IdPS, 97.5% for 15 IdPs and 97% when the number of IdPs reaches 20.
In the following, we do not show the graphs for the rest of the simulation cases but discuss
O" SS 
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(a) Accuracy for increasing percentage of malicious nodes varying the TTL, Network type
A, d=0.5, #IdPS=15
(b) Accuracy for increasing percentage of malicious nodes varying the TTL, Network type
A, d=0.5, #IdPS=20
Figure 8.12: Accuracy measured in Network type A with parameter d = 0.5 varying TTL,
MalRate and #IdPs=15,20
the obtained results instead. Thus, the next test consisted of applying the same congura-
tion of simulation parameters as in Figure 7, but using a d value equal to 0, i.e., providers
will not cooperate with unknown entities. The results obtained in this set of experiments
are very similar to the ones obtained when using d = 0.5: the accuracy tendencies regard-
ing TTL variation, increasing percentage of malicious nodes and increasing number of IdPs
are the same. The main dierence is that in this case we have a slightly more accurate
218 CHAPTER 8. VALIDATION
system, but with the negative counterpart that the number of transactions is reduced (as
shown in Figure 8.10 for the \nice" environment). On the other hand, we saw that there
is no dierence in the overhead regarding the percentage of malicious entities. From the
outcomes, we have also observed that the overhead is always lower for IdPs than for SPs.
However, as the number of IdPs increases, the average overhead for SPs decreases and so
both overheads tend to be similar.
The overhead increases with the TTL but not signicantly. Selecting a TTL equal to 1
in networks of type A means that entities will never get reputation data, so there is no
sense in choosing this value. In the case of networks of type B, entities can get reputation
data in one hop and the overhead is dramatically lower. However, selecting a greater TTL
increases the chances of cooperation and better knowledge of the network.
The dierence between a network with nodes tending to trust versus a network with
conservative nodes (i.e., using d equal to 0.5 or 0, respectively) is that the overhead for
the latter case increases. This is due to the fact that many times IdMRep messages are
sent but the interaction is nally not completed because no reputation data is obtained.
The behavior in terms of accuracy and overhead regarding the variable parameters is
very similar in both network types. We decided to choose a connectivity degree of 0.075
between IdPs because this degree is usually lower than the connectivity between SPs and
IdPs. Thus, although the results show little changes in networks of type A and B, more
experiments with dierent degrees of connectivity are required for a denitive conclusion.
As future work, we plan to make more experiments to better analyze the impact of applying
the protocol in dierent types of networks.
Besides, the obtained accuracy is very high in any case. But it is to consider that these
results are conditioned to a static behavior of malicious nodes: once the entities are rec-
ognized as trustworthy and inserted in the DTLs, the overhead remains low. On the other
hand, using a d value equal to 0.5 increases the number of transactions and improves
cooperation with unknown entities, still maintaining a good accuracy.
In general, it was expected that increasing TTLs lead to increasing accuracy and overhead.
However, the variation of the results with this parameter is small. In fact, the overhead
value depends more on the disposition of the entities to trust. For example, if entities are
not willing to trust unknown entities (d = 0), the knowledge of the network is based only on
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the pre-existing relationships, so the procedure is slower and more ReputationRequests
are sent that do not lead to a transaction. So, regarding TTL selection, we conclude that
any value greater than 1 provides similar results in accuracy and overhead, and this is due
to the special connectivity features of FIM networks. The recommendation is to chose high
values for the TTL because the overhead does not increase signicantly and they lead to
a better knowledge of the network and higher number of transactions. To conclude with
the discussion, the overhead imposed by the protocol is assumable and makes the solution
feasible. Furthermore, the obtained accuracy is very good (over 94% in the worst case),
since once the system learns, the transactions always succeed.
However we should analyze scenarios where the malicious pattern is not static and study its
impact on the accuracy. It would be also useful to have real data about FIM deployments
in order to better set the parameters of the simulations so they can reect real world
congurations, but there is not available public data in this regard.
Summarizing, we presented a set of initial experiments that constitutes a foundation to
continue building and improving dynamic cooperation in FIM as described in this this
thesis. Thus, our further research lines in this regard, which will be furtherly explained
in Chapter 9, aim to cover more complex scenarios in order to enhance and adapt the
reputation protocol.
8.4. Architecture Validation
According to [Ambler and Lines, 2012], the best way to validate an architecture model is
through implementation. The questions to be answered in this phase are:
1. Does the architecture work?
2. Is the approach feasible?
With the aim to answer the above questions, we have developed an architectural proto-
type that partially implements selected modules of the whole architecture proposed in
Chapter 4.
220 CHAPTER 8. VALIDATION
8.4.1. Conceptual Description: Dynamic SSO Using Reputation Data:
a Proof-of-concept
As a rst approach we have developed a proof-of-concept application to show the viability
of our dynamic federation architecture proposal. For this purpose, we work with the
simplest SAML-based SSO scenario: a user, an IdP and a SP. The providers are unknown
to each other, i.e., no formal contracts or trust pre-conguration exists. In this situation,
current providers either avoid interaction (rigid trust) or interact by default (trust-all-
comers).
In the specic case of the identity management infrastructure used for the experiments,
the user must introduce the URI where the metadata document of her IdP is located. This
must be done when the providers are unknown. After that, metadata are stored and all
the certicates contained in it are considered trustworthy for validating subsequent SAML
messages. The main limitation regarding trust issues is that no trust model is dened
since the SP will interact with any provider introduced by the user.
Thus, to enable dynamic and secure interaction we have added the new trust logic that
modies the usual operation diagram. It has been done through the implementation of
reduced versions of all the designed architecture modules, except from the Risk Manager.
The original work-ow and the modied one are depicted in Figure 8.13. As it can be
seen, the explained proof-of-concept application serves to prove that the core ideas of our
proposal are workable. In the following, we will explain the implementation details.
8.4.2. Implementation
In order to evaluate our proposal, we have deployed our own identity management infras-
tructure (see Figure 8.14). For the IdP, we are using Authentic [Authentic, 2007], which
is a Liberty-enabled identity provider based on the lasso library [lasso, 2010] that also
supports SAML 2.0 specications. Authentic is a Quixote application, which is a frame-
work for developing web applications in Python. We have also integrated Authentic with
OpenLDAP [OpenLDAP, 2013] to manage users' accounts. The required digital certicates
were generated by means of a certication authority deployed using the OpenCA [OpenCA
Research Labs, 2013] software. For deploying SPs we have chosen ZXID [SymLabs, 2012],
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Figure 8.13: a) Original work-ow followed by the SP used in the evaluation; and b)
modied work-ow after our extension is implemented in the SP.
a light open C library that implements the full SAML 2.0 stack. Both IdP and SP se-
lected implementations are open source and use OpenSSL [OpenSSL, 2013] as underlying
cryptographic library and Apache2 [Apache, 2012] as the web server.
Based on the described infrastructure we have introduced the modications to implement
the proposed architecture. For this purpose, we have developed the Trust Manager com-
ponent, including the functionality to ask for reputation data. We have implemented the
ReputationRequester and the ReputationResponder functions, which are software pro-
cesses that can be added to SAML entities. As the names suggest, the requester is in
charge of asking for reputation data regarding a provider and the responder is the respon-
sible of answering to reputation requests. Both the format of the Reputation Assertions
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Figure 8.14: Implemented proof-of-concept
and the exchange protocol, follow the description provided in Chapter 6. The concept of
DTL has been also implemented as a hash structure containing the known entities and
the associated trust information. For the specic use-case we tested, despite the central
scenario is SP-IdP-User, we introduce another service provider (SPaux) that has a relation-
ship with the IdP and thus possesses information about its reputation. The relationships
stored on the DTL of each provider are shown in Table 8.11
DTL Known Providers
DTL(SP) SPaux
DTL(SPaux) SP, IdP
DTL(IdP) SPaux
Table 8.11: Information contained in the DTLs of the providers involved in the implemen-
tation test
So, the SP has been modied to use the new trust functionality in the decision-making
process in order to dynamically determine whether to cooperate or not. Then, we tested
how changing the reputation value associated to the IdP in the DTL accessed by the
ReputationResponder function in SPaux, or adjusting the threshold reputation value in
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the SP, the provider makes dierent decisions to cooperate, always in a dynamic fashion.
Communication was tested over dierent protocol bindings, such as HTTP-Redirect or
POST.
It is to mention that the application also simulates the IdP and metadata discovery pro-
cesses depicted in diagram of Figure 8.13. We use a function to derive the IdP name
from the user email, but any other discovery service or application could be used since
the SAML specication sets themselves are neutral with respect to any particular IdP
discovery mechanism. A screenshot of the user interface is shown in Figure 8.15.
Figure 8.15: User interface of the proof-of-concept implementation
8.4.3. Further Validation and Lessons Learned
Both the proof-of-concept prototype, as well as the architectural design and research ideas
on which the prototype is based, were contributed to the national R&D project \Espa~na
Virtual"8. Espa~na Virtual is a CENIT9 project funded by CDTI (Centre for the Develop-
ment of Industrial Technology), Spanish Government.
The main goal of the project, that lasted between 2008 and 2012, was to establish a bridge
between geography and the Internet through the denition of an architecture, protocols
and standards of Internet geography, with a special focus on processing data, 3D visu-
8http://www.espa~navirtual.org/
9The National Strategic Consortia for Technical Research (CENIT) programme is promoted by the
Spanish Government, within the context of its programme to foster long-term public-private cooperation
in the eld of R&D, with the objective of promoting and developing industrial research
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alization, virtual worlds and interaction between users. An specic working package for
\Security and Identity Management", where our ideas were developed [Espa~na Virtual,
2010a], was included to give a exible and secure support to the envisioned rich ecosystem
of services.
In addition, the part of the architecture including reputation, together with the simulation
results presented in Section 8.3, were contributed in deliverables of an internal business
project centered in IdM at NEC Laboratories Europe.
Once we tested the architecture depicted in 8.14, we dened and developed new use-cases
to be integrated in the scenarios of the project. More specically, besides the SPs and IdPs
located in the domain of University Carlos III and in one of the participant companies,
we oered the possibility of introducing external third parties (e.g., Facebook, Twitter)
as IdPs. We successfully tested the dynamic federation with these 3rd parties, and the
subsequent delegation of user authentication to them.
Furthermore, not only a browser-based used interface was implemented (Figure 8.15), but
also a mobile client in Android was developed to access the SPs and IdPs. The client,
compliant to the SAML ECP prole allows the user to better control the exchange of his
identity information.
More details on the code, structures used, modication points, interfaces, congura-
tion, threat analysis and so on can be found in the project deliverables [Espa~na Virtual,
2010a] [Espa~na Virtual, 2010b].
On the other hand, apart from the validation in the context of the above mentioned project,
another type of validation was made through the design, implementation and publication
of derived use-cases and architectures based on the ideas presented here. Initially, the
architecture and main related concepts were outlined in [Cabarcos, 2009], [Arias et al.,
2009] and [Almenarez et al., 2009]. Furthermore, the new applications and proposals that
reuse the trust modules presented in this thesis are the following:
In the context of smart and mobile television, we proposed FamTV10 [Arias
et al., 2011a] and FedTV [Almenarez et al., 2011]. FamTV is an architecture centered
on providing presence-aware personalized TV. But it includes a security layer where
10This work received the Chester W. Sall Award for the 2nd place best paper in the IEEE Transactions
2011 (http://www.icce.org/index.php/awards2013)
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the trust-based federation will be used to dynamically cope with the huge ecosystem
of services and applications that can be accessed from the TV. In turn, FedTV
presents an architecture for an enhanced SAML-based mobile client that supports the
establishment of dynamic federations to allow cooperation in mobile DTV scenarios
(content sharing, service delegation, etc.)
In the context of Cloud Computing, we combined the dynamic federation archi-
tecture layers with privacy improvements [Sanchez et al., 2012] to dene a federated
identity management solution for cooperation, on-demand resources provisioning
and delegation in cloud-based scenarios. Furthermore, we designed and prototyped
SuSSo [Arias et al., 2012c], an architecture for moving sessions across devices guar-
anteeing cloud service continuity. The aim with this architecture is to provide users
with a mechanism to seamlessly move sessions of services that are given by cloud-
based providers (e.g., video or audio streaming). Both proposals build on the dy-
namic federation architecture presented in this thesis.
During the implementation and the process of new applications development that make use
of the architecture modules, we faced dierent problems and came to interesting conclu-
sions. The main lessons learned through this phase, as well as the remarkable conclusions
and limitations found can be summarized in:
The integration between SP and IdP implementations, even if supporting the same
set of IdM specications, is not an easy task. This fact conrms that the introduction
of automation features is important.
The designed trust logic is easy to integrate with current open source identity fed-
eration toolkits. In our tests, for the sake of simplicity, we directly modied the
source code of the used toolkits (Authentic and Zxid) in order to include the new
functionality. However, the programming of the proposed modules as external APIs
to be used from every SP/IdP implementation would be more appropriate and thus
is proposed as a future working line derived from this thesis.
The implemented prototype proves that the core principles of the architecture are
workable. Thus, the reputation protocol is realizable and can be included in SAML-
based frameworks, and the static operation ow of providers can be modied to
provide exibility in the decisions. In the implementation, tests were focused in
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the generation, sending, parsing and usage of reputation messages over SAML, thus
using a TTL parameter equal to 1. Further validation is performed by means of
simulation in section 8.3.
In conclusion , we covered the validation of the architecture proposed in this thesis through
the described implementation. As a future step, it would be interesting to test the ar-
chitecture in a real world FIM environment to validate not only if the architecture is
feasible, well-designed and meets the specied requirements, but also if it is useful in real
life scenarios (speed, correct decision-making, etc.).
8.5. Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented the work carried out to validate the ideas presented in
this dissertation. Validation has been performed through the implementation and testing
of prototypes, simulation experiments, behavioral testing of theoretical models, as well as
through the dissemination and publication in journals and conference, as well as through
contribution to R&D projects.
After all these steps we conclude that the ideas in this thesis are feasible, but also that:
The architecture can be further tested through its deployment in real world scenarios.
Validating risk assessment approaches, as pointed out in [Fenz and Ekelhart, 2011], is
a complex task. In general, successfully implementing a risk assessment mechanism
depends on trust in the gained results. Relying on an incorrect model will result in
incorrect data and security decisions. Here we have proved the correctness of our
model, but also propose extended validation as future work.
In the validation of the reputation-based trust model it is required an ecosystem with
a high number of services, which forced us to rely on simulations. In this regard,
there is a lack of public information on how FIM networks are interconnected, which
would have been useful in modeling.
Chapter9
Conclusions and future lines
The best way to predict the future is to
invent it.
Alan Kay, 1971
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9.1. Main Contributions
9.1.1. Technical Contributions
The main technical contributions of this thesis towards the fullling of the goals presented
in the introductory chapter in order to achieve dynamic federation are detailed below:
1. Study of FIM specications and gap analysis.
Federated Identity Management (or FIM) recently emerged as a new concept for
handling online identity. The main idea behind it is to enable the portability of
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identity information across otherwise autonomous security domains, allowing the
linkage of a person's electronic identity data stored across multiple distinct identity
management systems. Based on these premises, FIM enables use-cases such as the
widely known SSO, that allows users to authenticate at one site and gain access to
multiple services in other domains; but also more rich and complex use-cases, such
as attribute sharing, cross-domain user account provisioning, linking of accounts of
the same user at dierent providers, etc.
Due to the importance of the FIM paradigm, the industry and research community
have produced a number of standards and specications representing the funda-
mental building blocks to accomplish identity federation. However, FIM is still a
very new technology (only around a decade old) and so a number of gaps and chal-
lenges remain open and need to be lled and solved in order to achieve maturity
and wide-scale deployment. In order to identify these gaps, chapter 2 reviewed the
state-of-the-art on FIM technologies. This summary is the basis for the gap analysis
in Chapter 3, where the main research challenges are described. More specically,
there are important issues with regard to trust, security, privacy, interoperability,
assurance, liability and discovery (see details in Chapter 3).
In this dissertation, we center on the trust problem. Trust is a fundamental issue
to address scalability. Moreover, the exibility of every federation framework is tied
to the underlying trust model, often poorly dened or even out of the specications
scope. Currently, there are two common approaches in FIM: the \accept-all-comers"
model, which means that entities always trust every other unknown entity to share
identity data; and the rigid trust model, which means that no other entity will be
considered trusted, apart from those with pre-congured relationships. In the rst
case the are obvious security implications, whereas the second case provides security
by sacricing exibility.
Since there is not a way to establish a trust relationship in a dynamic and secure
fashion, we decided to tackle this problem and dene new enhanced techniques to
achieve ad-hoc dynamic federation. The proposal is based on the introduction of
a risk management model and the exibilization of trust management by including
reputation data. The combination of both aspects allows the moving from binary
decision-making based on digital certicate lists, towards a more granular model.
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2. Study of trust aspects in FIM.
In order to acquire the necessary background to design the dynamic trust model,
we started by studying how trust aspects are taken into account in FIM nowadays.
Hence, Chapter 2, provides an overview of trust and reputation models; and summa-
rizes related work being carried out by individual researchers, international research
projects and organizations involved in standardization. Then, after this objective re-
view, Chapter 3 summarizes the main points of the related work and how it compares
to our proposal.
According to the literature, the inclusion reputation has proven to be useful to
enhance security and facilitate interaction among strangers in distributed networks.
But in the particular context of FIM, a few proposals exist, being all of them reliant
on maintaining centralized information, but not completely distributed.
3. Study of risk aspects in FIM.
In the state-of-the-art revision in Chapter 2, we have also summarized the related
work in regard to risk. As documented in the mentioned chapter, a number of formal
methodologies have been developed in the IT eld. However, in the specic FIM
context, there are no dened methods for risk assessment. The only frameworks that
provide guidance in this sense are those based on level of authentication assurance
(or LoAs). The LoA refers to the degree of condence in identifying an entity to
whom a credential was issued, and the degree of condence that the entity using the
credential is indeed the entity that the credential was issued to. And this concept
is used in this way: the higher the risk, the higher the required LoA that must
be implemented to allow the transaction. Nevertheless, no complete model exists
that considers all the aspects (apart from LoAs) that inuence the risk in a FIM
transaction. Also, mathematical means to aggregate risk components and provide a
nal representative value that could be used in decision-making is missing and highly
desirable for automation.
Furthermore, works that integrate both trust and risk data into a model for trust
relationship establishment are scarce in IT, and nonexistent in FIM.
Consequently, the main appeal and contribution of this thesis is the design of an
architecture that includes and combines trust and risk to achieve dynamic federation
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establishment, as well as the denition of the mathematical models for reputation-
based trust calculation, risk calculation and its aggregation.
4. Design of an extended architecture for dynamic federation.
Once the gaps were identied and the problem of dynamic federation properly de-
ned, Chapter 4 contributes with the design of the required architecture to fulll
our goals. It is clear that current FIM architectures are limited to provided secure
and dynamic means to establish relationships between providers. Thus, based on the
general architectural model that is common to FIM systems, we introduce our ex-
tensions to extend its functionality. The architecture is composed of a set of logical
modules that separate and encapsulate the functionalities required to achieve dy-
namic federation. The pillars of the architecture are the risk and trust components,
which constitute the main contribution of the thesis. The mathematical models
implemented by each part are later developed in the subsequent chapters.
In conclusion, the extension of the architecture satises the intended goals, since it
makes possible to minimize pre-conguration requirements by allowing relationships
to be established on demand based on trust and risk analysis. In order to validate
the feasibility of the architecture, we have developed a proof-of-concept application,
which is presented in Chapter 8.
5. Formalization of a computational trust model based on reputation.
Having a formal model to compute and represent trust as a number provides a basis
for easy implementation and automation. With this premise as a foundation, we
developed the trust model that is implemented by the Trust Manager component
of the architecture for dynamic federation proposed in Chapter 6. It captures the
features of current FIM systems and introduces new dimensions to add exibility
and richness. The model includes the denition of a trustworthiness metric, detail-
ing the evidences used, and how they are combined to obtain a quantitative value.
Basically, authentication information is merged with behavior data, i.e., reputation
or history of interactions. With this, we move from the currently used binary-based
decision model into a model that allows more granularity. Trust is computed as a
continuous numeric value and continually adjusted taking into account the behavior
of the entities. An important part of the model is the inclusion of reputation data,
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which is a new research line in FIM that opens the door for further investigation. In
order to include reputation data in the model we contributed with:
the denition of a generic protocol to exchange reputation information between
FIM entities,
the denition of the SAML syntax for the reputation protocol messages, and
the implementation of a prototype and a set of simulation experiments (see
Chapter 8) to test the feasibility and benets of including reputation
Furthermore, our proposal aims to combine trust with risk assessment in order to
get a better informed decision-making procedure, which leads to the following con-
tribution and the most important and novel of the thesis.
6. Formalization of a risk assessment model.
The proposed risk model that is to be included by participants in federated identity
management scenarios is described in Chapter 5. The general goal of the model is to
provide a meaningful numerical value that condensates risk information, allows enti-
ties to include subjective preferences according to their interests, and aids entities in
decision-making. Since a pure quantitative analysis is not possible due to the lack of
available statistical data to build the model, we follow a semi-quantitative approach.
Qualitative scales are thus required, but instead of staying purely qualitative, the
mapping of these scales to quantitative values permits the automation needed for
dynamic federation.
The methodology employed to dene the risk model consists of three steps. Firstly,
we design a taxonomy to capture the dierent aspects of a relationship in identity
federation that may contribute to risk. This approach allows us to decompose the
complex problem of risk assessment and to acquire a detailed knowledge. Secondly,
based on the taxonomy and aiming at developing a computational model, we propose
a set of metrics as a basis to quantify risk. More specically, metrics are identied
in regard to security (cryptographic algorithms and protocols in place, authentica-
tion assurance mechanisms, etc), interoperability (of legal, technical and operational
policies), knowledge (related to the information known about a collaborator), history
of interactions and service specic metrics. Finally, we describe how to aggregate
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the metrics into a meaningful risk gure, coming to the nal formal denition of the
model. To develop this part it was required to study multicriteria decision problems
and applicable aggregation methods. After the analysis, we decide to use the Mul-
tiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT) model, which has been applied and adapted to
dene the risk aggregation procedure.
7. Mechanism for decision making based on trust and risk values.
Once the models to obtain trust and risk values are dened, the next contribution
(developed in Chapter 7) is the denition of a mechanism to aggregate both values
and output a decision whether to continue with a transaction or not.
In the traditional FIM model entities were added and removed as entries in trust
lists only as a result of explicit administrative action, reecting changes to agree-
ments with direct partners. The aim here is that these operations are performed
automatically.
The decision mechanism combines the trust and risk values associated to a transac-
tion, and generates a nal value that represents the decision. It is based on a fuzzy
aggregation system, that is parametrizable, exible, allows to model complexities in
the trust-risk relationship and captures the subjectivity of entities.
8. Study of multicriteria decision problems
During the denition of the computational trust and risk models we faced the prob-
lem of how to combine criteria of dierent nature, measured on dierent scales into
a meaningful value that can be used in decision making. This problem is known as
multicriteria decision making or MCDM.
There are two main approaches of MCDM, namely 1) the MAUT approach; and
2) the preference modeling approach, whose maximum representative method is the
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) [Saaty, 1990]. In MAUT, an absolute score is
given to each alternative with respect to each criterion, and the global score, tak-
ing into account all the criteria, is obtained by aggregating all the partial scores.
By contrast, in preference modeling, a preference degree is assigned to every or-
dered pair of alternatives, with respect to each criterion. Then, a global preference
degree is obtained by aggregating all the partial preference degrees. Similarly, an-
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other interesting approach comparable to preference modeling is the usage of MDS
techniques [Borg and Groenen, 2005], which allow to rank entities based on the
calculation of their similarities or dissimilarities regarding dierent dimensions. In
fact, MDS-based approaches have proven to be useful in security-related problems,
such as the selection of the most appropriate peer to interact with based on a set of
criteria (cost, distance, security) [Daz Sanchez, 2008] [Daz et al., 2006].
Like MAUT, AHP is a compensatory optimization approach. However, AHP uses a
quantitative comparison method that is based on pair-wise comparisons of decision
criteria, rather than utility and weighting functions. All individual criteria must be
paired against all others and the results compiled in matrix form, implying complex
calculations of Eigen values and Eigen vectors [Aldrich, 2006]. Apart from com-
plexity, the AHP approach always requires a minimum of two alternatives, and the
semantics of the values are relative degrees of preference. In our case we needed a
method that allows to give absolute scores, since dierent two type of decisions are
to be made: deciding among several providers, but also deciding whether a provider
is suitable to transact or not. In this later case, there are no alternatives, so AHP
would not be applicable. The same issue arises with the usage of MDS techniques.
For these reasons, we have chosen MAUT as the approach to combine the dierent
dimensions of risk, as well as to combine trustworthiness and risk into the nal value
for decision-making.
9. Study of Fuzzy-based aggregation in MCDM.
Another aspect of modeling MCDM problems is the aggregation of criteria. There
are several mathematical functions that can be applied to obtain a nal value and the
selection of these functions must be carefully performed depending on the features
of the problem. The weighted linear aggregation is the simplest and more commonly
used method, but its applicability is limited to cases where criteria are independent.
However, for interacting criteria, more complex functions are required. Based on
these arguments, we have used linear aggregation to combine the risk dimensions,
since they are independent. But for the case of combining trust and risk, we have
used fuzzy aggregation functions, since linear functions are not able to model the
interaction between these two criteria.
Thus, for designing the fuzzy aggregation mechanism, we rstly studied the two main
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existing alternatives: Mamdani-type fuzzy systems and Sugeno-type fuzzy systems.
The most fundamental dierence between Mamdani-type FIS and Sugeno-type FIS
is the way the crisp output is generated from the fuzzy inputs. While Mamdani-
type FIS uses the technique of defuzzication of a fuzzy output, Sugeno-type FIS
uses weighted average to compute the crisp output. This means that Mamdani FIS
has output membership functions whereas Sugeno FIS has no output membership
functions. These features make Mandani a more interpretable and intuitive option,
reason for what this type is the most commonly implemented. On the negative part,
the computational performance is better in Sugeno. We decided to use Mandani
because of its simplicity and the possibility of dening an output with dierent
membership functions that can be mapped to dierent degrees of cooperation. And
the computational cost remains low in this case because the number of rules is small.
10. Validation
Finally, we validated the main contributions in Chapter 8.
Section 8.2 in the validation chapter (Chapter 8), renes the risk model and com-
pletes its denition through a series of formal analytical tests. Validation is con-
ducted with the aim to demonstrate that the risk model works in conformance to
the associated principle guidelines, that the output is correct. More specically, we
test how the model is capable of handling the set of quantitative metrics dened and
use them as an input to generate the associated risk value. We show that the nal
risk value:
is relative to the perception, assets and needs of the provider that is making
the evaluation,
provides information on the assurance level coverage, and
can be used in decision making. The nal value allows to discard those entities
that do not satisfy minimum requirements; and also to make a comparative
ranking of entities when there are several options available
Based on the performed tests, recommendations are given on how to imple-
ment aggregation. Finally, a detailed catalogue summarizing the set of dened
metrics is contained in Appendix B.
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Furthermore, the reputation-based trust model was validated through a simulation-
based testing of the protocol. We showed the increasing cooperation rates when
incorporating reputation data with respect to the pre-congured model, and how
the reputation information allows to identify and isolate bad entities. Further work
could be done specically in regard to this part of the thesis, as it will be pointed
out in section 9.3.
In turn, the architecture was validated through the implementation of a prototype
and its deployment in the context of a national R&D project. Also, dierent modules
of the architecture were reused as part of other works published in [Arias et al.,
2012c] [Arias et al., 2011a] [Almenarez et al., 2011], that illustrate use-cases based
on dynamic federation.
9.1.2. Other Contributions
Apart form the technical contributions described above, another kind of activities were also
carried out in the context of this dissertation that convey an added value to its realization.
More specically:
1. Dissemination.
The dissemination tasks consisted on the publication of papers and contribution to
conferences and journals where the main ideas of the thesis were subject to peer
review, evaluation and discussion. The main publications are detailed in Chapter 1,
section 1.3.
Furthermore, part of the contents in this thesis were developed as a research line
in two national R&D projects: \Espa~na Virtual"1 and CONSEQUENCE2. Both
projects included an specic working package for \Security and Identity Manage-
ment", where our ideas on dynamic federation were contributed. In addition, during
a research stay at NEC Laboratories Europe, the work on the integration of rep-
utation in FIM and the simulations presented in Chapter 8 were included in the
deliverables of an internal business project centered in IdM.
2. Identication of new research lines.
1http://www.espanavirtual.org/
2http://consequence.it.uc3m.es
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In section 9.3, considering the limitations and the points of improvement of our ideas,
we identify a set of open issues for future research works.
9.2. Conclusions
After all the work carried out during the development of the thesis, we can conclude that:
FIM technologies are a solution to the problem of identity portability and sharing
of identity data across dierent domains. However, the underlying trust models
existing nowadays limit their applicability.
There are currently two main options to interact in a FIM context: to only interact
with know entities that are pre-congured to be trusted (by means of complex con-
tractual frameworks); or to interact with every entity independently of it is known
or unknown. In the rst case, the initial setup complexity is a high barrier and may
not worth adopting these procedures for a short-term collaboration because time and
cost will probably not outbalance the rewards of cooperation. In the second case,
security problems may arise.
The architecture proposed in this thesis solves the above problems and enables the
establishment of dynamic secure federations by including more exible trust manage-
ment and risk assessment. The new trust mechanisms allow to dynamically acquire
data (i.e., reputation) about previously unknown parties and compute a trust value.
The new risk mechanisms allow to analyze the features of other entities and de-
termine a quantitative number representing the risk involved in transacting. Both
values are combined to output a decision. They are also updated and computed on
a per-transaction basis, adapting the decisions to the real behavior of the entities
and to the value of the transaction in course.
The proposed trust model provides a quantitative formalization that captures current
FIM trust features and introduces exibility. The main features of the model are:
 Trust is based on two kind of evidences: authentication trust and behavior
trust. Authentication trust is based on digital certicates, and behavior trust
is based on the history of interactions and/or on reputation data. The inclusion
of reputation data implies also the denition of a protocol for the exchange of
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reputation in FIM scenarios. The dierence with the closest related works that
include reputation is that they use centralized storage of data, while our model
is completely distributed. However, our approach is not competing but inte-
grative, i.e., dierent algorithms for the calculation and update of the behavior
trust can be used.
 The protocol for reputation acquisition is outlined as an initial simple model
based in the existing reputation protocols designed for P2P systems, but den-
ing the specic features to be applicable in FIM, i.e., the data that should
be included and also how it can be implemented over a concrete specication
(SAML).
The inclusion of risk assessment into the decision-making process is the main novelty
in our proposal, which constitutes the rst contribution of this kind in the context
of FIM. Though the concept of including risk is suggested in the literature, there are
no works that explicitly dene a model to compute it.
The risk assessment model derives from a taxonomy that we have designed to under-
stand the federation procedure and to categorize the dierent aspects of risk. Based
on the taxonomy, we dened a set of metrics including the semantic description, the
procedure to obtain them, and the associated qualitative scales. Next, we provided
a quantitative mapping of the metrics and we put forward a collection of mathemat-
ical formulas that permit the aggregation of the metrics into a nal risk value. This
value has proven useful to provide rapid information about whether the potential
cooperating entity satises the risk policies of the evaluating entity and to which
degree, constituting a perfect element for decision-making. However, as we will see
in section 9.3, the validation of the model can be extended.
The implementation and deployment of a full prototype that follows the architecture
for dynamic federation is a challenge. Firstly, there is a need for common formats
and standards to convey all the information used in the trust and risk computation
(see section 9.3). But also, a real deployment raises many issues. For example, for
the reputation system to be realizable it is required that the protocol is implemented
by a high number of providers (or by providers with high connectivity), otherwise the
benets would be low, since it would be hard to nd reputation data about potential
cooperators. Further validation is required, as we identify in the next section, in
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order for the solution to be fully realizable.
The achievement of dynamic federation will enable the adoption of FIM at a wide
scale and make possible a new range of use-cases. A good example is the applicabil-
ity to the paradigm of Instant Virtual Enterprises or IVEs, where a set of partners
must quickly congure themselves to exploit a a concrete business opportunity. In
this context, a rapid mean to federate the identity management systems of the co-
operating partners is required, and current FIM technology does not satisfy these
high demands of agility.
Summarizing, we have developed an initial approach towards the realization of dynamic
federation that is based on improving the process of trust relationship establishment. As
the Internet Society (ISOC) remarks, \the issue of trust is both important and crucial for
the long-term growth and success of the Internet. There is no debate about the explosive
innovation that has occurred as a result of building the Internet and, if the promise of
federated identity can be realized, a similar explosion in innovation will occur." We believe
indeed that dynamic federation will enable a wide new range of possible business and
models of cooperation. However, our proposal is a set of preliminary ideas, partially
validated and, some of them, prototyped. As a preliminary work, many limitations and
weaknesses exist that open the room for further research and improvement. With the
aim to identify these lacks and open issues, the following section presents the main future
research lines that can be derived from here.
9.3. Future Research Lines
In this thesis we have contributed to evolve federated identity management towards more
exible, dynamic and secure models. However, there are still open issues and future lines
that require further research to make dynamic federation a reality. We recognize several
areas where the architecture and components presented here can be improved or extended,
all of them explained below:
1. Extension of FIM metadata documents to convey more information.
The risk model proposed in this thesis is based on a set of dened metrics belonging
to the following categories: security, interoperability, knowledge, service specic and
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historical interactions. The procedures to extract the metrics values consist on an-
alyzing the information available for their category, assign them a qualitative scale
and then map it to a quantitative value. For example, for the security metric \con-
dentiality at message level" it is required to obtain the algorithms/protocols used for
information encryption in order to determine the associated assurance level according
to specic features, such as strength, key size, etc. Hence, the information required
for extracting the metrics must be expressed and exchanged between entities. How-
ever, there are no standard formats and conventions to convey all the required data
(we developed our risk model assuming that this information was available).
Currently, there is support in SAML for communicating the supported crypto-
graphic algorithms through metadata extensions that are being dened in an OASIS
draft [Cantor, 2010]. And there is also support for communicating levels of authenti-
cation assurance in SAML. But there are no means to transmit other kind of security
data. For the rest of categories, it is also required to express information such as
the laws under which the provider operates, details of operational policies, service
parameters, etc.
Thus, an interesting future line would be to dene the extensions to the metadata
documents that allow to express the information required to derive all the risk met-
rics. In this regard, and following our integrative philosophy, the work that is being
carried out by the OIX organization (see Chapter 2) could be linked and used in the
extension of metadata information.
2. Denition of detailed frameworks for the risk metrics.
Apart from the extension of the metadata documents to include all the information
required for calculating the risk metrics, another closely related line for further re-
search could be the denition of more detailed frameworks (or new ones) for some
of the risk metrics.
In this thesis we dened a set of risk metrics together with the procedure to obtain
them. For a number of metrics (e.g., for those related with cryptography) there
is extensive expert knowledge available in the literature. In those cases, we used
this knowledge as a basis for dening detailed frameworks to assign the qualitative
scales. However, in other cases, this knowledge base does not exist, so we dened
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simpler frameworks that are just a starting point and do not cover all the nuances
and complexities. Hence, it is required to complete the process of investigating all
the aspects that may contribute to the assignation of a metric to a specic category
and generate this expert knowledge to complete the denition of better frameworks.
3. Denition of a SLA standard format and SLA negotiation for federated
identity management.
A SLA is put in place for the establishment of federations whether explicitly or im-
plicitly. Here we assume that entities have public SLAs where information about the
service provision features can be found and used for risk and trust calculation. In this
regard, a future research line could be the denition of standards formats for SLAs
in the context of FIM. It is required to dene all the parameters involved in services
provided by IdPs/SPs for an easier automation and usage in the establishment of
dynamic federations.
Furthermore, we contemplate the possibility of setting dierent SLAs depending
on the initial risk/trust that is placed on an entity and change them (giving or
denying more privileges) according to how the relationship evolves over time. For
this purpose, a SLA negotiation approach can be introduced and investigated as
a future line. In this regard, the European research project SLA@SOI [SLAatSOI
Project, 2011] focused on the process of negotiating SLAs and provisioning, delivery
and monitoring of services for highly dynamic and scalable service consumption. The
methods researched in this project could thus be integrated with the work presented
here.
4. Further study and analysis of the reputation protocol.
Developing an implementable reputation system is an art involving many separate
design problems and choices. We have dened the main features for the reputation
protocol to be applicable in FIM: the data that should be included and also how it
can be implemented over a concrete specication (SAML). We started a simulation
testbed to prove the benets of the protocol, showing that the cooperation rates
improve and that the bad entities are isolated. But further work is still required.
Among others, the following aspects could be addressed:
Study and comparison of dierent forwarding strategies. The initially proposed
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protocol consists on forwarding reputation requests to every trusted node in the
DTL. More intelligent strategies could be designed (e.g., identifying those nodes
with more connections and forward only to them) to improve the performance
of the protocol.
Security analysis and enhancement. According to the initially proposed proto-
col, if the reputation queries are forwarded beyond direct neighbors, the query-
ing entity may receive reputation response messages form unknown entities. It
could lead to attacks such as the injection false response messages. This, and
other possible attacks should be simulated and investigated in order to improve
the protocol to take into account high security considerations.
5. Additional validation and evaluation.
Apart from the further study suggested above in regard to the reputation protocol
and its complete validation, both the risk model and the general architecture need
also to be subject of an extended validation.
The risk model has been validated by testing if it conforms to the design objectives.
To validate results in the context of risk assessment, apart from testing that the
model is correct according to the design requirements, researchers have proposed
other three main approaches: 1)using experts, 2) using alternate decision processes,
and 3) using statistical evidence.
In our case, since there are no other risk-based decision tools in FIM, neither threats
statistical data are available, the validation using experts would be the next step in
validation.
The process would consist on running our model in IdPs/SPs deployed in the real
world and comparing the decision output with the decision of the administrator.
6. Study and denition of business models based on dynamic federation.
A big issue in the adoption of federation, as for every other technology, is business.
Recent studies point out that one of the main reasons that the wide adoption of fed-
eration is not happening is because service providers do not have sucient incentives
to become relying parties. There is a need to dene models for monetizing identity
services, investigate business needs and dene models where the benets for all the
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involved parties are balanced.
7. Integration of the dynamic federation in dierent specications.
The main goal in this thesis was to dene an infrastructure generic enough to be
applicable to any federation specication. Hence, we studied the main documents
of the dierent FIM protocols as a basis for the denition. However, whenever
particularization was required to go deeper on the description of the model, we
based on the SAML specications. Also, the developed prototype was implemented
over SAML. Further work is required to integrate and implement the proposal in the
rest of the specications.
Appendices
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AppendixA
Glossary
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
A
ACI Assurance Compliance Index
AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process
API Application Programming Interface
ARP Attribute Release Policy
ADL Architecture Description Language
B
BAL Business Anchor List
B2B Business to Business
C
CA Certication Authority
CENIT Consorcio Estrategico Nacional de
Investigacion Tecnica
CoT Circle of Trust
D
DTL Dynamic Trust List
E
ECP Enhanced Client Proxy
ETSI European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute
F
FIM Federated Identity Management
FIS Fuzzy Inference System
H
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
I
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
IdP Identity Provider
IMS Internet Multimedia Subsystem
ISO International Organization for Stan-
dardization
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ITU-T ITU Telecommunication Standard-
ization Sector
IVE Instant Virtual Enterprise
J
JCR Journal Citation Report
L
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Proto-
col
LoA Level of Authentication assurance
M
MAUT Multi-Attribute Utility Theory
MCDM Multi-Criteria Decision Making
MDS Multi Dimensional Scaling
N
NGN Next Generation Networks
O
OASIS Organization for the Advancement
of Structured Information Stan-
dards
OIX Open Identity Exchange
OHSAS Occupational Health and Safety
Assessment Series
P
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
P2P Peer To Peer
R
REFEDS Research and Education Federa-
tions
RFC Request For Comments
RP Relying Party
S
SAML Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage
SDO Standards Developing Organization
SLA Service Level Agreement
SLA Single Log Out
SOAP Simple Object Access Protocol,
SP Service Provider
SSL Secure Sockets Layer
SSO Single Sign On
SSTC Security Services Technical Commit-
tee
STS Security Token Service
T
TAL Trust Anchor List
TERENA Trans-European Research and
Education Networking Association
TTL Time To Live
U
UML Unied Modeling Language
V
VE Virtual Enterprise
VO Virtual Organization
X
XML eXtensible Markup Language
AppendixB
FIM Risk Metrics Catalogue
In this Appendix, we summarize the set of metrics for risk quantication in FIM proposed
in this thesis based on the taxonomy in 5.1. To simplify the presentation of the metrics,
they are classied and grouped according to dierent features, namely:
General Category, indicates if the metric is under the Pre-Federation or the Post-
Federation category.
Level, indicates the taxonomic level in which the metric is located.
Type, indicates if the metric is Basic or Aggregated.
Formula, indicates the mathematical expression for calculating the metric value.
Only for Aggregated metrics.
Assurance Framework, species features about the assurance framework used
to dene the metric. It can be whether a well-known framework or a self-dened
framework. In the rst case, if alternative assurance frameworks are available, they
are also indicated. In the latter case, it is also specied if the framework is based on
expert recommendations or dened in a higher abstract level.
Assurance Scale, indicates the qualitative scale used by the assurance framework,
as well as the quantitative mapping used fro aggregation.
The catalogue encompasses 15 Basic and 7 Aggregated metrics in the Pre-Federation cat-
egory; and 12 Basic metrics and 5 Aggregated in the Aggregated category. All the metrics
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are summarized below.
B.1. Pre-Federation Metrics
Table B.1 shows the set of basic metrics in Pre-Federation.
Level Metric Denition Scale Framework
L4
CONFTL
Condentiality assurance at the trans-
port level
3-level scale
fLow,Medium,Highg
with associated
quantitative values f1,
2, 3g
Self-dened based
primarily on NIST
recommendations and
SSL/TLS
specications
CONFML
Condentiality assurance at the mes-
sage level
INTTL Integrity assurance at transport level
INTML Integrity assurance at message level
AUTHTL
Authentication assurance at transport
level
AUTHML
Authentication assurance at message
level
L3
NON-REP Non-repudiation assurance
Self-dened, high
abstract level
AV Availability assurance
ACC Accountability assurance
LOP Level of Protection, privacy assurance
INTEROPTT Technical interoperability assurance
INTEROPO Operational interoperability assurance
INTEROPL Legal interoperability assurance
KNOWD Direct knowledge assurance 2-level scale fFalse,
Trueg with associated
quantitative values
f0,1g
KNOWI Indirect knowledge assurance
Table B.1: Basic Pre-Federation Metrics
In turn, Table B.2 shows the set of aggregated metrics in the Pre-federation category. The
formulas to compute the aggregated metrics are the same for all the metrics (based on
the MAUT technique [Keeney and Raia, 1993]). The dierence lies on the score vectors
(SV) and the reference vectors (RV) employed in each case. Thus, the score vectors for
each metric are shown in Table B.3. The RVs, however, will depend on the risk policies
dened by the entity applying the risk model.
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Level Metric Denition Formula
L3
CCONF Constrained Condentiality Assurance
CAgg =

Agg if ACI = 1
0 if ACI 6= 1
, where
ACI =
8<:1 if SV  RV (i) 8 ij [ SV j
n
otherwise
CINT Constrained Integrity Assurance
CAUTH Constrained Authentication Assurance
L2
CSA Constrained Security Assurance
CIA Constrained Interoperability Assurance
CKNOW Constrained Knowledge Assurance
L1 PreFedA PreFederation Assurance
Table B.2: Aggregated Pre-Federation Metrics
Metric Score Vector
CCONF [jj CONFTL jj, jj CONFML jj]
CINT [jj INTTL jj, jj INTML jj]
CAUTH [jj AUTHTL jj, jj AUTHML jj]
CSA [ CCONF, CINT, CAUTH, jj NON-REP jj, jj AV jj,jj ACC jj, jjLOP jj]
CIA [jj INTEROPT jj,jj INTEROPOjj,jj INTEROPLjj]
CKNOW [jj KNOWDjj,jj KNOWI jj]
PreFedA [CSA, CIA, CKNOW]
Table B.3: Score Vectors for Aggregated Pre-Federation Metrics
B.2. Post-Federation Metrics
Table B.4 shows the set of basic metrics in Post-Federation.
Level Metric Denition Scale Framework
L4
CONFTL
Condentiality assurance at the trans-
port level
3-level scale
fLow,Medium,Highg
with associated
quantitative values f1,
2, 3g
Self-dened based
primarily on NIST
recommendations and
SSL/TLS
specications
CONFML
Condentiality assurance at the mes-
sage level
INTTL Integrity assurance at transport level
INTML Integrity assurance at message level
AUTHTL
Authentication assurance at transport
level
AUTHML
Authentication assurance at message
level
L3
NON-
REP
Non-repudiation assurance
Self-dened, high
abstract level
AV Availability assurance
ACC Accountability assurance
LOP Level of Protection, privacy assurance
LOA Level of Authentication assurance
4-level scale fLittle,
Some, High, Very
Highg with associated
quantitative values
f1,2,3,4g
NIST 800-63 [Nadalin
et al., 2006]. Other
alternative avail-
abel frameworks are
ATSC21, ATSC32,
STORK3
HINT Historical interactions assurance
3-level scale
fLow,Medium,Highg
with associated quan-
titative values f1, 2,
3g
Self-dened
Table B.4: Basic Post-Federation Metrics
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In turn, Table B.5 shows the set of aggregated metrics in the Post-Federation category.
The formulas to compute the aggregated metrics are the same for all the metrics (based on
the MAUT technique [Keeney and Raia, 1993]). The dierence lies on the score vectors
(SV) and the reference vectors (RV) employed in each case. Thus, the score vectors for
each metric are shown in Table B.6.
Level Metric Denition Formula
L3
CCONF Constrained Condentiality Assurance
CAgg =

Agg if ACI = 1
0 if ACI 6= 1
, where
ACI =
8<:1 if SV  RV (i) 8 ij [ SV j
n
otherwise
CINT Constrained Integrity Assurance
CAUTH Constrained Authentication Assurance
L2 CSA Constrained Security Assurance
L1 PostFedA PostFederation Assurance
Table B.5: Aggregated Post-Federation Metrics
Metric Score Vector
CCONF [jj CONFTL jj, jj CONFML jj]
CINT [jj INTTL jj, jj INTML jj]
CAUTH [jj AUTHTL jj, jj AUTHML jj]
CSA [ CCONF, CINT, CAUTH, jj NON-REP jj, jj AV jj,jj ACC jj, jjLOP jj]
PostFedA [CSA, jj LOA jj, jj HINT jj]
Table B.6: Score Vectors for Aggregated Post-Federation Metrics
1www.ref.gv.at/AG-IZ-Sicherheitsklassen-Sec.1719.0.html
2www.ref.gv.at/Sicherheitsklassen.2329.0.html
3www.eid-stork.eu
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